The Role of Emotion in Leader Trust Processes

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St. Gallen, 20 March 2009

The President

Ernst Mohr, Ph.D.
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Abstract

Recent studies examining the link between affect and trust have attempted to explain how emotions influence a truster’s reactions and how they might be utilized to optimize trust relationships. Most of this research focuses on the interpersonal perspective and the social norms that shape a dyadic trust exchange between truster and trustee. Though trust is viewed as a psychological state, surprisingly little is as yet known about the critical intrapersonal aspects of trust that precede the interpersonal dyadic exchange, i.e., how context and emotion influence the truster’s subjective experience of the trust relationship.

The purpose of this dissertation is therefore to suggest that trust should also be studied from this internal angle as a continually changing experience rather than as a quantifiable outcome. I begin by discussing how past research has considered the role of emotion in the emergence of trust. Then I use cognitive appraisal theory (Lazarus, 1991a) to propose that intrapersonal trust is an appraisal-based exchange between the truster and the environment and is motivated by personal well-being, and therefore situated by emotion. To shed light into the person-environment exchange behind intrapersonal trust, I build an exploratory framework that begins with an appraisal platform and moves through each step of the appraisal process. The appraisal platform consists of an environmental variable specific to the trust context and a personal variable that can be specified to reflect the truster’s priorities in the trust environment; both are qualitative. I refer to this framework as the intrapersonal trust framework. Using this basic framework, I discuss how each basic emotion – fear, anger, sorrow, disgust, happiness, love, and surprise – gives intrapersonal trust a unique experiential quality, behavioral response, and interpretation. Finally, to round out the reader’s sense of the possibilities associated with the intrapersonal trust framework, I use it to discuss the internal experience of leaders as trusters. I conclude with a discussion of limitations and potential future development of this research.
Zusammenfassung der Dissertation


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Chapter 1: Introduction: A Study of Intrapersonal Trust

This dissertation is an inquiry into the other “dark side” of trust (cf. McAllister, 1997), i.e., the internal side, as experienced by leaders. The purpose of this chapter is to present the problem statement, for which I offer a potential solution. Toward that end, I problematize the experience of leaders as trusters and describe the purpose of this dissertation as well as the research questions driving this study. The relevance and significance of the problem for the fields of leadership, trust, and organizational studies is discussed. I then introduce the concept of intrapersonal trust.

I conclude with a basic outline of the structure of this dissertation.

Looking within: Leaders and trust

Findings from leadership and management research hint at an entire landscape of organizational phenomena relating to trust that are motivated solely by the intrapersonal experience of organizational members. Trust and leadership are critical issues at the heart of these phenomena because they revolve around how leaders and subordinates relate to one another. Considerable research on free-riding and social loafing (e.g., Karaus & Williams, 1995), for example, has suggested that, collectively, managers do not trust subordinates and take preemptive measures to waylay employee indolence through heightened accountability and monitoring. In a similar vein, transaction cost theory argues that subordinates’ inherently opportunistic nature must be monitored and prevented (Williamson, 1993). Several internal experiences indicate why managers find delegating tasks to subordinates so challenging: Fear of subordinate negligence through incompetence or nonchalance, the desire to stay involved in something in which one has invested a great deal of effort and emotional energy, fear that a project will develop differently than one originally intended or envisioned, and many others. Conflict avoidance, inaccessibility, and tyrannical behavior are all signs that leaders do not trust subordinates to solve collective problems constructively. Conversely, the ability to make rapid leadership decisions that feel right and that are effective revolves around being able to give subordinates trust without the resources to make a perfectly informed decision.

Such findings have revealed an affective flipside, i.e., that leaders’ actions ensue as a result of the emotions they anticipate experiencing. The ample literature on downsizing, for example, has revealed that leaders often execute layoffs as quickly and dismissively as possible, without much consideration of the emotional impact to their former subordinates (e.g., O’Neill & Lenn, 1995). Preemptive precautions against potential subordinate retaliation reflect a leader’s expectations of employee opportunism and also how she subsequently gives trust. Such preventative measures are also reflective of the negative
affect such a leader expects to experience as a result of giving trust and of the attempt to keep unpleasant experiences at a distance.

Affect thus does appear to have some influence on how leaders give trust. Certain situations can make a leader feel emotionally exposed by his company’s expectations for him as a leader combined with his former subordinates’ potential emotional reactions and subsequent behavior.

When such factors do not harmonize, trust and leadership can feel like a very uneasy marriage from the leader’s internal standpoint. A frequent argument in the trust literature is that this intrapersonal dissonance is caused by the risks involved in exposing personal vulnerability to one’s subordinates (e.g., Lane, 1999), the common assumption being that fear is the base affective element for such vulnerability. However, vulnerability goes hand in hand with the fundamental desire to satisfy all the emotional objectives that are at the heart of the truster’s well-being, not just the desire to remove a threat that is associated with fear. Mere communication does not always ensure that trust will emerge between organizational members (Newell & Swan, 2000); people need a sense of personal attachment or investment in a situation, i.e., an affective experience that will tell them how to ensure their personal well-being regarding a trust decision. When vulnerability and a truster’s remaining internal experience can be driven predominantly by any one of the basic emotions in a trust situation, trust is not necessarily motivated first and foremost by utility. I therefore believe that the internal dissonance a leader experiences as truster is in fact indicative of a more fundamental connection between trust and leadership that is forged through emotion. The role of vulnerability in shaping the truster’s internal experience thus deserves to be considered from a standpoint that is emotional before it is utilitarian rather than vice-versa.

Leadership tasks that have trust at their core, such as the ability to delegate effectively, are considered the hallmark of a good leader. However, as Hirschhorn (1998) notes, “management theorists underestimate the complexity of the emotional work required to delegate authority to a subordinate” (178). So deciding to give trust or not can indeed be a challenging experience for leaders when factors in the trust environment contradict what a leader’s emotions are telling her she should, or wants to, do. However, making a particular trust decision can feel good, even empowering or liberating, when a leader’s emotions appear to confirm what she sees as the facts in her trust relationship.

A truster clearly does experience trust, or mistrust, as a result of what she is thinking and feeling (cf. McAllister, 1995). The internal experience of trust can be fraught with ambivalence when a leader is not able to reconcile her feelings with her thoughts. The trust decision, any trust decision, requires a leader to synthesize knowledge with the emotions that drive his motivations, perceptions, and experience of a particular situation. Using affective information toward this end can be particularly challenging because emotions always harbor deeper, more personal desires that may or may not harmonize with the shared goal for which a leader is responsible and for which he must give trust to his subordinates. However,
affective information also augments and stabilizes personal convictions that would otherwise seem much more difficult or risky.

Given that many important decisions are made in highly affective environments (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005, 736), I suggest in contrast to many previous studies of trust that emotion influences leaders’ trust decisions, rather than vice-versa, as has more commonly been suggested. Accordingly, I also propose that such emotion is directly related, rather than incidental, to the situation provoking the trust decision. Toward that end, this thesis examines specifically the internal experience leaders go through when making decisions about whether or not to trust a subordinate. As will be argued in more depth below, past research has explored how cognition informs emotion, the assumption being that the cognitive aspects of trust can be easily distinguished from affective elements of trust. However, emotion and cognition are closely connected and difficult to separate as parallel processes in research precisely because one informs the other (Lazarus, 1991b, 1991c). In this thesis, I therefore explore the ways in which emotion informs trust-related appraisals in the dyadic exchange in which the leader is the truster and the subordinate the trustee.

For example, expecting positive outcomes as a result of a particular decision can also generate positive affect during the decision-making process. The common emotional backdrop assumed in the trust research when a truster makes herself vulnerable to the trustee (Lane, 1999) is fear, with which the truster tries to cope by hoping that all will be well. In practice, leaders nevertheless make trust decisions in anticipation of how good the decision will make them feel; even if the trust decision does not translate immediately into payoff, the positive outcomes for others have an emotional impact on the leader putting such outcomes into motion. Leaders thus give subordinates trust, e.g., by delegating resources, strategy development, and process management. Goals with positive emotional roots such as the culmination of a personally inspiring vision for an organization also have the potential to guide a leader’s experience of trust because such goals put in primary focus a desired outcome. Thus a leader’s appraisal of trust events around the achievement of such a goal is guided by a sense of doing something good by enabling others, of expecting to feel good about having done something good, and finally of feeling good because of that expectation. In sum, leaders probably do give subordinates trust precisely because of expected positive outcomes and affect.

This dissertation was thus inspired by the question of whether or not a leader’s decision, e.g., to give a project to a particular subordinate or to delegate resources a particular way, entails an act of trust even when a leader is focused on positive affect rather than vulnerability. If vulnerability is a critical element of trust, how vulnerable does a leader need to feel toward a subordinate for her decision to comprise an act of trust?

My belief is that from an emotional stance, an individual’s internal experience of trust is primarily guided by the expectation that a potential trustee will respond appropriately to her trust decision, “appropriately” here meaning whatever the truster feels would constitute a
correct response by the trustee. In this light, trust enables a leader to feel right about engaging a subordinate for the fulfillment of shared goals and to look forward to the good feelings this present sense of rightness will allow her to feel later. In terms of trust as an internal process, then, I propose that leaders project their goals or desires on subordinates and so harbor particular expectations for what an appropriate trust response entails. In essence, a leader as truster reacts not to a subordinate’s actual response but rather to that subordinate’s anticipated response (cf. Hirschhorn, 1998; De Vries, 2005).

Research on well-being has revealed that feelings of vulnerability emerge around any type of basic emotional goal, which in turn suggests that vulnerability can become manifest in different ways, depending on an individual’s emotional goal relating to any emotional event. Assuming that the decision to give trust is associated with emotional goals, a logical extension of these two ideas is that different basic emotions might give the internal experience of trust a different experiential quality. Thus desires relating directly to trust, even spontaneous desires rather than deeply ingrained desires from childhood, do not need to be driven solely, or even primarily, by the heightened sense of personal risk or threat that is associated with fear. Vulnerability motivated predominantly by love results in a much different emotional experience than vulnerability motivated primarily by fear or anger.

In line with the notion that emotional goals color an individual’s experience of vulnerability, emotion theorists have proposed that the underlying goal of each emotion moves an individual to unique action. The goal behind anger, for example, is to right a wrong, which energizes an individual to try to rectify, and to believe in his ability to rectify, a situation that has, but should not have, gone wrong. Given that each emotion has its own goal and therefore its own adaptive function influencing a leader’s behavior, it seems reasonable to believe that each emotion would give a leader’s experience of trust a different experiential quality that could also potentially result in different trust behavior by a leader.

Despite the truly vast amount of research that has been conducted on trust in organizations, surprisingly little is known about how leaders give trust or how emotions influence trusters’ experience of and emotions around trust. Indeed, most trust research has scrutinized trustee behavior in the assumption that rational considerations would dominate a truster’s experience and render predictable a particular response by the truster to trustee behavior. Most of the data collected on trust dyads thus does not observe their behavior directly except in experimental settings constructed against the supposition that, given a choice, trusters will prefer the rational one.

The intersection between emotion, leadership, and decision-making reveals a similar tendency to observe followers rather than leaders. Although leadership is increasingly being seen as the art of emotion management, research has nevertheless emphasized how leaders manage subordinates’ emotions rather than their own (but for an important exception, see Salovey & Mayer, 1990). Rather, most research underscores the importance of projecting emotions that will inspire subordinates (e.g., Dasborough, 2006) rather than illuminating the
reasons leaders find managing their own emotions particularly challenging. This focus has tended to generate management recommendations for changing followers’ behavior and affective regulatory skills rather than a leader’s own (Quinn, Spreitzer, & Brown, 2000).

In short, not much is known about a leader’s subjective experience preceding and leading up to trust that has a direct impact on every trust decision that he makes. Little is known about the internal experience that makes giving trust feel risky in one instance to a leader and in another instance like a risk-free decision. Accordingly, I hope to contribute to what is known about how leaders give trust by exploring the following focal research question:

• What is the impact of emotion on a leader’s experience of intrapersonal trust and the trust decision?

Other research questions include:

• How does each basic emotion influence a leader’s experience of intrapersonal trust?
• How does emotion help or hinder a leader’s ability to give subordinates trust?

Having outlined the primary thoughts and potential contributions with regard to leadership that inspired this dissertation, I now turn to issues relating to the study of trust as an intrapersonal, rather than an interpersonal, phenomenon.

The fundamental trust divide: The environment and the individual

Research on trust in organizations, and ergo research on the relationship between trust and leadership, has over time been conducted to account for primarily the object of trust (e.g., Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995) or for the environment that shapes the truster’s perceptions (e.g., McAllister, 1995). My belief is that a fundamental divide between the environment and the individual therefore frames most models of trust. This divide forces researchers to focus on either one or the other, but not the interaction between both. This either/or focus has given particular emphasis to the cognitive and interpersonal elements of trust, as will be argued below. A perusal of the growing literature on trust reveals that both should nonetheless be taken into account because trust hinges on contingencies created by the interaction between person and environment. My argument in this section, then, is that the future of trust research needs to focus on this interaction, the role of emotion, and the intrapersonal aspects of trust – and this dissertation is an attempt to build a theory that will make these elements visible and consider how they impact organizational phenomena, specifically leadership.

That contingency is a central element of trust is apparent in the omnipresence of two different kinds of variable throughout the trust literature: Contextual variables and referents. Contextual variables refer to the environment that shapes the truster’s perceptions. Referent variables entail the object of trust and thereby emphasize the individual in a trust relationship.
Contextual variables influence the truster’s perspective and thus revolve around either the trust environment itself or the elements in that environment. Contextual variables are a legacy from Deutsch’s (1958) observation that the truster’s expectations are a function of his evaluation of the environment. Such variables explore the different environmental influences that generate the willingness to give trust and/or perceptions of trustworthiness (e.g., Cummings & Bromiley, 1996; Kramer, 1999; Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Lewis & Weigert, 1985b; McAllister, 1995; Mishra, 1996; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998; Sheppard & Tuchinsky, 1996). In this exploration, cognition and affect have been set forth as intuitive opposites (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002; Lewis & Weigert, 1985) under various names, e.g., instrumental and relational trust (Tyler & DeGoey, 1996); calculus- and knowledge-based trust (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996); conditional and unconditional trust (Jones & George, 1998); and of course cognitive- and affect-based trust (McAllister, 1995). If theory development has accounted for both, the emphasis in this type of trust research has nonetheless been on cognition (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002) and therefore on the logical reasons that people are believed to give trust.

Other trust research makes use of referent variables to focus on the truster’s perception of the object of trust. Referent variables generally comprise the person, concepts, or institutions in which trust is placed or with which trust is associated, i.e., the trust target (Clark & Payne, 1997) and most usually the trustee. The assumption is that in complex environments, trusters are selective about who or what they trust, i.e., do not unilaterally and unquestioningly trust as a matter of personality (McCauley & Kuhnert, 1992). Individuals give trust depending on who the trustee is (Bhattacharya, Devinney, & Pillutla, 1998). Since referent characteristics, such as personality trait, are thus essentially non-transferable, great effort has been invested into making determinations about the many different potential objects of an individual’s trust and the qualities about these objects that make them seem worth trusting (e.g., Fox, 1974; Hosmer, 1995; Whitener, 1997; Mayer & Davis, 1999).

Despite this large body of research, many questions about trust remain unanswered. First, despite the overarching discovery that trust is dependent upon neither just the environment nor just the truster as an individual, most research does not integrate both types of variable (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002) in a way that would enable a full exploration of the trust-inducing contingencies generated by the interaction between a truster and the environment. This broad-level emphasis on models of trust has created a research legacy that focuses on observable variables outside the truster, creating a natural bias to view trust as an interpersonal phenomenon. Doubtless trust is relational and social (Welch, Rivera, Conway, Yonkoski, Lupton, & Giancola, 2005); but before it can become visible thusly, the truster must develop, and enact, feelings of trust.

Given the increasing agreement about what trust actually is, i.e., a psychological state comprising the willingness to accept vulnerability because of positive expectations about the trustee’s response (Rousseau et al., 1998), surprisingly little is known about how trust feels
on the inside as an intrapersonal experience from the truster’s point of view (cf. Möllering, 2006). Beyond the assumption of certain environmental givens that produce, or are associated with, trust, not much is known about how the truster’s internal affective and cognitive experiences help generate feelings of trust. The search for observable variables to explain the truster’s reasoning has generated a plethora of structural trust models with constructs detailing the attributions a truster could reasonably be expected to make about a trustee, e.g., benevolence, integrity, authenticity. However, each additional construct brings the potential for increased error and distraction away from the actual trust phenomenon (Dyer & Wilkins, 1991) and toward certain aspects of trust that are more easily measurable.

Certainly, trust research has emphasized the influence of cognition rather than affect (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002). This emphasis has elevated to a theoretical tenet the assumption that emotion arises from cognition in trust relationships. As McAllister (1997) observes, a truster’s reasonable, and reasoned, expectations must be met before she will be willing to make a deeper, emotional investment in the relationship (92). This idea is nevertheless at odds with findings from emotion research that underscore the rapid influence of emotion’s spontaneity on decision-making and the fact that emotional decisions often do not seem reasonable to individuals observing them (Lazarus, 1991; Power & Dalgleish, 2008).

Thus emotions may not, as often assumed in trust research, necessarily arise a) logically from cognition and b) only over time within the stabilizing context of a relationship. Certain real-life occurrences are still not easily explained by current trust theory, e.g., spontaneous acts of trust without any particular impetus such as an urgent collective task or positive feelings from giving trust that are not associated with altruistic behavior. Moreover, effective leaders need an equitable balance between analytical reasoning and spontaneity (Litzinger & Schaefer, 1986), and emotions enhance decision-making (Seo & Feldman-Barrett, 2007), particularly rapid decision-making (Damasio, 1994). Since emotions do influence trust decisions (Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007) and since they would not necessarily seem logical to an on-looking bystander, my belief is that trust needs to be studied as an intrapersonal phenomenon that is, at least in part, guided by emotion – and therefore to be given a somewhat different theoretical foundation.

All of these considerations clearly indicate various gaps that still require answers in trust theory. First, theory must be developed that accounts for the contingent nature of trust as an exchange between an individual and the environment. Second, this theory should focus on elements within the truster’s direct experience, rather than on elements outside the truster. Third, affect should be given more emphasis in trust research. Accordingly, the intrapersonal experience of trust should receive more attention, which requires the development of theory that focuses explicitly on describing and explaining the truster’s internal affective experience. My hope with this dissertation is to provide a framework of intrapersonal trust that makes first steps that address all these points by emphasizing the interaction between the truster and the environment rather than one or the other.
Thus a focal research question with respect to trust theory asks the following:

- What is the impact of emotion on trust as an intrapersonal experience?

Other questions include:

- How do each of the basic emotions influence the truster’s experience of intrapersonal trust?
- How do emotions and each basic emotion, respectively, inform the trust decision at the dyadic level?

**A few words about methodology**

In line with the research gaps already alluded to above, this thesis, and the theory of intrapersonal trust presented here in terms of the leadership situation, was guided by particular methodological considerations.

The first and foremost consideration was to build theory that would be in some way observable using known, current research methods for gathering and analyzing data (Kerlinger, 1986). For all its breadth and variability as a construct, trust has generally been studied in quantifiable terms (see Chapter 2 of this dissertation), an approach that has harmonized well with the utility-based models of trust dominating the literature. However, trust is increasingly being viewed in organization in varying degrees as an emotional phenomenon, which is not easily quantified. In order to study trust in a way that would superimpose as little as possible an artificial, analytical framework onto the phenomenon, the theory proposed here is based on qualitative variables that bring to the forefront the contextual richness and the emotional experience of the truster, i.e., the as-yet unquantifiable process leading up to the visible act of giving trust. To acknowledge the variable nature of trust, especially when influenced by emotion, the propositions in this thesis constitute less a formal model ready for testing and more as “unproved theory tentatively advanced to explain observed facts or phenomena” (Mauch & Birch, 1983, 61).

The increased focus on emotions is also revealing the rational choice as a greatly limited basis for observing trust relationships, particularly as emotions evolve in such relationships over time. Researchers are experimenting more and more with the idea that the trust decision is guided by emotional and cognitive elements that work in parallel, but essentially separately (e.g., McAllister, 1995), the basic assumption being that cognition leads to emotion (e.g., Tomlinson & Mayer, 2008). However, research on trust has left essentially untouched the issue of how emotion and cognition inform one another during the critical moments or seconds leading up to the trust decision. Experimental research has also emphasized this separation of emotion and cognition in the trust decision by assuming that all outcomes are the product of a rational, utilitarian choice.

As noted before, the spontaneous and emotional nature of trust decisions in practical settings indicate that people probably do not experience trust thusly. Therefore, an integral
part of this thesis consisted of discussing illustrative, real-life trust relationships between leader and subordinate that I observed over the course of several months as a platform for considering the exploratory ideas presented here.

Even given the tentative nature of the propositions offered here, the qualitative approach from the internal perspective as suggested here harbors a number of inherent challenges. Qualitative research yields more multi-layered results with less straightforward interpretations. The internal perspective is less easily observable and depends greatly on the willingness and ability of a leader to document his or her experiences giving subordinates trust. Additionally, I do not consider these cases as research data in the conventional sense since I observed some directly while writing this thesis and others sometime prior to that. Recollections of emotional events fade or change in emphasis with time, and I was able to record only some of the cases as they unfolded and ergo as they evolved emotionally. Furthermore, while I was a participant observer in some of these cases, in others I was a researcher conducting retrospective interviews about past events. Finally, such case-based data would need to be recorded qualitatively in a comparable manner and from different perspectives – i.e., researcher, truster, and trustee – and then triangulated with other data sources toward the development of a testable model.

Nevertheless, each case discusses a trust situation primarily from the perspective of leader as truster in practical work settings, a largely unresearched and vital perspective on trust relationships. The methodological approach chosen in this thesis offers the first foundations for research into an exploratory model. I believe each case is illuminative because each permits a discussion of trust at the emotional level without imposing the assumption that rational thought will generate emotional outcomes. The propositions here and the cases used to support them demonstrate how emotion can inform trusters’ cognitions and thereby have a fundamental impact on subsequent trust decisions and even the trust relationship between leader and subordinate. In this way, and the inherent challenges regarding the methodological approach taken notwithstanding, I hope to make a first step toward generating theory that gives voice to the commonsense interaction between the truster and the environment and that focuses on the truster’s experience rather than the object of trust.

The concept of intrapersonal trust

Finally, I would like to conclude this introduction by briefly discussing the concept of intrapersonal trust that will be a major focus in Chapter 3 and the basis for the ideas discussed in Chapter 4. Using the basic tenets of cognitive appraisal theory, I propose that intrapersonal trust is an appraisal-based process performed by the truster regarding his environment in specific relation to the attainment of an objective, for which he expects a certain response from the trustee and feels that the trustee will meet his expectations. Intrapersonal trust thus entails a psychological state motivated first and foremost not by
logical attributions about the trustee but rather by what *feels* reasonable, i.e., right, given the circumstances. Here, expectation generates emotion, which emerges because the truster is considering, or has considered, the personal implications of a situation or incident if trust is given.

**Structure of this dissertation**

This dissertation is segmented into five chapters. Chapter 1, this introduction, introduces the reader to the research questions, the methodological considerations behind this dissertation, and the concept of intrapersonal trust. Chapter 2 is a theoretical literature review of how emotion has been handled across the wide trust literature through academic disciplines relevant to leadership. This Chapter looks at why emotion has in some ways been difficult to reconcile with the majority of trust theory. Chapter 3, then, presents a discussion of intrapersonal trust in order to focus more explicitly on the aspects of affect, about which little is as yet known in trust theory. To make this discourse applicable in practical contexts, a framework for observing intrapersonal trust in exploratory research is put forth. In line with the idea that each basic emotion provides a different experiential backdrop for intrapersonal trust, six basic emotions plus surprise are discussed. Accordingly, the intrapersonal trust framework is used in Chapter 4 to illuminate the experience of leaders as trusters when predominated by each of the basic emotions. The impact of surprise on the affective experience, intrapersonal trust itself, and ergo the trust decision is also discussed. Finally, Chapter 5 presents concluding thoughts. It begins with a summary of the theory of intrapersonal trust and its application to leadership. The theoretical and practical implications of this dissertation are discussed, followed by a discussion of limitations and potential future directions for study.
Chapter 2: Trust as experience: Previous research

Throughout the many academic disciplines in which trust has been studied – including sociology, political science, psychology, economics, organizational theory, management and leadership theory – researchers have largely concluded that participating in the trust relationship, i.e., “cooperating,” fundamentally enhances human experience. Trust is considered “indispensable” for stable human interaction (Blau, 1964; Lewis & Weigert, 1985, 968) and is even thought by some to be the major variable impacting interpersonal and group behavior (Hirsch, 1978, 78). The presence of trust was thought so fundamental an element of social interaction that researchers did not even deal with it explicitly at first (Misztal, 1998).

Context is the defining factor with regard to trust (Rousseau, et al, 1998) because it frames how trust will develop as well as how decisions and behavior in the trust relationship will affect outcomes. Accordingly, the impact on the people in a trust relationship differs somewhat from one academic perspective to the next. For example, the general finding from political studies (e.g., Doney & Cannon, 1998; Hardin, 2001; Sztompka, 1995) seems to be that the presence of trust creates institutional stability, producing over time an increasingly shared set of norms and expectations that in turn facilitate human cooperation and perpetuate trust in the greater culture. Economists (e.g., Williamson, 1985; Coleman, 1990) find that trust maximizes personal utility. Studies of trust in sociology (e.g., Giddens, 1990; Luhmann, 2000) find that trust increases continuity and cooperation through social norms, thereby simplifying how people negotiate unknowns, make decisions, and ensure their well-being in a complex world. In line with these ideas, leadership and organizational researchers (e.g., Ghoshal & Moran, 1996; Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1999; Mayer, Schoorman & Davis, 1995; Newall & Swan, 2000; Nooteboom, 2002; Ring & van de Ven, 1994; Sako, 1998; Whitenen, 1998) have discovered manifold benefits to collectives when trust is present, including greater innovation, a sharper strategic edge, and fewer resources spent on control mechanisms. Psychological studies (e.g., Erikson, 1968; Peterman, 1985) have found that trust benefits intrapersonal and interpersonal processes, including increasing one’s ability to connect with other human beings, to develop as individuals, and even to look past personal discomfort for a greater good. Although the outcomes and implications for the way people experience trust are different in each approach, each has been used – and occasionally fused together – to explore and test the nature of trust relationships between the members of an organization.

The purpose of this chapter, then, is to explore in more detail how trust between people in organizations has been studied, particularly with respect to emotion. I begin by discussing the role of rational choice theory in establishing trust as a cognitive construct. Theories that place trust against a relational backdrop follow. Finally, consideration is given to accounts of
how people experience trust at the personal level. This foundation will then be used in Chapter 3 to offer a model of emotion as an antecedent of trust; Chapter 4 will apply the trust-giving model to shed some light on how emotions move leaders to give trust.

**Trust from a cognitive/rational perspective**

As a function of rational thought, trust is the major theoretical inheritance in most research on organizational science (Kramer, 1999; Six, 2004). The underlying assumption of this approach to trust seems to be the Socratic idea that no one can survive alone. Luhmann (2000) postulates that people give other people trust because they have to.\(^1\) Emphasizing human interdependence has underscored the role of vulnerability and reciprocity in studies of trust (e.g., Kramer, 1999). As individuals made vulnerable by their need for a particular response from others, trusters are faced with the dilemma of being at least partially dependent upon a potential trustee (Lane, 1998), but without enough information to be able to sufficiently verify the trustee’s intentions and/or response in advance of the trust decision (Coleman, 1990). Trust is thus given in terms of anticipated risk as a means for counteracting dependency and safeguarding against threats to one’s personal interests (Williams, 2007). As such, consistent behavior and reciprocity are expected to reinforce trust-giving, inconsistency and lack of reciprocity to discourage it (Garfinkel, 1963; Zucker, 1986).

Scholars also quickly assumed that the negative effects of being dependent on others could be counteracted using the rational approach, allowing trusters to make up for their lack of information by calculating to at least some degree of certainty the best possible outcome around trust (e.g., Deutsch, 1958). Here, deliberation, predictability, and rational thinking – cognitive elements, all – are emphasized as the means for determining whether or not to give someone trust. Obtaining help from others to survive requires that the trustee take on some risk even when she is optimistic about a potential trustee’s good intentions (Lane, 1998; Rousseau, et al, 1998). There is no true trust without risk (Coleman, 1990; Williamson, 1993), which lies in calculating from particular behavioral signals how likely a trustee is to be trustworthy (see also Bacharach & Gambetta, 2001, Dasgupta, 1988; Gambetta, 1988b; Hardin, 1993; Williamson, 1993).

**Purely rational accounts: Economic theory**

Economic theories of trust use rational choice models to take these ideas to their most extreme. The trustee’s considerations of whether or not to participate in a trust relationship are purely economic and exchange-oriented, i.e., based on some type of cost-benefit analysis (Child, 1998; Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). No consideration is given to how emotions might

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1 Which in fact poses the question as to just how voluntary the willingness really is to lay bare one’s vulnerabilities to the hoped-for, and anticipated, goodwill and benevolence of another as many conceptualizations of trust suppose.
influence the truster’s logic in making these calculations. Trust constitutes the willingness to take a risk in the belief that the trustee will reciprocate; reciprocity, rather than external incentive, ensures the best outcome for truster and trustee (e.g., Axelrod, 1984).

The assumption here is that people make rational, efficient trust decisions to maximize anticipated gains (utility) and minimize expected losses (Coleman, 1990). People thus choose to trust or not after carefully weighing the likelihood of a beneficial outcome against that of a negative one in a deductive thought process (Deutsch, 1958). Trust arises only when ambiguity exists about an outcome that might cause personal harm (Camerer, 2003), vulnerability, or loss (Kahneman & Tversky, 2000); ambiguity arises when the truster lacks sufficient information about the trustee and/or the time to find out enough.

If personal utility cannot be maximized, trusters act to minimize the potential of harm. In leadership, trust-giving is thus preceded by the calculated anticipation of what others will do to control and minimize risk (Thompson, 1967). Trust is inferred through empirical research when a person engages in certain behaviors, which are processed as signals, such as cooperative behavior and distrust when they engage in uncooperative behavior (Arrow, 1974; Axelrod, 1984; Coleman, 1990; Miller, 1992).

Game theory

Taking the principle of utility maximization from rational choice theory, game theory uses mathematical probability to make statements about how people with varying degrees of rationality will act in a situation (Camerer, 2003). Purely game theoretical accounts are not based on direct observation. Rather, game theory is used to predict the likelihood of human behavior, such as giving trust, so that people can change, fully utilize, or counteract it to ensure a more favorable outcome. The potential outcomes of human behavior are calculated in a “game,” in which payoff is calculated for every potential outcome and a probability assigned to the likelihood of an outcome. A truster can to some degree control the information on which this calculation is made, but not the trust game itself (Child & Möllering, 2003, 70). The objective is to determine how utility will a) explain a particular phenomenon, b) can potentially be generalized to others, and/or c) offer insight into other hypotheses. As with rational choice experiments on trust-giving, the objective of game theory is not to depict trust in all its complex forms in a real-world setting. Rather, outcomes from a game offer a benchmark against which to compare real-world outcomes.

Some trust games have very limited outcomes, such as the “prisoner’s dilemma,” in which two individuals are confronted with the dilemma of whether or not to engage in a particular interaction. Compromising to minimize the potential of harm rather than to maximize personal utility constitutes the best outcome in this game (Camerer, 2003). Other games are motivated by an infinite number of potential responses, such as the “tit-for-tat” strategy (Axelrod, 1984), which posits that people will reciprocate in kind, i.e., cooperate, if others cooperate with them. Trusters can considerably reduce the amount of harm or loss to them
by cooperating with their interaction partners (Friedland, 1990; Hosmer, 1995). Indeed, trust-giving actually has strategic and tactical advantages. Being responsive to the needs of those with whom one must interact is thus actually in one’s rational self-interest (Friedland, 1990). Repeating a game, i.e., an interaction, will reveal patterns around acts of giving trust and around cooperative, i.e., trustworthy, behavior. The truster assesses what the likelihood of a particular outcome is based on previous experiences with a certain partner. The important role of past experience with a person’s trustworthiness – reputation (e.g., Lewicki & Bunker, 1996) – particularly speaks to this idea. Positive past experiences will usually induce the truster to give trust.²

Defined as a function of utility in games, emotion constitutes a benefit only when it increases utility in trust dyads. People avoid negative emotions and take risks to feel positive emotions. Thus when they associate negative feelings with giving trust, people give it less. If a trustee reciprocates despite moral dilemmas and ulterior motives, the truster experiences positive emotion; if not, the expected outcome is that the truster will feel regret (Camerer, 2003, 85). So at least to some extent, game theory posits that people give trust to feel good (e.g., Falk & Fischbacher, 1998; Rabin, 1993).

Principal-agent theory

Similar ideas of trust have been studied in principal-agent relationships, in which the principal, or truster, must determine the strength and stability of the agent’s, or trustee’s, motivations, intentions, and attitudes. Agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) has been used to explore the contracts linking individuals to depict the transactions between individuals locked in an implicit hierarchy, i.e., the principal as superior and the agent as subordinate, in which the principal’s goals are given priority (Dess, 1992). Individuals are assumed to be opportunistic in nature because their first motivation is to maximize their returns in an economic exchange (Eisenhardt, 1989).

Although the additional social capital generated in collaborative relationships gives both parties a rational motivation to trust, conflict between principal and agent is nevertheless inevitable because this tendency toward opportunism yields potential loss for the truster through freeloading trustees not necessarily bound by, or interested in pursuing, the truster’s goals. An upshot is that agents’ first motivation is to signal trustworthiness whether they are or not. A solution is to create a contract of some kind to align an agent’s interests with the truster’s, the contract in this case being implicit and based on the expectation that if trust is given, trust, or cooperation and altruistic behavior, will be reciprocated for the benefit of both. However, a trustee’s sense of obligation, moral entitlement, and motivation may be

² However, depending upon the nature of the truster, he or she may trust as a result of negative expectations for the outcome, as well, e.g., despair or masochism (Deutsch, 1967).
influenced by personal interests or the environment such that trust is either not reciprocated as expected or not reciprocated at all (Ripperger, 1998).

**Transaction-cost theory**

Transaction-cost theory uses transactions between economic actors to analyze organizations, the assumption being that contractual arrangements regulate transactions, which in turn drive organizations (Williamson, 1991). The central issue is whether the value of the transaction is also proportional to its cost (Creed & Miles, 1996; Zajac & Olsen, 1993). Research has therefore focused primarily on what makes one transaction more cost-efficient than another (David & Han, 2004), translating ultimately into the effects of trust on performance (e.g., McEvily & Zaheer, 2006; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995).

Going beyond the “hyperrationality” of rational choice, the emphasis here is to describe trust-giving in a more realistic setting, in which actors must deal with organizational constraint (Williamson, 1993), including imperfect, insufficient information. From this boundedly rational perspective, people engage in measures they feel are cost-effective. The interests of the truster clash with those of the trustee, who is expected to maximize personal utility by exploiting the system covertly, such as withholding information or deliberately violating agreements (Williamson, 1985, 47).

Against this theoretical backdrop, both truster and trustee are motivated first and foremost to reduce the costs, in the broadest sense, to them. The truster’s motivation is to ensure optimal efficiency through implicit or explicit contracts (Eberl, 2003, 77). Managers use trust to reduce costs by emphasizing the reduction in cost for subordinates who choose to give trust (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Williamson, 1993) and by augmenting personal relationships with subordinates to ensure them that the manager shares their concerns and motivations (Sitkin & Roth, 1993). However, in transaction-cost theory, the caring manager is also a pragmatic leader with an awareness of the opportunistic behavior in organizations. Managers thus utilize task control mechanisms to safeguard against costly employee insubordination, including written contracts, wage incentives, and surveillance as well as values, beliefs, and norms (Long & Sitkin, 2006; Sitkin, 1995; Sitkin & Stickel, 1996). In this way, the value of increasing trust between managers and subordinates is in proportion to what is required, ensuring the optimal use of organizational resources and realization of opportunity in order to achieve goals and ensure a positive environment (Bromiley & Cummings, 1996; Wicks, et al, 1999). Trust and control therefore can, and should, go hand in hand.

**Application problems**

The utopian nature of the universe in rational choice models of trust-giving compromises the transferability of findings to contexts beyond the experimental setting. This portrayal of
trust also emphasizes the somewhat contradictory notion of the reactive truster, who gives trust to safeguard against the greater amount of personal harm he would experience if he chose not to give trust.

Individual differences such as analytical ability, emotional intelligence, organizational position, and personal predisposition are not accounted for; how these factors might define an individual’s approach to trust decisions at all are considered insignificant compared to the human tendency to try to solve problems rationally. The assumption, ultimately, is that if a person were completely informed and had an infinite amount of time to process that information, he would also a) have the necessary analytical ability; b) be predisposed to interpret the information in a way that would compel him or her to maximize utility (see Gambetta, 1988b), and finally, c) never alter in his approach to giving trust, no matter what the situation or changes in the trust environment. The effects of time and experience are left essentially untouched, except to say that past experience informs present decisions; trust decisions are the product of rational considerations in the now. How experience, particularly trust decisions relating to a particular person or issue, may leave an indelible impression on an individual and shape her approach to trust later or her feelings about a particular person does not transfer into the idea of maximizing one’s economic benefit.

Rational-choice conceptions are confined to cognitive elements within the experimental universe. The affective elements of trust necessarily attached to the maximization of utility in the practical world, such as fear, anticipation, jubilation, or gratitude, are essentially assumed away, as is the entire practical backdrop against which trust is given. Studies from this theoretical perspective, if they deal with affect, tend to posit that affect – emotion, to say nothing of mood – is either the function of rational thought or the product of an exchange between truster and trustee. Before the act of trust-giving, emotion – usually fear resulting from the prospect of exposing personal vulnerabilities to others – guides the truster to focus on ensuring personal security. After the act of trust-giving, emotion is the logical product of a rational exchange: If trust is not honored, feelings of betrayal will ensue; if it is honored, trust is believed to become stronger, but with little discussion of post-trust positive moods and emotions.

As will be argued below, I believe that the role of affect in trust is a great deal more complicated and useful to trusters. Rational choice models assume away the natural complicity of the human mind, as well as human idiosyncrasy and individuality for the sake of hypothetical argument under utopian, context-free, experimental conditions, thus making for a much-simplified, incentive-driven view of an individual’s cognition when deciding to give trust (Lewis & Weigert, 1985).

Cognitive and affective elements do co-exist around the decision to trust or not (Petermann, 1996), and emotion does have an influence on trust (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005). For example, whether or not cooperative behavior truly measures acts of trust-giving is up for some debate: An individual may cooperate with one person precisely because they
assiduously do not trust another person. People sometimes cooperate not out of trust but because cooperation holds the promise of benefits or protection that have nothing to do with trust (Kee & Knox, 1970). In addition, people do not necessarily choose to give trust based on personal gain (Fichman, 2003; March and Olsen, 1989). Altruistic and selfless behaviors are reflective of trust in organizational settings precisely because they are motivated by affect and ethics. Moreover, there is some question as to whether or not the expectation of “payback” is really trust or economic exchange (March & Olsen, 1989). Such findings indicate that an act of giving trust may constitute more than the truster’s attempt to control or contain the potential for unpleasant experiences.

The path toward emotion: The relational nature of trust

Trust was studied as a component in relational settings, i.e., as a social element, well before it was studied in dyadic economic exchanges. Organization scientists built on these initial ideas primarily by using rational choice and social exchange theory to explain variations in the dynamic, relational nature of trust. These efforts paved the way for studying how human cognition and emotion converge around trust.

Sociological accounts of trust

System theoretical accounts of trust: Rational exchange, emotional dependency

System theories emphasize the relational nature of trust, i.e., that trust first takes on its meaning when it is given by and to someone and that trust gives people the ability to connect and build sophisticated societies. Simmel (1950) was the first to note that trust, far more than just a state of mind, constituted the critical, and irrefutable, mechanism for human interaction and ergo the development of civilization.

In similar vein, Luhmann (1979) developed the idea of trust in systems, i.e., institution-based trust, which has an impact on individual beliefs or intentions regarding trust (Tan & Thoen, 2003; Tschannen-Moran & Hoy 2000). Trust helps social systems to function smoothly by reducing social complexity and filling in gaps in knowledge or information (Luhmann, 1979, 1984); thus trust is a coping mechanism that allows individuals to adapt to the increasingly complicated environment of an ever-more modern society (Lewis & Weigert, 1985a). Indeed, the need for trust is proportional to the level of social and organizational development in a society: The more complex the society, the greater the need for trust (Arrow, 1974). Modern societies are built on collective trust in the ability and goodwill of experts precisely because they build the social institutions on which the people in a society rely (Giddens, 1990). Trust thus enhances people’s quality of life considerably in tangible, material ways.

Expanding beyond dyadic interaction into the arena of an organization, or system, system theory approaches to trust also show that the social context is where trust develops and that it
has systemic implications. People are drawn to trust because it lends them a sense of personal attachment to and association with a group, which in turn brings social and psychological benefits (Granovetter, 1985). Trust also creates shared norms and interpretations of the environment: How people trust is constrained by a social structure, but in turn that social structure is a construction of how people experience trust (Giddens 1990). With time, trust becomes tantamount to a collective attribute based upon relationships between people in a social system (Lewis & Weigert, 1985, 968). Indeed, the purpose of formal social and institutional mechanisms is to ensure trustworthy conduct.

These attributes and norms come with particular obligations for human conduct and ethical standards, all of which are embedded in informal social relationships (Granovetter, 1985). These ethics therefore encourage people to entrust others with things they value; people perceive risk and give trust in proportion to the subjective value of whatever it is they are entrusting to another (Baier, 2001). Trust among people also breeds an awareness of trust, a kind of “social intelligence” that heightens people’s perception of “trust-related information,” which in turn enables human connection and opportunity (Yamagishi, 2001, 139). Where trust is lacking, people remain isolated and have less opportunity to learn from others (ibid, 140). Trust almost constitutes a public good that is taken for granted until it is gone (Hirsch, 1978).

In system theory, the decision to trust is generally framed as a rational one, and therefore always a matter of careful reflection and deliberation. As with rational choice approaches to trust, trust is portrayed as a self-reinforcing phenomenon: Trust in the past leads to trust in the future (Granovetter, 1985). People are aware of the risks associated with giving trust and measure those risks in terms of the apparent benevolence of a potential trustee as well as of their own personal vulnerability as truster (Baier, 2001). So valued is the role of rational deliberation with respect to trust that giving trust actually becomes a liability when doing so is so much a matter of course that people cease questioning whether or not they should (ibid).

The implication of the system theoretical argument is that emotions are a function of rational thought. A step beyond the Aristotelian idea that emotion and cognition are at odds with one another, system theories of trust imply that rational thought is the basis for intelligent decision-making, which gives people the emotional disposition to be able to benefit from each other optimally. The emotional and psychological health of a society and the individuals in it is thus dependent upon rational exchange. Despite the emphasis on the social, emotional, and psychological benefits of trust, system theories of trust do not posit that emotion is an antecedent of trust; rather, trust is always given as a result of deliberation. Indeed, when trust is given unquestioningly, it is considered a liability; the social phenomena behind giving trust intuitively are not discussed at length.
Social exchange theory (e.g., Blau, 1964; Homans, 1961) was used to further develop the idea of trust as an exchange between people further. Specifically, rewards and costs – two concepts taken from behavioral psychology – and resources – taken from economics – are used to explain and describe human interaction. In a social exchange, an individual offers another person benefits of some kind, with the expectation that the benefactor will at some later date reciprocate. Resources are material or symbolic commodities exchanged through human interaction (Foa & Foa, 1980). Costs entail punishments, missed opportunity, energy invested in a relationship, and other material or symbolic losses incurred as a result of making one choice over another (Blau, 1964). Surplus of rewards and resources enables one to provide others with benefits (Emerson, 1976); a lack thereof creates dependency that forces individuals to seek exchanges with others who are able to compensate this want. Thus dependency creates indebtedness that must be repaid materially – in the purely economic sense suggested through rational choice theory – or immaterially (Blau, 1964; Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard, & Werner, 1998).

Social exchange theories of trust posit that people are constantly assessing potential gains and losses in an exchange (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959); when an individual determines that the costs of staying within a relationship are greater than seeking another, he is likely to take the more cost-efficient alternative unless he is somehow dependent upon the exchange (Levinger, 1982; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). In this process of assessing profit and loss, an individual harbors tacit values, beliefs, and expectations, i.e., particular cognitions, which define his or her sense of standards and norms that would be appropriate in a particular exchange (McDonald, 1981). Such standards and norms have been spoken of in terms of fairness (Homans, 1961), distributed justice (Blau, 1964), and equity (Walster & Berscheid, 1968). When these norms appear to be violated, or not reciprocated, an individual will intentionally or unintentionally try to adapt the exchange to conform more with his or her expectations of exchange standards (Berardo, Shehan, & Leslie, 1987).

Emotions are emphasized in social exchange theory because they constitute an exchange output founded on the tacit expectations exchange partners have for one another. Individuals engage in social exchange because they expect it will yield certain returns, which can refer to increases in material wealth but just as often refer to emotional gains (Blau, 1964). Rewards are benefits from social relationships, i.e., pleasure, gratification, satisfaction (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). In particular, satisfaction, expected or experienced, in an exchange relationship is a defining factor in how people experience actual outcomes and form expectations (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). In social exchange theories of trust, then, the expectation of positive emotion generally heightens people’s willingness to give trust. The opposite side of this coin is that the anticipation of negative emotion can be misplaced and
will deter trust-giving; and such expectation is often not articulated (Morrison & Milliken, 2000).

Trust, i.e., the belief that one’s exchange partner(s) will adhere to expectations and above all not exploit or take advantage of one, plays a key role in the stability of a social exchange. The longer the exchange reflects norms and expectations regarding reciprocity, the more people are likely to trust (Blau, 1964). Trust allows people to let down their defenses for the sake of longer-term goals (Scanzoni, 1979); in essence, trust entails a promise to reciprocate as expected. So the presence of trust reduces the need for formal structures, control mechanisms, and explicit contracts (Macauley, 1963; Powell, 1990; Williamson, 1975), and so represents in practical terms a resource in collaborative projects, particularly between units and organizations (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998).

By explicitly specifying emotion as a benefit of giving trust, social exchange theories thus highlight the role of emotion as a motivator for human interaction. Giving trust thus brings emotional and psychological benefits to the truster. Emotions are also given a more active role in human interaction. However, as with other decision-based theories grounded in economic principles, emotion is not thought to be part of the – generally deductive and deliberative – thought process around whether to seek or give, provide or withhold, resources and rewards. Affect – either underlying moods or transitory emotional states – is not thought to influence deductive processes that determine decisions before, during, or after trust-related exchanges. Instead, rational deduction is thought to inform the hedonic desire to experience pleasant emotions and avoid unpleasant ones in an effort to maximize personal gain; social exchange theories therefore conclude that trust is given as a means to an end, rendering intrinsic gains instrumental.

**Neo-institutionalism: The leap of faith into established roles**

The neo-institutional perspective underscores how expectations between people determine what is considered appropriate and ethically correct with respect to trust. In neo-institutionalism (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983), the environment is an aggregation of institutional rules that define how organizations should function. These rules in govern ideas of legitimacy in and of organizations, which need legitimacy in order to acquire resources for the resource exchange necessary for survival (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Indeed, rules are beneficial because they provide a heuristic for framing social interaction against personal expectation (Garfinkel, 1963).

In this view, trust therefore constitutes a set of shared expectations shared by exchange partners that have become institutionalized over time as a mutual reality. The institution is interpreted as a manifestation of repeated direct interaction between individuals (Garfinkel, 1963). Thus trust is placed not only directly in other individuals but also in processes and institutions (Zucker, 1986, 54). This interaction is considered vital for maintaining
cooperation in the environment and even for the routine interactions that occur between people everyday (Zucker, 1986, 56).

People adapt action individually and collectively to adhere to institutional rules, a practice termed “isomorphism” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Thus “swift trust” (Meyerson, Weick, & Kramer, 1996) constitutes a reliance on accepted roles and norms within a particular organizational system to enable trust between individuals on a temporary, spontaneous basis. Here, roles and other institutions align expectations by removing the need to consider the capriciousness of an individual’s interpretation of and subsequent behavior in the environment (cf. Meyerson, et al, 1996, 173). Rather, trust is given because people take it for granted that others will adhere to institutionalized rules and roles.

As trusters interpret their social context, they are likely to be easily moved to give trust if mores around trust are deeply embedded within their environment. Where trust is lacking, however, people perceive more risk in the act of trust-giving (Möllering, 2005a). Since tacit rules govern acts of trust-giving in a particular environment, people sense uncertainty with respect to trust; giving trust thus always constitutes a “leap of faith,” even in environments in which trust is deeply embedded (Möllering, 2006). Möllering (2005a) in particular argues that the only way institutions can come to represent a source of trust between individuals is if trust is proactively evolved constantly à Giddens (1994) to counteract the ever-greater destabilizing elements of an ever-more complicated modern society. Returning to Simmel’s notion of trust as an inexplicable, almost spiritual, act of faith, Möllering also posits that trust cannot be motivated merely, or even predominantly, by rational thought because each actor’s interpretation of and reaction to the environment is unique. The implication of this argument is that emotion does indeed precede and influence the decision to give trust.

**Application problems**

Whether at the systemic, institutional, or individual levels, sociological accounts document the relational nature of trust and provide answers to the question of trust’s role in the environment. Emphasizing that trust is not only a social phenomenon but also the keystone of human relationships and interaction challenges the notion that giving trust can revolve around the predominantly economic consideration of maximizing personal benefit and minimizing harm. Perhaps most importantly, the neo-institutional view of trust states that people make inferences regarding trustworthiness by looking at the system or the environment in which they find themselves rather than at a potential trustee’s personal traits or behavior.

However, a number of aspects in the development of these theories have made testing them difficult. To begin with, there is some disagreement about whether trust is a process or an output. For example, Cook (2001) maintains that trust is a matter of belief rather than action; Hardin (2001), on the other hand, suggests that because trust takes on true meaning once it has become apparent, it should be viewed in terms of action. Lewis and Weigert
(1985) also view trust as a “risky course of action” (971), whereas Luhmann (1979) views trust as a general attitude. These differences in definition preempt a standardized definition of trust that would enable researchers to retest and reproduce findings. Such definitional differences also require fundamentally different empirical testing and measurement and suggest that findings will vary greatly from one test of trust to the next. This variability indicates that trust is particularly affected by the theory used to measure it.

Another problem that is especially visible in system theories of trust, but that also applies in other sociological accounts, is the tendency to generalize dyadic behavior to the level of the system. For example, Luhmann’s account of trust as a generalized expectation within a system or Möllering’s concept of trust as an aggregate, collectively developed institution consisting of rules poses the question of how to move from the individual to the organizational level in a test situation.

Finally, sociological theories do not agree about how emotion relates to trust. While neo-institutional theory has offered the idea that trust constitutes a leap of faith, the mental platforms people use to make that leap of faith and the emotional states that surround it are largely unknown. In social exchange theory particularly, but also systems theory, emotions are viewed as the by-product of rational considerations. The implications for emotion throughout all of these theories remain at the system level; factors that make each truster’s approach to trust and the trust environment unique, e.g., personal predisposition or the affective states of the trustee or truster, are not discussed. As Möllering (2006) notes, the systemic approach is not yet ready for use as a model for testing the leap of faith.

**Psychological accounts of trust**

Trust has been studied widely in psychology, as well, ranging in depth from deeply psychoanalytical, highly individualistic analyses of one person to broader-level behavioral elements that explain people’s response to uncertainty and ambiguity. The latter tend to combine the abovementioned exchange-based ideas and findings on trust to make normative statements about truster motivation and behavior.

*As a function of personality*

The earliest studies of trust in psychology posited that trust was a matter of an individual’s personality. Trust-giving is believed to depend upon more than the human tendency to rationalize; the assumption is based on the Freudian idea that an individual’s past and personality, shape the way in which he or she chooses to give trust (Eberl, 2003). This research explores the trust-giving process at a very deeply personal, emotional level that delves into the personal history, childhood, and idiosyncrasies of the truster as an individual. Here, the psychological state is generated primarily by congenital personality traits and/or predispositions (Erikson, 1968), even when initial childhood experiences are assumed to play a role years later in the decision to give trust (Ainsworth, 1978; Bowlby, 1969; de Vries,
2005; Erikson, 1968; Hirschhorn, 2000; Thomae, 1997). Trust is tied to emotion, with respect to both having – and maintaining – trust in oneself as the truster and in the trustee (Erikson, 1968).

Rotter (1967) used social development theory to evolve this idea by suggesting that, beyond how one may be predisposed to approach and give trust, individuals also learn to be willing – or unwilling – to take risks and/or give trust (Rotter, 1967). Toward this end, changing one’s trust-giving behavioral patterns is about revealing one’s vulnerabilities and needs up to others to break down mutual defensive barriers (Gibb, 1961, 1964; Johnson-George & Swap, 1982). The act of leader trust-giving, almost tantamount to an act of courage, constitutes overcoming one’s own defensive barriers for the sake of a greater goal but also the well-being of the work unit as a whole (Gibb, 1961, 1964).

As interpersonal exchange

The basic idea of trust being the product of disposition was developed further by Deutsch (1958), who suggested that trust was in fact not constructed as a result of the personal traits or learned behaviors of one person but rather the environment around an individual. Trust thus became a situational variable based on human calculation that could be observed given the right circumstances. This idea has had a great impact on conceptualizations of trust in organizational theory, particularly in leadership and management theory (Neubauer & Rosemann, 2006) and has motivated researchers to explore in detail the environmental conditions – be they the traits or behaviors of another, the political stability of a community, or the scarcity of resources within the environment – under which trust is given.

This emphasis on the truster’s interaction with the environment has fed the belief that reciprocity is the key component of interpersonal trust, which as a result develops gradually over time through iterated reciprocation (Burt & Knez, 1996). Clarity is often lacking with respect to the folk beliefs, moral norms, and contingencies that apply under the term “reciprocity” (Gouldner, 1960) in studies of trust. However, the recent convergence of what constitutes basic aspects of trust – e.g., risk, vulnerability, ambiguity in addition to reciprocity – suggests generally that reciprocity promotes human survival, which in turn represents a powerful motivator to engage in reciprocal behavioral exchanges.

The concept of reciprocity as functional rests upon two necessary, basic assumptions that form the framework for the basic dilemma around trust, i.e., whether or not to give trust. First, the assumption is that the trustee will reciprocate; and second, that the trustee’s reciprocates because the truster has something positive to offer the trustee (Gouldner, 1960, 163). The fact that either of these two assumptions might not be true indicates that the trustee might not be willing to reciprocate for lack of a good reason to do so. Studies of trust as an exchange in organizational theory (see section below) are particularly reflective of this basic situation. In essence, trust is conceptualized and studied as a mutually contingent
exchange of benefits in an all-or-nothing situation, suggesting quantifiable, game-type applications.

A third assumption that power relations between truster and trustee are asymmetrical is transferred to leaders and followers in much research on trust in organizations (see Chapter 4). The scenario envisioned in research, particularly social exchange research, then posits that the more powerful individual, or the individual in control, is called upon to signal benevolence by demonstrating that she will not use her power to coerce the other individual into an undesired, or unbeneﬁcial, situation.

This emphasis on the irrefutability of unequal exchanges has also underscored the presence of vulnerability as another major component of trust. Vulnerability constitutes a lack of the leverage, capability, resources, or power necessary to survive in one’s environment, requiring an individual to seek the assistance of another. Trust constitutes the willingness to take the risk of exposing personal vulnerability to another (Deutsch, 1958; Mayer, et al., 1995).

Adjunct to the willingness to admit vulnerability to others is the expectation that a universal moral dictates against exploiting that vulnerability for personal beneﬁt, where exploitation constitutes the acquisition of undeserved beneﬁts from an inequitable exchange. These moral expectations motivate people to give and reciprocate trust, but also the faith necessary to believe that trust will be reciprocated if it is given. Thus these expectations reinforce trust as an interpersonal cycle (Walker, 2002). Against this ethical backdrop, trust constitutes the willingness of one person to increase her vulnerability to another person, whose behavior she cannot control (Michalos, 1990, 620) “in the interests of some perceived greater good,” which may not beneﬁt the truster but which still may be good for the community or another person (Hosmer, 1995). Trusting for others’ sakes is therefore considered mutually beneﬁcial for both truster and trustee in the long run.

When taken in concert, people therefore have a biological, social, and moral motivation to participate in trust relationships. Implicit here is the idea that strong trust relationships develop when people’s moral foundation enables them to work together in the understanding that everyone will adhere to social norms and honor the expectations of the others with whom they are working. A potential loss of credibility, e.g., from being publicly denounced, could thus prevent someone from being able to participate in and beneﬁt from trust relationships; social norms and ethical standards thus also partially motivate people to proactively ensure that they have a reputation for trustworthiness.

As a product of attribution

In line with trust as an interpersonal, situational variable, research has revolved around discovering the circumstances under which trust is likely to be given. Efforts have been made to determine what about a trustee makes him appear trustworthy to a truster, a pursuit in which personal attributes have been frequently used (e.g., Dirks & Ferrin, 2003; Eberl, 2004; Rotter, 1967). Attribution theory posits that people attribute certain causes to success
or failure by relying on fixed expectations about a relationship. These expectations – schemas, prototypes, stereotypes, categorizations, etc. – serve as filters, or heuristics, for processing information about others’ behavior (Cronshaw & Lord, 1987; Miner, 2005). Attribution revolves around gathering information and seeking causal explanations in a process of hypothesis testing. Making attributions about consistency, consensus, and distinctiveness (Green & Mitchell, 1979) affects how people respond to those responsible for the outcomes in question (Ilgen & Klein, 1988). Trusters thus first process information about the trustee that seems particularly relevant about trust and then connect this information with contextual information that may be salient and relevant for the trust decision (Trope, 1986).

Accordingly, such attributions affect how a manager will respond to, and trust, a particular subordinate regarding future performance, competency, work behaviors, and attitudes (Dienesch & Liden, 1986; DeNisi, et al, 1984; Dorfman & Stephan, 1984; Ilgen & Klein, 1988). For example, attribution theory has been used to posit that trust forms in leader-subordinate dyads based on causal attributions, self-perception, and attribution biases, among others (Ferrin & Dirks, 2003; Eberl, 2004). In this context, subordinates give trust by making attributions about a leader based on a leader’s link to a third-party known by a subordinate (Ferrin, Dirks, & Shah, 2006). Past interpersonal behavior by the trustee determines whether trust will form; the emphasis is on whether or not leaders seem trustworthy to subordinates. Positive self-perception and attribution biases are also vital for leaders to be able to see subordinates as trustworthy (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). So if the perceiver/truster has dispositional information about people in the context at hand, such as an attitudinal position (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Kelley, 1972), he or she will use it to attribute causes to something.

**Application problems**

Studying trust from the psychological perspective has shed light into the factors that motivate people to participate in a trusting relationship with another individual. In essence, the relational nature of trust as discussed at the systemic level in sociology is brought to the dyadic level. Another major contribution has been to show that, irrespective of one’s background, trust is a learned behavior resulting from an individual’s exchange with his or her environment. The cognitive, information-processing elements of attribution and interpersonal exchange synthesize smoothly with ideas of exchange from sociological and economic theory. These contributions, among others, have enabled the study of trust in terms of its ramifications for society, the individual, and the development of both.

Interpersonal trust conceived thusly limits the questions that may be asked about the intrapersonal experience of trust, however, and does not respond to findings from personality theory which state that an individual’s personal experience has a profound impact on his trust-giving behavior. Based on reciprocity and exchange, interpersonal trust builds from the idea of an objective reality that is co-created by multiple individuals and in which shared
expectations and ethical norms are essentially based on the same assumptions, whether or not an individual chooses to adhere to them. The practical reality of trust is that expectations are often not shared precisely because an individual’s function and position defines how she constructs her reality around the experience of trust. The more unequal exchanges are, the more likely people are to construct their experience according to different moral standards and expectations. Given the considerable emphasis on the role of reciprocity in the development and sustainment of interpersonal trust, it is ironic that few studies examine in depth the basis for reciprocity as it relates to trust (Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007; for an exception see Serva, Fuller, & Mayer, 2005). There is an intrapersonal aspect to the trust phenomenon that precedes and impacts interpersonal exchange that theory should account for more explicitly and make visibly testable.

Studies of attribution have also shown that people can mistakenly attribute a cause. For example, behavior is also moderated by other factors, such as self-serving attributions, the relationship between truster and trustee, or truster expectations (Mitchel, Green, & Wood, 1981). Leaders tend to attribute success and behavior consistent with their expectations to internal attributions, e.g., good leader support of subordinates; but failure and behavior inconsistent with their expectations to external factors, such as task difficulty (ibid).

Such findings raise the question of whether or not the mental processes used to infer cause might go beyond the cognitive. The role of the truster’s/perceiver’s emotions in the formation of attribution hypotheses is unclear, though causal attribution has been shown to be strongly associated with emotion (cf. Weiner, 1985) because it enables people to evaluate information in terms of values and expectations. Clearly, people recognize how a piece of information relates to their situation at different, e.g., the informational and relational levels (Smith, Haynes, Lazarus, & Pope, 1993). As a basis for trust, attribution – as indeed with other cognitive theories – assumes that cognition and emotion are two separate, distinct processes (Chaiken & Trope, 1999). However, cognitive and emotional processes are in all likelihood not separate but rather supplementary (Lazarus, 1991a). If trust revolves around exposing one’s vulnerability and protecting against risk, then it also revolves around making emotional assessments.

Organizational theory accounts of trust

Organization and management studies of trust have tended to gravitate around interpersonal trust, often as an outcome (e.g., Ferrin, Dirks, & Shah, 2006; Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard, & Werner, 1998), a process (Serva, Fuller, & Mayer, 2005), and both (e.g., Zand, 1972, 1997). Researchers have drawn upon the theories primarily from economics, sociology, and psychology, which have resulted in a wide array of trust definitions and theoretical syntheses, including attribution theory (e.g., Ferrin & Dirks, 2003), social learning theory (e.g., Rotter, 1967 and 1980), game theory (Boyle & Bonacich, 1970; Butler, 1995; Tjosvold, 1985), social exchange theory (Konovsky & Pugh, 1994; Whitener, et al, 1998),
and attribution theory (Ferrin, Dirks, & Shah, 2006; Korsgaard, Brodt, & Whitener, 2002; Kruglanski, 1970; Malhotra & Murnighan, 2002), just to name but a few. Much interdisciplinary, sometimes partially exploratory, work combines these and other theories (e.g., Eberl, 2004; Johnson-George & Swap, 1982; McAllister, 1995).

The vast majority of this research takes the sociological assumption that trust is good for organizations because it facilitates cooperation and enhances organizational resources. Trust is also generally thought to reduce dependency and increase opportunity. The major difference in these studies as it relates to emotion is that trust is framed either in rational, calculative or in social, relational terms (Kramer, 1999), and sometimes both (e.g., McAllister, 1995).

At the systemic level, for example, trust is discussed as a mechanism for governing organizations (Bradach & Eccles, 1989) that reduces opportunism and promotes cooperation (Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Nooteboom, 1996, 2002; Parkhe, 1998; Pavlou, 2002). Organizational researchers have also found that trust provides a systemic strategic edge that enhances and optimizes creativity, innovation, and knowledge transfer (e.g.; Clegg, et al, 2002; Holste & Fields, 2005; McAllister, 1995; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998), facilitates organizational transformation (Rousseau, et al, 1998; Scott, 1980), and increases productivity (Doney, Cannon, & Mullen, 1998; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998). Thus all of these trust-related outcomes as well as the enduring presence of trust itself enables organizations to think and plan for the long term (Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 1999).

Much research on trust in organizations revolves around the idea of trust as an exchange, an idea inherited from economics and developed further in social exchange theory. As motivated by rational choice, the trusting is a self-interested individual who attempts to deduce whether a potential trustee is trustworthy. The ultimate goal of the rational choice is to ensure that the truster makes the best possible, i.e., least harmful if not most beneficial, decision with regard to another individual’s trustworthiness. For example, Mayer and Gavin (1999) found that followers would engage in self-protective behaviors if their leader appeared untrustworthy. A major research issue has accordingly been how and by which criteria a truster determines a trustee’s trustworthiness. Relational elements such as past experience with the trustee or trustee motivations and proclivities have been used to explain this deliberation process. Cues from the environment assist this process only insofar as they clarify the truster’s perceptions of the trustee’s potential trustworthiness (Möllering, 2006).

These ideas from economics synthesized smoothly with the psychological elements of the social exchange to study leader-follower trust dyads through the perspective of the follower as the more vulnerable exchange partner (e.g., Konovsky & Pugh, 1994; Whitener, et al, 1998). The assumption is that followers view their interaction with their leader as a relationship associated with more than just economic benefits. The leader-follower interaction is defined by the particular needs of both leader and follower rather than by calculations of predicted outcome (Clark & Mills, 1979; Fiske, 1992). When a leader’s
behavior signals that she is sensitive and responsive to the needs of a follower, the truster communicates the trust he feels by reciprocating, i.e., responding to what he believes are the leader’s needs. Accordingly, extra-role behaviors have been taken as expressions of follower trust generated by leader responsiveness (Konovsky & Pugh, 1994).

Both of these theoretical approaches are grounded in the basic idea that people deliberate rationally to maximize gain or benefit and minimize loss or costs. This cost-benefit emphasis implies and highlights the fact that the truster has something to lose, thereby making vulnerability and risk major motivators of trust behavior. Trustee behavior and trustee perceptions of trustee behavior are thus a major focus (e.g., McAllister, 1995). For example, the dilemmas of rationally predicting opportunistic behavior in trustees have been a focus in transaction cost theories of trust (e.g., Zaheer, et al, 1998). “Trust in leadership” research (e.g., Dirks & Ferrin, 2002; Podsakoff, et al, 2000) assumes that those with less formal authority have fewer resources and ergo are compelled to trust those with more capabilities and power. Here, vulnerability is a function of power because the trustee, i.e., leader, can use his influence to mitigate or aggravate a follower’s vulnerability (Mayer, et al, 1995).

Application problems

The exchange view that predominates organizational theories of trust has shed light into how trusters draw inferences about a trustee’s likely trustworthiness. In addition, trust as exchange underscores the role of contingency in shaping human relationships. Another trend that has enabled even richer dialogues on trust is an increasing consensus within organizational theory about what trust actually is, i.e., “a four-place predicate: A truster (1) trusts a trustee (2) in some respects (3) under some conditions (4)” (Nooteboom, 2006, 259).

However, many aspects of trust are still not well accounted for. To begin with, researchers have still not resolved the issue of how to account for the impact of context on manifestations of trust. The outcome has been to speak of different types of trust, which leaves the dubious possibility of the existence of as many types as there are contexts. Another problem with regard to context is the limited value of normative generalizations of behavior when trust is highly individualistic and defined by personal inclination and even mood.

With respect to emotion itself, above and beyond the presence or absence of particular environmental tendencies or personal attributes in the trustee, the mental processes of the truster are still not well understood and have placed the truster in a highly passive light (Williams, 2004). The psychological elements in social exchange theory put emotion and cognition tantalizingly at odds with one another, suggesting through vulnerability, expectation, and benefit that truster’s emotions have a significant role before, during, and after the “leap of faith,” i.e., the decision to give trust (Möllering, 2006), but never specifying which, under what circumstances, and for whom. Finally, the jury is still out on whether or not follower trust in leaders is indeed vital for organizations (compare for example Dirks & Ferrin, 2002 and Williamson, 1993).
Instead, emotion is only empirically visible as a by-product of rational considerations of either past experiences with or personal traits of a particular trustee/truster. Altruistic and extra-role behaviors are therefore only possible once they have been stripped of their intrinsic motivations. Specifically a trustee must signal benevolent intent to reciprocate trust expectations. Vulnerability, surely the source of powerful emotional experiences motivating trust and other human behavior and the basis for the most fundamental assumptions of trust behavior, can only emerge in terms of rational considerations of what one might lose. In short, the theoretical inheritance around trust as exchange does not adequately account for the way emotions inform rational thought or for the time frame in which emotions are able to inform rational thought. Concepts such as “swift trust” and “affective trust” have responded to these two concerns, but as applications of normative theories, do not delve deeply into the trustee’s personal interaction with the environment.

**Emotion: The new frontier**

The purpose of this Chapter has been to look more closely at how previous research and theory have framed the experience of trust and to highlight the resulting ramifications for this experience in its exchange-based foundation. Against this framework, emotions are either a by-product of trust decisions or a benefit arising from shared and observed social norms between truster and trustee. The logical extension of defining reciprocity as the backbone of trust is that people give trust first and foremost because they wish to survive, i.e., because they are afraid, thereby artificially delineating the emotional motivation behind, as well as the affective experiences around, trust.

Conceptualizing trust within a survival-based exchange has put considerable limitations on the study of the intrapersonal aspects of trust that impact how an individual processes information well before trust is given or not. Studies in organizational behavior on violations of trust, distrust, retaliation-oriented behaviors, and uncooperativeness (Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2001; Bottom, Gibson, Daniels, & Murnighan, 2002; Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998; Morrison & Robinson, 1997; Robinson, 1996; Robinson & Rousseau, 1994) all reflect the role of emotion in trust relationships at a more variegated and complex level than merely survival. The burgeoning literature on how cognitions and emotion co-exist and influence each other around trust also suggests that much about the role of emotion in trust is still unknown (e.g., Dirks & Ferrin, 2002; Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005; Gillespie, 2003; Gillespie & Mann, 2004; Johnson-George & Swap, 1982; Jones & George, 1998; Kim, Dirks, & Cooper, 2008; McAllister, 1995; Slovic, 1999; Tomlinson & Mayer, 2008; Vohs, Baumeister, & Chin, 2007; Whitener, et al, 1998).

So rather than looking at the interpersonal level by looking at environmental or interpersonal factors, I believe much can be learned about trust by focusing on the intrapersonal level at which trust germinates. I believe this can be done by framing trust as
expectation that emerges as a result of emotions that arise in association particular key goal of the truster’s. Chapter 3 will be devoted to this cause. Chapter 4 will then delve into the ramifications of the third basic assumption around power and trust by examining the trust relationship when leaders trust subordinates.
Chapter 3: Trust as intrapersonal: Rightness in appraisal

As noted in Chapter 2, research has emphasized the interpersonal aspects of trust; whether measured as a behavior (e.g., Arrow, 1974; Coleman, 1990), a psychological state (e.g., Rousseau, et al, 1998), or something else, trust revolves around the idea of giving to get, usually in order to survive. On the one hand, trust does become significant for others and begin its social evolution once the truster expresses trust in some visible way. On the other hand, an intrapersonal experience must precede such expressions of trust to allow the truster to become aware of such feelings and process how she intends to express them. Given the importance accorded to the relational aspects in trust in the organizational environment, and to emotions in particular (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002; Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005; Gillespie & Mann, 2004; Johnson-George & Swap, 1982; Jones & George, 1998; Kim, Dirks, & Cooper, 2008; Mayer, et al, 1995; McAllister, 1995; Slovic, 1999; Tomlinson & Mayer, 2008; Tyler & Kramer, 1996; Vohs, Baumeister, & Chin, 2007; Whitener, et al, 1998), it is surprising that more is not known about how this internal process guides trusters to give trust or not.

The purpose of this Chapter is therefore to consider trust as an intrapersonal phenomenon in which emotion motivates cognition. I begin by arguing that trust is a dynamic function of expectation rather than reciprocity. Using cognitive appraisal theory, I then posit that emotions are a function of personal goals and the basis for a truster’s assessment of, and expectations for, an outcome if trust is given. A definition of intrapersonal trust is offered and discussed in detail using an intrapersonal trust framework based on the appraisal process, to show how the emergence of intrapersonal trust is a function of how emotions develop. The basic emotions considered most immediately relevant for intrapersonal trust are then discussed. Finally, consideration is given to the environment from which intrapersonal trust initially springs. Toward that end, I introduce an appraisal platform that consists of an environmental variable specific to the trust context and a personal variable that can be specified to reflect the truster’s priorities in the trust environment; both are qualitative.

Trust as a dynamic function of expectation

Research has only recently begun to explore how emotions and expectation fuel and frame the subjective experiences that move people to give trust. To date, expectation as it relates to trust has generally been studied as a function of the truster’s beliefs that trust will be “reciprocated” by the trustee and will be, if not beneficial, then at least not harmful (e.g., Misztal, 1996; Robinson, 1996; Sako, 1992; Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard, & Werner, 1998). Both truster and trustee are assumed to agree about how trust should be reciprocated. Most researchers have therefore interpreted non-reciprocal trustee behavior as a deliberate violation of ethical and behavioral norms.
By focusing on reciprocity thusly, researchers have largely assumed away the influence of subjective experience on individuals’ expectations, which can differ from person to person and from one circumstance to the next. While such intentional breaches of trust doubtless occur, they nevertheless do not always explain why a trustee does not always respond as desired. For example, such behavior can instead be a sign of a misunderstanding between the truster and trustee as a result of different expectations regarding the trust outcome.

Expectations are the basis for any type of behavioral response in a dyadic relationship. Before a truster can give trust, she must have particular expectations, and before a trustee can reciprocate, he must also have particular expectations about what is expected, what he can do, and what he wants to do. As such, personal expectations constitute strong motivators for human behavior that are more likely to be guided by personal desire than by shared norms. The desire to feel good rather than bad moves individuals to adapt their situation proactively to ensure positive emotional experiences (Brockner & Higgins, 2001; Frijda, 1988), i.e., by closing the gap between their current and their ideal realities (George & Jones, 2001). Specifically, positive emotional experiences make individuals feel as though their concerns and desires are being – or will be – facilitated (Gross, Richards, & John, 2006), irrespective of whether those goals are truly being enabled. Difficult challenges can thus be evaluated with more subtlety than mere intimidation: People take on the abyss to embrace the positive emotions at the end of a negative experience, its intensity at the beginning making the positive emotions afterward all the sweeter (Boudens, 2005). Other individuals seek out positive affect to assiduously avoid the potential of unpleasant, negative experiences (Isen, 1987, 2001; Isen & Baron, 1991). For example, Brooks (2003) found that managers delegate to their subordinates situations with which the managers associate anxiety.

Expectations are informed by affect, and they play a large role when trustees assess whether or trust should be given. Specifically, expectations emerge out of the goals for ensuring one’s personal concerns and well-being; since emotion also has personal well-being at its roots, emotion is closely linked to how an individual develops such expectations.

With respect to intrapersonal trust, then, expectation should be seen as the truster’s evaluation of how a particular trust decision will make him feel. Rather than merely attributing causes while processing information, trusters make causal inferences between potential outcomes and the affective states that they might experience as a result (Stein & Levine, 1999). Accordingly, at the heart of every trust decision – e.g., for whatever organizational goal a truster may wish to satisfy by trusting someone else – is also a desire to satisfy the need to feel good about the situation and about deciding to give trust. Such desire is the basis for expectation. Trusters therefore generate expectations that are completely subjective, specific to a particular situation (Elfenbein, 2007), and motivated by the desire to feel good about the decision, whether those good feelings arise from trusting someone, achieving a critical organizational goal, avoiding negative affective experiences, or some combination of all three.
Expectations therefore play an important role in a truster’s subjective experience of trust. Expectations stabilize a truster’s frame of mind as she makes decisions about unknowns in her future. Toward that end, her emotions give her a sense of what to expect as well as what she wants to see happen. She uses this affective, internal process to digest all manner of information in her environment, determine whether or not it has any bearing on her personal interests, and decide how to act upon it. Expectations around the trust decision thus entail not only projections about outcomes but also the truster’s ideas of what the outcome of a particular trust decision should be, including how the trustee ought to respond to the trust decision. When a truster’s expectations are not satisfied, i.e., because something in the trust environment violates those expectations, she has an involuntary emotional reaction.

For example, editor-in-chief Goran Kojic hired an expert, Dragan David Dabic, to prepare a number of articles for publication in *Zdrav Zivot* (“Healthy Living”), a Serbian alternative medicine journal. Dabic was unable to verify by means of official documentation his status as a neuropsychiatrist, but his texts were excellent and Dabic himself seemed extraordinarily educated, eloquent, serene, and cultured (MacDonald & Hadzivukovic, 2008). On 21 July 2008, Dabic was arrested and revealed to be Radovan Karadzic, who was believed responsible for the genocide of thousands of people in the Bosnian War in the 1990s and therefore to be tried for international war crimes at The Hague. The emotion behind Kojic’s violated expectations is palpable and illuminative:

As far as I’m concerned, I have never met Radovan Kradizic. … The man I knew for the past year or so – Dragan David Dabic – wrote wonderful articles for *Zdrav Zivot*. … This whole episode has somehow tainted all the great work my colleagues and I have done since we started the magazine five years ago. … I was trying to show people that living healthily was possible; now I wonder if it was all in vain. … I am very angry at the man who presented himself as Dragan David Dabic, because the Dabic I knew was such a fine person, and no one recognized him [as Kradizic] (ibid, 2).

From the perspective of reciprocity, Kojic and “Dabic” each had an obvious, and rational, motive for participating in a trust relationship between editor and author: The former needed good writers for his publication and the latter needed a living, if not also positive exposure. However, the above quotation indicates that such a win-win exchange was not the fundamental motivation for Kojic’s trust. Rather, Kojic’s feelings about who “Dabic” was generated expectations about how the working relationship would develop and about how Kojic and Dabic would relate to one another as people while collaborating toward a greater goal they both believed in. Kojic expected good outputs for his publication from Dabic; but at some level Kojic also expected to have positive emotional experiences because of that productive collaboration. The emotional impact of trust emerged as a result of Kojic’s expectations about the good results to come as a result of trusting “Dabic.” That Kojic felt good, or at least right in his convictions, about giving trust at the time seems likely, since his anger demonstrates a great discrepancy between what he expected to come of giving trust and what actually did.
When goal-related expectations are confirmed, the trustee will experience a sense of the rightness to which Möllering (2006) has alluded. The presence of rightness does not necessarily imply that positive emotions will ensue as the result of a particular trust decision. A truster who feels confirmed in the dangers of trusting a particular individual is unlikely to be driven primarily by the positive emotions that might come as a result of having been correct in his assessment. Rather, I would expect the primary emotional impetus to be the truster’s caution, i.e., fear, when dealing with that individual. When these expectations are not confirmed, the truster may experience surprise and will in any event begin to reassess the situation and his original conclusions about the trust decision.

The above example demonstrates that expectation informs and is informed by a truster’s emotional response. This overlap also indicates that affect and appraisal are almost intertwined throughout some processes. Indeed, emotion and cognition may well work in concert, particularly as emotional reactions become routinized in learned behaviors over time (Elfenbein, 2007).

However, in order to observe the emergence of trust as an intrapersonal phenomenon, an initial assumption has to be made about how trust germinates internally. Trust is a forward-looking phenomenon. My argument is therefore that a truster engages her cognition to anticipate potential outcomes, generally well before experiencing the potential personal ramifications of them that would generate an emotional response. The ideas about intrapersonal trust will therefore be developed here on the assumption that expectations and assessments inform the emotional response behind trust, even though I would also expect empirical research to demonstrate a more complex, and possibly even parallel, relationship later. To be quite clear, the modular line of impact suggested here is that expectation influences affect which in turn influences intrapersonal trust.

To summarize, I have argued here that trust emerges through an intrapersonal process in which expectations frame the truster’s emotions that fuel the ultimate trust decision. Toward this end, a truster uses personal experience, function, and predisposition to construct expectations differently regarding what constitutes appropriate behavior for both the trustee and herself. The inherently relational, interpersonal quality of trust becomes manifest when these expectations generate behavioral responses that truster and trustee assess in turn, thereby creating new impressions about and potentially also new expectations for the trust relationship with each new assessment. Intrapersonal trust by nature thus precedes interpersonal trust. Here, trust emerges and is sustained in some form over time through the interaction of truster and trustee, but the intrapersonal perspective suggests that this interaction does not necessarily have to be cyclical or self-reinforcing. In the section that follows, I develop a theoretical basis from which to study the emergence of intrapersonal trust as a function emotions and expectation, or “rightness.”
The trust process as situated appraisal

Intrapersonal trust is ultimately motivated by emotions. Accordingly, trusters are bound to have different experiences around their trust decision depending on whether they are frustrated, sorrowful, or happy at the time. The emotional experience of a truster seeking to escape harm is much different than that of a truster giving someone else an opportunity to grow. The former is impelled predominantly by negative emotion, the latter by positive emotion.

In this section, I argue that the intrapersonal trust process constitutes situated appraisal framed against the goals that generate emotion, and ergo expectation, around particular outcomes. Further, I posit that intrapersonal trust emerges on the basis of a concatenation of many different expectations about multiple factors in the trust environment, i.e., a feeling of rightness. A process-based definition of intrapersonal trust is offered, and I discuss how the presence of a basic emotion alters the motivation to give trust. In this way, I hope to highlight the rich, affective landscape in which intrapersonal trust is initially nestled and then to demonstrate the inherently dynamic nature of trust by focusing on how intrapersonal processes have their impact on interpersonal processes rather than, as has more generally been the case, vice versa.

Cognitive appraisal theory: The basis for intrapersonal trust

Chapter 2 demonstrates that the majority of the existing research on trust has been based on the idea that trust is caused either by personality or by the environment (but see Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005, for an exception). My response is instead to argue that trust, which is so universal a phenomenon but also so sensitive to context in its manifestation, emerges as a function of the interplay between personal elements and environment.

Cognitive appraisal theory revolves around this very relationship, to show how people assign personal significance to events in their environment and ergo have particular, discrete emotional reactions in response to those events. During appraisal, the truster assesses knowledge and information in terms of values, personal subjectivity, and objectives as they relate to his personal well-being, which is a function of personal goal achievement (e.g., Forgas, 1995; Lazarus, 1991b; Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006; Ortney, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Roseman & Smith, 2001). This process involves decision-making components that generate a unique evaluation pattern for each emotion, each of which has a core relational theme with identifiable aspects at every stage (Lazarus, 1991a; Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Smith & Lazarus, 1993). Appraisals thus set the emotional process in motion, which in turn initiates the physiological and behavioral expressions and responses that culminate in the perceived emotional state (Smith & Lazarus, 1990). People’s appraisals are also specific to their situation, which increases the likelihood that an emotional response will be appropriate for that situation, even if it does not seem
logical to the passive observer. Situational specificity also sheds more light on the emotional why motivating an individual’s judgment (Arnold, 1960; Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Forgas, 2003; Lazarus, 1991 c).

In line with the ideas discussed above, I propose that intrapersonal trust is an appraisal-based process performed by the trustee regarding her environment in specific relation to the attainment of an objective, for which she expects a certain response from the trustee and feels that the trustee will meet her expectations. Intrapersonal trust thus entails a psychological state motivated first and foremost not by logical attributions about the trustee but rather by what feels is reasonable, i.e., right, given the circumstances. Furthermore, this psychological state is framed by temporal thinking dedicated to identifying, striving toward, and revising a goal (cf. Austin & Vancouver, 1996, 340). Here, expectation generates emotion, which emerges because the trustee is considering, or has considered, the personal implications of a situation or incident if trust is given.

I believe these process and causal elements in appraisal offer a medium through which to study the subjective experience of trust as an affective process (cf. Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). Specifically, appraisal allows for the influence of environmental factors, such as social context, past history with the trustee, or implicit theories, on the trustee’s appraisals and on intrapersonal trust (cf. Weiner, 1980, 1986) that attributions associated with particular emotions do not (Smith, Haynes, Lazarus, & Pope, 1993). I therefore use appraisal to separate the emotional, intrapersonal experience of trust into observable elements for exploratory research and theory-building.

**Defining emotion**

In line with appraisal theory, I assume that emotions are discretely different states (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Izard, 1977; Roseman, 1984; Plutchik, 1962; Tomkins, 1962). Each emotion is triggered by a different drama (Lazarus, 1991a), or “emotivational” goal (Roseman, Wiest, & Schwarz, 1994), and triggers in turn a unique “core relational theme,” i.e., a psychophysiological reaction with its own person-environment relationship that is either harmful or beneficial to the trustee (Lazarus & Smith, 1988). This emotion process is a relatively short-term reaction that can be observed in “patterns of perception” and “experience, physiology, action, and communication” (Keltner & Gross, 1999, 468).

I therefore view emotion as a process with sub-processes (Elfenbein, 2007; Lazarus, 1991b; Niedenthal & Krauth-Gruber, 2006; Power & Dalglish, 2008), including an eliciting event, the perception of the event, and an appraisal of the event, all of which then cause a physiological reaction and an action tendency (Frijda, 1986), followed by conscious awareness (Power & Dalglish, 2008, 62), a behavioral response, and finally a reflective reappraisal after the initial emotional reaction.

Serbian editor Kojic’s reaction is representative of emotion as process. Kojic’s awareness of “Dabic” as a potential contributor constituted the start of the trust event. His subsequent
appraisal of “Dabic’s” ability to meet Kojic’s expectations and work toward a goal impacting Kojic’s personal well-being led Kojic to feel right about what would happen if he entrusted “Dabic” with the task of writing for his journal. Kojic’s act of trust, among other things, was therefore to provide “Dabic” with the opportunity to voice his ideas in a public forum and to feel good about the decision. This act satisfied Kojic’s drive to ensure his personal well-being, e.g., by feeling good about knowing and helping a fine person, while also ensuring the goal of building up the local alternative medicine community. Kojic’s awareness of these emotions and expectations surfaced in the cold, clear light of day with the discovery that “Dabic” was in fact not a fine person but rather an international war criminal being hunted worldwide. His subsequent response was to experience anger at Kradizic, but perhaps also shame and anger at himself for having been duped (Vohs, Chin, Baumeister, 2007) and then to cope with the strength of these emotions through complete incredulity: “As far as I’m concerned, I have never met Radovan Kradizic.”

This emphasis of emotion as process highlights the fact that an emotion’s intrapersonal nature and all the behavioral processes being motivated by it lends it significance to an individual long before it matters to others. Because personal well-being is among the most fundamental drivers of human existence while also being the lynchpin of appraisal, the emotional processes behind trust often preoccupy trusters long before the act of trust facilitates the achievement of an overarching goal. The effort to ensure personal well-being also frames the way in which trusters view time and think temporally and influences how their moods and emotions fluctuate over time, including with respect to how they generally feel about trust, their acts of trust-giving, and the environment’s response to those acts (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996).

In essence, emotions are adaptive responses to the environment (Scherer, 1984a; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Ekman, 1992), each with its own function to ensure the truster’s well-being and adaptiveness within his or her environment. Adaptiveness here refers to the impact of emotions in helping the truster to survive and flourish, e.g., by lending perseverance in times of difficulty, providing solutions, and facilitating interaction with others (Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Lazarus & Lazarus, 1994).

The episode triggering the appraisal process is a trust event. The truster’s decision, whether to give trust or not, is the attempt to respond as adaptively as possible to the situation, i.e., to use trust to ensure the goal primary in the truster’s mind. The attempt to respond adaptively does not ensure that the response will be. A truster’s response is only adaptive to the extent that it motivates the truster to give trust constructively, i.e., so that he or she is better able to flourish and survive. Where it thwarts those functions, thereby reducing the chances of the truster’s goal coming to fruition or even causing him harm, a response may be called maladaptive. Non-adaptive behavioral responses occur when they neither facilitate nor harm the attainment of an overarching goal linked to the environment by appraisal.
Toward this end, Elfenbein (2007) offers the provocative suggestion that emotions are most deleterious when an individual fails to focus on emotion’s helpful functions, e.g., by viewing negative emotion as a thing to be avoided rather than as a warning that the individual’s behavior or assessment of her situation needs to change. This idea truly implies that intrapersonal trust can indeed generate a proactive, adaptive trust decision through emotional processes.

While affective experiences can include emotion, mood, or personal disposition (Power & Dalgleish, 2008, 131), my primary focus is on the relationship between emotion and trust rather than mood. First of all, emotions parallel more closely the decision sequence around a particular event culminating in trust, particularly with respect to the temporal considerations that go hand in hand with trust because emotion is fleeting while mood is not. Second, little is known about how discrete emotions color the truster’s expectations and differently motivate trust-giving behavior. I believe that understanding more about the unique influence of each basic emotion on intrapersonal trust will shed light on the truster’s person-environment exchange, the effectiveness of these emotions for the truster within that context, and the different behavioral visage trust wears as a result of emotion.

*Emotion in relation to cognition: Help or hindrance?*

Since the attempt to respond adaptively to a trust situation can nonetheless come to a maladaptive end, the question remains as to whether emotions help, hinder, or work parallel with, cognition. The idea that emotion is useful and adaptive is relatively new, a response to the Aristotelian notion that cognition and emotion are at odds with one another (Lazarus, 1991b) and that emotion creates internal dilemmas and agendas that distract away from effective thinking and problem-solving (Forgas, 2003; Power & Dalgleish, 2008). Both of these established ideas essentially make the functionalist argument about emotions; the latter particularly assumes that the function of emotions is deleterious to good decision-making.

Recent research has found that emotions actually assist more effective decisions (e.g., Seo & Feldman Barrett, 2007). Emotions are not inherently at war with rational thought; rather, they generally inform deduction (Lazarus, 2006). Positive emotions, variously, assist the everyday routine (Fredrickson, 2001), engender a sense of reward (Larsen & Ketelaar, 1989), and generate the motivation and endurance to persevere in the face of challenge (Fredrickson, 2001). Negative affect heightens awareness of problems, helps people to seek constructive confrontation (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006; Morris & Keltner, 2000), avoid complacency by questioning the status quo and thinking critically (George & Zhou, 2002), mobilize against threats, and find solutions (Keltner & Haidt, 1999).

Like all social tools, however, emotions can be deployed to beneficial or harmful ends. For example, when emotions warn people to pause and reconsider their circumstances, they have the valuable function of interrupting routinized, potentially maladaptive cognitive processes (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). On the other hand, when such interruptions no
longer synchronize with the environmental stimuli that revolve around the trust event, emotions can potentially alter people’s ability to determine potential outcomes and consequences resulting from a particular trust decision (for a review of emotional pathologies, see Power & Dalgleish, 2008). Positive emotions can accordingly generate complacency (Frijda, 1988; George & Zhou, 2002), stereotyping (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003), overconfidence (Staw, Sutton, & Pelled, 1994), and reduced inquisitiveness (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995; Beal, Weiss, Barros, & MacDermid, 2005; George & Zhou, 2002). People go to great lengths to protect feeling good by assiduously avoiding negative affect (Isen, 1987; Isen & Baron, 1991). Negative emotions create in their own turn disruption, immobilization, and isolation (e.g., Lazarus, 1991a). Additionally, emotions can have a carryover effect that shapes the truster’s decision-making in a situation that is completely unrelated to what a person is feeling (Forgas, 1995).

The response to these two positions has been to suggest a third way of thinking about the relationship between cognition and emotion, namely that they are inextricably linked (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003) and work in concert to regulate people’s thoughts and behavior (Elfenbein, 2007). That affect and cognition are difficult to separate (Forgas, 2003) and that each plays an essential role in trust decisions and events is also reflected in the trust literature (e.g., Johnson-George & Swap, 1982; McAllister, 1995). Where trust is concerned, affect is essential to the decision-making process because it provides important signals regarding the desirability and impact of particular decisions (Damasio, 1994). However, its effectiveness is dependent upon people’s ability to use this information while engaging in other cognitive processes such as deduction to determine the causality of events (Elfenbein, 2007). In sum, then, affect and cognition probably do work in concert to inform the trust decision; however, as argued above, more needs to be understood about how emotion informs cognition in trust decisions.

**Personal goals and well-being**

Intrapersonal trust as experience revolves around the idea that a truster, as with all individuals, has particular goals that lend a sense of stability that defines how the truster will experience, and assess, her environment (Lazarus & Lazarus, 1994). The term “goal” does not necessarily suggest purposeful intent or cognition of which the truster is cognizant. Rather, a “goal” here broadly constitutes any target, objective, outcome, result, or response that contributes to the truster’s well-being through the experience of positive emotions (Cropanzano, James, & Konovsky, 1993). The experience of positive emotion and well-being can originate from externally imposed goals, such as the completion of a large-scale company project, to internally generated goals, such as the desire to avoid negative emotion, or a combination of those two (cf. Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). Thus the ends called “goals” here might in other cases just as readily be called desires or motivations.
Goals are the standard against which the truster gauges whether or not her environment facilitates her well-being. Environmental changes, or trust events, that appear to change the status of a goal come to the truster’s attention precisely because those changes have implications for the truster’s well-being. Such events are the basis for external “shocks” to underlying affective patterns that generate new emotions and ergo new affective patterns (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). Their link to the truster’s well-being gives them an emotional heat and a sense of causality that mere attribution lacks (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Lazarus & Smith, 1988; Smith, Haynes, Lazarus, & Pope, 1993; cf. Tomlinson & Mayer, 2008). To the extent that she was unaware of them, a truster is thus most readily made cognizant of such goals when they are facilitated, achieved, or hindered.

As with all individuals, trusters have multiple short-, medium-, and long-term goals for ensuring their subjective well-being, and they may not always be compatible with each other. The emotional process triggered by appraisal helps the truster to prioritize such goals and tackle them as effectively as possible (Lazarus, 1991a; Ortney, Clore, & Collins, 1988). Accordingly, a truster’s goals can change as his priorities change and cause the truster to reappraise the trust environment and completely alter how he feels about some aspect of the trust decision or trust event. Similarly, a new trust event may cause a truster to revise his feelings about a trust event he was in the middle of appraising. In this way, intrapersonal trust is fluid in nature, referring back and forth to many different elements in the environment to generate an overall feeling of rightness about the trust decision.

A trust decision or an act of giving trust is a single decision relating to a goal, or set of goals relating to a single trust event within a long chain of choices and appraisals that constitute a trust relationship. Because of the subjective, highly contextualized nature of the truster’s expectations, giving trust constitutes the act of openly revealing to another person the goals that one believes will assist, and indeed are fundamental to, one’s personal welfare at that point in time, even when the trust decision revolves around a long-term goal.

At the moment trust is given, the truster is implicitly asking, and expecting, another individual to understand the personal significance of these goals and to make them happen so that they are compatible with the truster’s expected, and desired, outcomes. The truster’s assumption is often that trustees completely understand what is being asked of them and how they should respond to the act of giving trust, even if they choose not to behave thusly. Because people are often not cognizant of their emotional experiences and reactions, trusters also frequently make this request without even really realizing it until after the trust event has played itself out completely. Thus intrapersonal trust can emerge from emotions generated through appraisals relating directly to a trust event rather than as a result of “incidental emotions,” i.e., carried over from unrelated past situations (cf. Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005). Furthermore, emotions are more ephemeral and more intense than incidental emotion, and associated with a particular cause and therefore a defined cognitive frame (cf. Cropanzano, Weiss, Hale, & Reb, 2003).
With time, the iteration of this deeply personal, and often unspoken, process becomes the basis for the trust relationship. The more experience the truster has within a particular relationship, the more she is likely to rely on her feelings rather than her beliefs in trust decisions relating to that relationship (Weiss, 2002). In addition, the more time or emotional intensity that has been invested into a trust relationship or decision, respectively, the more likely a strong emotional reaction will ensue when an act of trust-giving has been justified or disappointed. However, initially, intrapersonal trust is generated solely on the basis of the goals that relate directly to a truster’s individual well-being.

**Intrapersonal trust as an experiential process**

With the basic definition of intrapersonal trust as a process as well as the role of emotion, goals, and well-being in mind, I would like to break down this process into various decision-making components that clarify a truster’s expectations, the emotion(s) experienced, and the emergence of intrapersonal trust. I use the basic appraisal process to focus on the internal, experiential nature of intrapersonal trust toward that end.

**Basic process elements**

As stated above, the process of appraising and in turn interacting with one’s environment constitutes the basis for the intrapersonal experience of trust and implies an internal process with a series of steps through which the truster must go to process, as well as ultimately to react to, the initial trust event and its emotional significance. Within any given situation, these steps include a) the emotion-eliciting stimulus in the trust event; b) the appraisal process itself; c) the rightness about what will and should happen if trust is given; d) the emotion(s) experienced as a result of appraisal; e) the behavioral response, i.e., the initial trust decision; and then g) reappraisal in light of the trustee’s initial response (f) to the initial trust decision (e).

![Fig. 1: The intrapersonal trust process framework based on appraisal](image)

Several assumptions are made about the intrapersonal trust framework, to enable an initial discussion of the ideas offered here. First, I assume that this framework deals solely with the development of intrapersonal trust within a dyad, e.g., between a manager and a subordinate.
For the moment, no influences from third-party relationships on intrapersonal trust are assumed (cf. Ferrin & Dirks, 2006). Excepting the contextual variables that frame the person-environment exchange for intrapersonal trust, the assumption in Figure 1 is that the appraisal process occurs in sequence. While in practice context is omnipresent and ever-changing, I assume that a truster’s evaluation of her context depends upon her interaction with it, i.e., with her environment. Further, I assume that each trust event that elicits development in intrapersonal trust is dominated by a goal or a set of goals compatible with the act of giving trust and ergo is guided by predominantly one basic emotion. In addition, I explain the framework below as if it revolved around the very first emergence of intrapersonal trust resulting in the very first trust response in a dyad.

Finally, in line with appraisal theory and the notion that appraisals and therefore emotions will overlap in real-life trust settings, I assume that intrapersonal trust can change from appraisal to appraisal. To elucidate, the appraisal process enables the fluid, context-sensitive nature of trust to come to the forefront. Each trust event has a unique meaning for a truster at a particular point in time and in a particular trust relationship. Therefore, each trust event can also catalyze appraisal that changes the truster’s rightness about giving trust. On the one hand, such changes can accumulate over time to reinforce a truster’s sense of rightness about giving trust and ergo her trust decision under particular circumstances. On the other hand, new emotional reactions can change rightness in a contradictory or inconsistent fashion from one trust event to the next. With time, reappraisal and emotion management also lend complexity to this tendency; however, a truster does not necessarily give trust or not because she attributes reliability to a particular trustee. Rather, her assessment of what the goal behind the trust event means to her combined with the possibilities behind giving trust guide her appraisal processes and ergo the rightness she feels with regard to a particular decision. Thus a truster does not necessarily give trust or not out of fear by deduction; rather, a truster gives trust or not according to what her emotions are telling her to do in a particular instance. This aspect of intrapersonal trust has potential for explaining selectiveness, inconsistency, and frailty in how an individual gives trust. Accordingly, although this process is mentioned in a linear fashion for the sake of clarity here, a more fluid, organic process is possible, given the right circumstances.

*The springboard for appraisal: Context*

As argued above, intrapersonal trust emerges precisely because the truster, with particular personal traits and tendencies, interacts with her environment to ensure a particular goal. Irrespective of whether an individual is conscious of them or not, the desire to ensure one’s goals (Chartrand & Bargh, 1996) operates in terms of one’s environment and personal circumstance (Fitzsimons, 2006).

Accordingly, intrapersonal trust is always contextualized by personal and situational variables that interact to form the cognitive basis for processing information. These personal
and situational variables thus act as an initial platform for the appraisals that generate intrapersonal trust. As will be argued in more detail below, a truster’s assessment of her resources for ensuring the goal linked to a trust event comprises a situational, or environmental, variable motivating how she believes the trust event impacts her. This resources variable relates directly to the truster’s interaction with her environment. A personal variable, however, is more closely connected to how the truster evaluates the trust environment because of who she is. A personal variable gives her a sense of personal involvement around the trust event and differs depending upon what her primary role is around the trust event. One woman can be a mother, manager, and sister all at the same time, but each trust event invokes a different personal variable for her intrapersonal trust appraisals. A personal variable posited for leaders as trusters in Chapter 4 deals with the extent to which a leader associates personal well-being with the achievement of shared goals. In sum, then, the environmental and personal variables that are immediately relevant to the trust event set the stage for the internal process around making evaluations regarding the trust decision.

Taken together, these variables help the truster to construe a subjective experience – rather than an objective reality – of her environment as a backdrop for feelings and decisions relating to intrapersonal trust. Intrapersonal trust is experienced depending on prior knowledge, beliefs, and appraisals, which are used to draw inferences about the status of one’s personal concerns, priorities, or goals as well as about what is causing that status (Stein & Levine, 1999). Predictors of trust thus do not revolve merely around the truster’s traits or environmental factors such as trustee traits, but rather around some combination of both, depending upon the concerns driving the trust decisions.

All of these variables are potentially subject to change and so could be viewed as “extensible dependencies” (Leerstellen; Laucken, 2001, 2004) that give the environment a different feel to the truster depending upon how she defines, and reacts to, each. For clear expectations, emotions, and intrapersonal trust to emerge, the truster must be able to assemble all of these variables together compatibly, in terms of a bigger picture and potential outcomes that relate directly back to the trust decision. More than a mere outcome, intrapersonal trust thus entails a sense of rightness based on a coalescence of answers and choices selected from multiple alternatives that appears cohesive and convincing to the truster. When the overall picture fits well in a coherent constellation of both cognitive and emotional elements, the truster will feel a sense of rightness about her trust decision and a sense of wrongness about her trust decision when it does not.

Though one might be tempted to assume that the sequence of appraisal suggests that appraisal occurs universally from one individual or culture to the next (Scherer & Wallbott, 1994), appraisal is nonetheless an individual phenomenon. The internal assessment of the personal implications of a trust event is tailored not only to a particular truster at a particular time in a particular trust relationship but also to a particular trust event. Each of the two
different types of variables mentioned above, personal and environmental, have a distinct role in this process. Both types of variables need to converge in appraisal to give the truster a sense of the bigger picture; so even though personal factors guide the internal dialogue, they interact with, rather than precede, contextual variables.

How a truster construes the various environmental factors defines how she assesses being able to achieve the predominant goal in the trust event. Such contextual variables can include, but are not limited to, the broader social framework, the trust event itself, the trustee and his potential intentions toward the truster, the type of relationship between truster and trustee, as well as the trustee’s affective state. Given the role of expectation in framing the emotional response that ultimately motivates the trust decision, I would expect the truster’s perception of her resources in the very broadest sense to play a pivotal role in helping her to determine whether or not she should seek the assistance of another to facilitate her goal. “Resources” in this context refers to the material and psychological basis for ensuring the goal motivating the truster as initiated by the trust event.

The truster’s appraisal of her environment and the trust event is also guided by personal factors that influence her expectations, including among others implicit theories, goal identification, emotional intelligence, trait affect, or personality traits. The personal variables of greatest significance to the truster in a given trust situation therefore relate directly to the overarching goal of a particular trust event. Thus certain personal variables may play a larger role in the emergence of intrapersonal trust in one situation but essentially no role at all in another. Nevertheless, the truster’s emotional experience behind intrapersonal trust is a function of who she expects to be based on who she is now. Individual differences ergo shape the trust experience.

This process of contextualization relates to the emotional and external goal(s) behind the trust event and serves as a springboard for appraisal. It begins with the trust event and informs, but later is also informed by, appraisals relating to intrapersonal trust. How the truster contextualizes his environment also determines to a certain extent whether a negative emotion will entail primarily anger, sadness, disappointment, fear, or some combination of all of these things. These considerations will be discussed in more depth below with respect to practical application of the intrapersonal trust framework in research.

A: The stimulus

The intrapersonal trust process is set in motion by means of a stimulus, or what I have referred to above as a trust event, i.e., an emotion-eliciting event that initiates intrapersonal trust. In line with appraisal theory, I envision this event being closely connected to the objectives of the truster.

The emotional process leading to the emergence of intrapersonal trust thus begins when an individual becomes aware that a stimulus, or an event, in her environment is impacting a personal goal in a way that seems to require the assistance of another. This event moves the
individual to consider the implications of seeking help to ensure the objective highlighted by the trust event. To begin with, she may consider other solutions prior to preferring trusting another party. The trust event thus presents the issue of whether an individual wishes to, or should, take on the role of truster at all.

Prior to the event, the truster’s state of mind is still fundamentally influenced by “background noise” from mood, i.e., affect uncoupled from its original eliciting stimulus, as well as environmental concerns. In essence, the stimulus sets the scene for an affective reaction by reminding the truster that the event is personal, i.e., catalyzes a particular type of interpretive process that asks not “What does an event mean?” but rather “What does an event mean to me?” (cf. Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005)

B: Appraisal

Her next response is therefore to wonder how, i.e., whether, it will be good or bad for her and/or help or harm her. This existential sense of being personally affected in some as-yet unknown way keeps the appraisal process in motion. At this point, the individual is determining how she is, or may be, personally affected by the trust event. She may for example be involved because the welfare of a loved-one is at stake; or she may feel a personal affront to her ego because one of her ethical standards have been violated (Lazarus, 1991b).

This individual still cannot be called a truster since she has not even determined that she will perhaps use trust as a means for dealing with the message her emotions are sending her. Foremost in her mind at this point is that the event represents either an opportunity or a threat. People do not view events merely as problems to be coped with or surmounted but rather as opportunities upon which to “capitalize” (Rimé, 2007, 468). Instead, individuals make decisions precisely because they look forward to, or “savor,” the positive outcome by interpreting the situation in terms of potential benefit (Bryant, 1989). Appraisals are also made in terms of challenge, which if stressful, nevertheless constitute an opportunity for growth, mastery, or gain that is associated with positive emotions such as excitement and eagerness (Folkman, 1984, 840). The prospect of gain, contrary to the idea risk, does not just fill a hole created by the anticipation of potential loss. Gain thus moves the truster to dream about positive outcomes and to experience positive emotions in anticipation that she is approaching her goal or goals.

Thus viewing help from another party as the means to an objective does not immediately imply that the truster has foremost her potential vulnerability in mind. When the truster sees the help of another as an opportunity to capitalize on en route to her goal, she will experience positive affect in the anticipation that giving trust will enhance her well-being. If she sees seeking help as an action could make her vulnerable to the wiles of another or weaken her position in her environment, then she will anticipate experiencing negative emotions that decrease her well-being. In sum, the truster’s expectations regarding the assistance she feels
she needs to ensure her goal, and the ramifications of seeking it, define her emotional state around intrapersonal trust.

These assessments and responses are the basic elements of primary appraisal (Lazarus, 1991a), whose seminal function is to stimulate the truster’s awareness of the given's in her environment and to move her to begin making assessments about whether, why, and ultimately how they should or should not have changed. Having determined essentially whether the trust event is good (i.e., facilitates) or bad (i.e., impedes or completely blocks) for the objective at hand, the truster begins to consider who is responsible and whether she needs to manage the situation (problem-focused coping) or the emotional impact (emotion-focused coping) brought about by the trust event. At this point, she also considers the future psychological ramifications of the event, i.e., whether the event has changed the situation so as to increase or decrease goal congruency in the future (Lazarus, 1991b).

The purpose of secondary appraisal is then to determine how to deal with the shift in reality by focusing on accountability and impact. The individual thus asks herself who is responsible for the event. The emotions behind her trust decision and her act of trust-giving depend greatly on who she holds accountable. For example, if the truster is a project manager who has not yet ordered inventory urgently needed for a project, she will like as not humbly – and possibly with self-deprecation – entrust a subordinate with the task of solving the problem because she feels shame. However, if her subordinate failed in his responsibility to order the inventory in a timely fashion, her disgruntlement is likely to be proportionate to her distress, moving her experience anger and therefore to entrust a different subordinate with the task of solving the matter.

At this point, the truster also makes an assessment of whether she is able manage the demands of the event on her own, especially while still ensuring the things that are important to her, without adversely affecting them. The moment that she determines that she cannot ensure her priorities and manage the demands of the event on the strength of her own resources, trust becomes an issue because it represents a potential means for ensuring her desired outcome, i.e., achieving the goal or goals at hand.

Note that the project manager could satisfy several goals by entrusting a subordinate with the task of obtaining the missing inventory quickly. First, she would fulfill a personal emotional goal of mitigating the negative emotion and stress she is experiencing because of the missing inventory and looming project deadlines. She might also transform her anger or chagrin into gratification by displacing the inventory problem onto some other subordinate’s shoulders, who will do the job according to her expectations. She would also be taking a further step to ensure the completion of the project for which she is responsible, which in turn would move her to feel positive emotion as a result of adapting the situation to ensure the best possible outcome. This array of goals also highlights the many different environmental factors and personal inclinations that can conflate in a trust appraisal event.
and thereby create a contour of expectations and emotions that make a trust decision feel right or not.

At the same time, the truster generates particular expectations for what could, or should, happen in her environment, e.g., such as how others should help her. These expectations are directly related to the goal(s) behind the trust event and the emotion(s) propelling the trust decision. They are her basis for assessing whether a potential trustee will respond to the trust decision appropriately, i.e., as the truster believes the trustee should.

Given an array of different emotional responses and/or trust decisions, some that might be more effective than others, the truster also considers the ultimate impact of each in combination with the trustee’s behavioral and affective response. The project leader might for example decide that openly displaying her anger to her subordinate for his mistake in not procuring the needed inventory will be counterproductive to her working relationship with him in the long term. One option in this case might be to display positive affect toward her other subordinate, to whom she plans to delegate the task in future.

C. Rightness

These considerations set the scene for the truster’s emotional response because it is also here that the rightness ensues. As noted before, intrapersonal trust is not experienced because of the mere presence of particular contextual or personal variables per se. Trust will be given if rightness ensues. Rightness will ensue if the truster expects the trust decision a) to ensure the key goal linked to a trust event and b) to create a positive impact to her personal welfare. At this moment, the decision to ensure her goal by giving trust feels right, and she takes on the role of truster, i.e., of an individual who seeks external support to manage her situation within a particular environment.

Circumstances that result in intrapersonal trust can include among other things the trustee’s abilities or desire to participate in and augment the trust relationship and even the truster’s own mood at the time she gives trust. However, unless they relate directly to the thing for which she feels trust must be given to obtain – unless they generate in the truster emotion fuelling the truster’s expectations – such circumstances are more likely to play a minor role in the intrapersonal process moving her to feel trust or not.

Returning to the example of the Serbian editor and his trust relationship with one of the magazine’s contributors, Kojic’s incredulity at ever having met Kradizic and his open anger indicate that his decision to publish articles by “Dabic” was not the result of weighing risks and consequences. Rather, his words indicate feelings of rightness about a number of considerations in his environment relating directly to the goals of promoting alternative medicine, giving a distinguished expert a chance to voice his ideas, and feeling good about doing so:

I told him that I couldn’t list him as a neuropsychiatrist without seeing his credentials, but we went ahead and published his contributions nonetheless. … I don’t like to think about parallels between
Karadzic and the man I knew. But from talking to Dabic, I had no doubt about his knowledge of the field (MacDonald & Hadzivukovic, 2008, 2).

As an intrapersonal phenomenon, trust is therefore grounded in the deeply seated desires and perceived needs of the trustor and therefore requires the subjectivity of emotions to inform the trust decision, i.e., the decision to give trust or not. As a process, the emergence of intrapersonal trust is by nature affective because the role of personal significance in making assessments culminating in trust lends it emotional heat (cf. Smith, et al, 1993). The violation of Kojic’s expectation that “Dabic” was a good person generated emotion in Kojic because he experienced an affront to things that were of personal significance to him and to the rightness that motivated his initial act of trusting “Dabic.” The spontaneous nature of this reaction is highly emotional precisely because it is unforeseen.

Given the completely unexpected exposure of “Dabic” as one of the world’s most wanted fugitives, Kojic could hardly have anticipated his reaction; nor did he calculate that trusting “Dabic” would culminate in such strong feelings of betrayal, indignance, and ire. Kojic’s internal turmoil needed to find some outlet for expression precisely because the outcome of his decision to trust “Dabic” was so completely different from what Kojic expected.

A truster may be cognizant of certain calculated deliberations, intuitions, or expectations, compelling him to trust. Ultimately, he trusts – or not – because it feels right, no matter which factors inform that trust (Möllering, 2006). Only in retrospect might a truster come to understand why a trust decision felt right. Rightness is affective because it combines the personal ramifications of the trust event – i.e., whether the event is good or bad for the trustor – with expectations regarding what will happen if trust is given. As noted above with respect to self or other accountability, exactly which emotion(s) compel that trust decision depend(s) on which decision-making components play a role in the appraisal process. More about the relationship between trust and each basic emotion will also be discussed below.

D. The emotional response

Rightness thus triggers the emotional response experienced behind intrapersonal trust, but the emotion experienced frames it. The truster has by this time made specific inferences regarding the trust event, who is responsible for it, as well as how the trustee can and should help. Appraisal has enabled the truster to fill the cognitive vacuum in each of these “extensible dependencies” regarding the trust decision and thus to form an overall picture of how the event affects her.

The result is an involuntary emotional reaction tailored to ensure the goal underlying the appraisal process. Toward this end, each emotion has its own goal impact (or “relational drama,” Lazarus, 1991a) and ergo its own function in relation to trust goals. Accordingly, each function should reveal different motivations and behaviors with respect to the experience of intrapersonal trust.
The trust decision does not have to culminate in the act of giving trust. The trust decision entails the decision to give trust or not as motivated by emotion. Consider an example in which fear generated distrust that ended maladaptively for the truster.

In mid-July 2008, computer engineer Terry Childs was indicted for sealing off access to San Francisco’s new multi-million-dollar fiber wide area network (fiberWAN) by changing the pass codes for its routers and switches. Prior to the lockout, peers and superiors throughout the San Francisco IT department knew that Childs was the only person able to define administrative access to the network thusly. Indeed, they knew that Childs was also the only one who truly understood how the network was configured because he was its sole builder. Even as lead network engineer for the entire city, Childs involved other engineers as little as possible; he viewed his management superiors as intrusive, incompetent, uninformed, and obstructive when it came to the sound development of the network (Venezia, 2008). Childs was afraid that people without the technical expertise and abilities might try to manipulate, and unwittingly to endanger, the network, without which the city could no longer function (Vijayan, 2008). He therefore took action to protect it – and ergo the city – by locking all the other administrators out of it (Venezia, 2008). For ten days, and even with a team of code crackers working full-time, the City of San Francisco was not able to gain access to its own system, and Childs himself was sent to jail.

The adaptive function of fear is to protect a critical goal by preventing or avoiding unwanted outcomes. Before the lockout, Childs attempted to preempt harmful effects to the system by considerably limiting the amount of control people other than himself had to it. To safeguard the network even more, he made himself available for technical support around the clock, but with time he felt overextended (ibid). His fear culminated in a lack of trust that manifested itself as an inability to delegate, a constant workload, depleted energy levels, and ultimately the lockout. Childs’ fear informed him to protect something that was crucial for the City – and for his own equilibrium – so his exclusion of access of everyone but the one individual he could be sure he could trust – himself – seemed a viable means of ensuring that goal. In this case, trust was intentionally not given.

The caveat to the functional nature of emotions is that some behaviors are probably indicative of more than one motivating affective state (Power & Dalgleish, 2008). Fear and later anger appear to have motivated Terry Childs to take much more drastic action in communicating the importance of his dedication to the integrity and security of San Francisco’s fiberWAN network. As another example, anger and disgust could couple to motivate a manager to entrust one employee with a much larger project for which she feels he is not ready simply so that she will not have to deal with another employee who she does not trust. Conversely, I would expect surprise and happiness to move the same manager to take pleasure in her subordinate’s unexpectedly good performance, to reevaluate her ideas about the subordinate’s abilities, and then to entrust him with more valued projects in the future.
I have depicted this process in detail, but appraisal can occur rapidly at a low, almost subconscious level of awareness or slowly in a process of careful, in-depth thought (Giner-Sorolla, 1999). Thus appraisal allows people to digest information of all types, including knowledge and information gleaned from emotional assessment, and at the necessary speed. Indeed, given the volatility of the truster’s appraisals and subsequent emotional responses to changes in his environment (Scherer, 1984), I would expect most appraisals around trust to be rapid in nature and to feel intuitive to the truster.

E. The behavioral response: Trust decision and physiological reaction

As the above examples show, the emotional response is driven by specific perceptions and motivations that generate a particular frame in which intrapersonal trust is experienced. The different experience generates different behavioral responses as well. These responses include the initial trust decision as well as the physiological responses that are adjunct to each emotion.

Of note at this point is that trust is being experienced largely as an intrapersonal phenomenon. The truster has a clear sense of his goal, and his emotions are informing him of what has to happen to ensure it, in turn motivating him to act on the desire to ensure his goal. Again, the detail described here might imply calculated design or particular awareness of one’s own response. However, appraisal can occur rapidly and subconsciously enough for the truster to be aware of neither except that the decision feels right and should be acted upon. The truster may feel so convinced in the rightness of the trust decision that the full ramifications of why it felt so right only become clear later during reappraisal.

The behavioral response is thus also the beginning of the transference of trust from the intrapersonal to the interpersonal sphere as an initial trust decision that the trustee perceives and experiences in some form, i.e., as specific, observable behaviors. Up to this point, the affective basis of intrapersonal trust has helped the truster to better understand his own priorities. Once the trust decision is made and a behavioral response reflecting that decision ensues, the truster uses his emotional frame of mind to signal visibly his expectations about how the trustee should respond in the trust relationship. Thus Childs’ lockout as an act of distrust had a social function, as well, of signaling the reality of the latent dangers of whose occurrence Childs had been initially afraid.

If emotion is a psychological experience, then it is physiological, too (Frijda, 1986). Physiological reactions are induced over the short and longer terms as a result of emotion, which lend associations to the emotional experience, e.g., a “burning” sense of shame or an increased heartbeat from excitement. I would expect trust as an emotional experience to have some kind of physiological impact on the truster, either resulting from the salubrious effects of positive emotions on physical functioning (Heaphy & Dutton, 2008) or from negative effects that could potentially culminate in long-term physical decline. However, to stay focused on the intrapersonal experience of the truster and how emotions motivate it, the
remaining discussion of intrapersonal trust will revolve around psychological effects, in this case as they become visible through actions taken, i.e., behavioral responses.

F. The trustee’s response

The trustee makes his own appraisal of the trust decision and responds in consideration of his own person-environment exchange. After intrapersonal trust has developed and after the trustee has demonstrated this fact with an act of trust-giving, the trustee’s response plays a critical role for the affective continuance of the trust relationship. Although I would expect the appraisal processes and response of the trustee to parallel in many ways those depicted above for the truster, I remain focused on the experience and behavior of the truster to stay focused on intrapersonal trust.

G. Reappraisal and regulation of intrapersonal trust

The final phase of the intrapersonal trust process is the truster’s observation of and response to the trustee’s response to the trust decision. Again, trust transfers back to the intrapersonal sphere because the truster’s first response at this point is to consider the ramifications of the trustee’s response. I therefore anticipate that positive emotion will generally ensue when the trustee’s response meets the truster’s expectations and negative emotion when the trustee’s response does not. Additionally, when the emotional drama behind a trust decision is perpetuated, the associated emotion will be augmented.

In a similar vein, it is also during reappraisal that I would expect surprise to play its most prominent role because it is at this point that expectations are either fulfilled or disappointed. Editor-in-chief Kojic began his reappraisal by learning of “Dabic’s” true identity; his initial surprise completely upended his past suppositions about the man who wrote articles for him. The shift in reality forced Kojic to reassess past events. The fact that the trust relationship he had with Kradizic was built on a false identity offended his honest attempt to further the goals of building the alternative medical community while helping a fellow expert. This motivation is the basis for anger, whose adaptive function is to rectify a situation, particularly a moral offense. Indeed, Kojic clarified his position by concluding that that Kradizic should stand to trial for his misdeeds at The Hague. This final, moralizing statement was emotionally gratifying to Kojic because it enabled Kojic to hold Kradizic responsible for personally deceiving Kojic about Kradizic’s true identity.

A truster may control displays of trust-related emotions, less to manage others’ experience around the trust relationship and more to prevent anticipated negative emotions as a result of future thwarted goals. Reappraisals are in and of themselves a means of regulating emotional experiences and these also have a direct impact on both inter- and intrapersonal trust.

The reappraisal process also renders trust highly intrapersonal because the truster’s mind and experience revolves around considering what happened, what was supposed to happen, and whether or not the feeling of rightness is justified. The truster’s experience of
intrapersonal trust is less bound to a single point in time around a particular trust event at this point, giving the truster much more opportunity to become more fully cognizant of the ramifications of a trust decision. That awareness does not necessarily come immediately; but the truster does begin to examine at some level the contextual factors that seemed salient at the time of the trust decision, these often including the personality, intentions, and predictability of the trustee.

This reappraisal phase feels especially important, and is conducted with particular attention, if a truster has not felt affirmed in the initial sense of rightness that motivated her trust decision. If the trustee has not acted according to the truster’s expectations, the truster feels challenged in her ability to trust her sense of rightness about a trust decision later. Because rightness often occurs below the truster’s awareness, the truster may well question her ability to make intuitive judgments. If the trustee’s response to the trust decision has pleasantly surprised the truster, the challenge is less discomfiting. However, if the truster’s confidence is shaken by the trustee’s unexpected, disappointing response, the truster will focus on reassigning the situation so that she is certain to have learned the right lesson in the present that will enable her to trust her gut instinct in the future. This behavior is in line with the galvanizing, focusing nature of negative emotions to alert an individual to a problem and focus his mind on solving it, e.g., by heightening his critical thinking regarding the status quo (George & Zhou, 2002; Gross, 1998b; Keltner & Haidt, 1999).

This process of counterfactual thinking assists the regulation of emotions after the trustee’s response (Gross, 2007). Kojic’s relative helplessness in truly changing his past trust in Kradizic forced him to look introspectively at his own priorities and rethink his relationship with Kradizic. Kojic’s inability to reconcile the two identities of the good man he knew with that of Kradizic, who had been demonized and damned as irrefutably guilty worldwide, moved him in the short term to try to suppress the whole memory and to deny he ever knew Kradizic. This initial response may have offered immediate relief in some measure, but does not indicate that Kojic had finished considering the implications of his relationship with Kradizic. In essence, the trustee is preoccupied with figuring out what she has learned through the act of giving trust while dealing with the implications of the trustee’s response. In this way, the reappraisal phase lays the foundation for further development in the trust relationship.

Even farther down the road after the trust decision, the trust relationship – but also intrapersonal trust – is eventually the product of repeated interaction. Initial appraisals become more stable over time with respect to a truster’s goals (Zand, 1972; Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985), which affects the emergence of intrapersonal trust in the medium and long terms. Sudden external change also has emotional and behavioral implications when routinized trust behaviors change and force trusters to reappraise a long-term trust relationship (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). One wonders, therefore, whether time really eventually makes up for the fragility of trust (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996), especially
considering the lingering aftereffects of mood (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005) as well as affective contextual factors such as the truster’s – or trustee’s – emotional intelligence and implicit theories.

Closing remarks

The intrapersonal trust framework presented here argues that trusters engage in an ongoing, internalized dialogue that is a function of time, emotion, and constant reinterpretation with regard to how a situation will affect their future (Ross & Karniol, 2003, 613). In addition, I have argued that even at the involuntary, spontaneous emotional level, trusters thus strive to strategically select the environments that they believe will be most beneficial for their purposes (Buss, 1987; Diener, Larsen, & Emmons, 1984). The emphasis on process in the intrapersonal trust framework implies that people manage their emotions constantly, i.e., before, during, and after a trust event (Gross, 2007).

Prior to the trust decision, the process of appraisal helps people make the future relevant to the present by creating in their minds “possible selves,” i.e., different potential images of themselves looking, feeling, and acting a particular way in the future (Markus & Nurius, 1986; Markus & Ruvolo, 1989). An individual considers the advantages and disadvantages of each of these potential futures as it relates to his overarching goal (e.g., Bandura, 1989, 1990; Locke & Latham, 1990). In this manner, trusters are able to control their exposure to particular trust events – as well as to optimize the affective experiences that come with those events. Trusters manage their emotions during appraisal, too. As noted above, primary and secondary appraisal have dedicated functions toward this end. Primary appraisal commands the truster’s attention and secondary appraisal provides the means for understanding the personal implications of a situation.

Intrapersonal trust thus entails a coalescence of choices and interpretations that is stimulated by a trust event and that converges as an emotional decision that feels right to the truster. It is the product of the truster’s internal assessment of multiple extensible dependencies, each of which can be interpreted and acted on in multiple ways. These expectations and the appraised implications for the truster’s well-being frame the emotions behind the trust decision and ergo the visible act of trust-giving.

Depicting each how the truster experiences each step in this process demonstrates how intensely personal and emotional an experience it is. Furthermore, breaking down the process thusly sheds light on the points at which trusters are indeed proactive or guided more by affect and motivations of which they are unaware. Considering the role of emotions in the development of trust facilitates insight into the reasons why people give trust that go beyond either personality or environmental considerations. When viewed as an intrapersonal process, trust thus seems less like a mystical leap of faith (Möllering, 2006; Simmel, 1950) with an arbitrary nature that is impossible to explain or predict and more like a in-depth
interaction between reason and emotion motivating a truster at a particular point in time with respect to a particular trust relationship.

The emotions in intrapersonal trust

Now that I have defined intrapersonal trust and offered some insight into how trusters experience it as an internal, affective phenomenon, I would like to return to the subject of emotion, around which the intrapersonal trust framework revolves.

Basic emotions

In the process of intrapersonal trust depicted above, I assume that emotions emerge through the appraisal process, which gives each emotion a different function and impact on trust, first intrapersonally and then interpersonally. Accordingly, I take the argument that emotions are not dimensional by valence and arousal but rather divisible into discrete categories, i.e., basic emotions with a unique cognitive structure and adaptive function.

A basic emotion is a) at least ubiquitous, if not also essentially universal irrespective of culture, b) associated with a small set of pan-cultural core objectives (Stein & Trabasso, 1992) that link personal goals with events in the environment (e.g., Frijda, 1986), and c) assumed to have its own unique adaptive function (Lazarus, 1991b; Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). These differences are useful for a theory of intrapersonal trust because they delineate the type of experience a truster can have, given a particular emotional state, and the way they motivate him.

To consider the unique impact of each emotion on intrapersonal trust in more detail, I assume that basic emotions revolve around particular action tendencies (e.g., Arnold, 1960; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991a; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987). I do not assume that these basic emotions are biologically hardwired (e.g., Ekman, 1992; Gray, 1982; Izard, 1971, 1977; Panksepp, 1982; Plutchik, 1980) or the product of attributions (Weiner & Graham, 1984). My focus on the psychological, affective aspects of intrapersonal trust is also based on the assumption that biological functions rarely invoke feelings of trust (Smith & Kirby, 2004).

Finally, many different lists of the basic emotions exist (e.g., Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1972; Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989; Plutchik, 1994; Power & Dalgleish 2008; Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O’Connor, 1987) and tend to conceive of emotion as outcomes (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). Up to this point, I have centered the process of appraisal around intrapersonal trust in detail to give the reader a sense of how emotion has an impact on the emergence of trust within the mind of the truster. My focus now will be on emotions as components of the greater appraisal process and therefore also as antecedents of intrapersonal trust from now on.
Basic emotions in intrapersonal trust

As antecedents to intrapersonal trust, basic emotions need to reflect the truster’s subjective experience, i.e., as a result of giving trust to further some much-valued goal. The relationship of intrapersonal trust to each emotion thus needs to be reflective of the expectations that motivate the truster to feel rightness prior to trust. Since intrapersonal trust is dependent upon rightness that hinges on the automatic response in line with an emotion’s a) core relational theme and b) function (Lazarus, 1991), these two factors were primary considerations in the development of a list of basic emotions relating to intrapersonal trust. Although intensity is more readily associated with certain basic emotions, I assume that all of them can manifest themselves subtly or strongly; all can develop gradually over time or occur suddenly and even be reversed through the element of surprise.

I use the basic list offered in Weiss and Cropanzano’s (1996) adaptation of Shaver, et al (1987): Fear, joy, love, sadness, anger, and – because it can indeed play a key role in many trust situations – possibly also surprise (21). With this I synthesize Power and Dalgleish’s (2008, 99, 132) conceptual descriptions, or “core relational theme” (see Lazarus, 1991a) and Lazarus’ (1991a) specification of love to collate the basic emotions I believe play a role in intrapersonal trust. How these emotions constitute part of a proactive attempt to safeguard a valued goal will be discussed in more detail in the following section.

Since negative emotions experienced at work seem to exert a greater influence on individuals (Laucken, 2001; Elfenbein, 2007), I discuss these first. Negative emotions focus attention on the immediate moment, on the now, so I would expect them to link very visibly intrapersonal trust with particular responses. These emotions are also particularly important for the study of trust because many current definitions of trust in organizational science assume that negative emotions are the springboard for the occurrence of trust (e.g., Deutsch, 1958; Rousseau, et al, 1998).

Anger entails the frustration of a role or goal important to the truster as a result of an agent’s unwillingness to prevent an outcome under his or her control (Lazarus & Lazarus, 1994; Power & Dalgleish, 2008). The purpose of anger is to overcome the obstacle instated by the agent in order to ensure the desired role or goal. Anger thus has a moral component of right and wrong and therefore is used in its most adaptive capacity to confront the agent to change his or her behavior (Dilorio & Nusbaumer, 1993; Morris & Keltner, 2000). Anger becomes maladaptive when the truster must invest a great deal of energy dealing with the experience of its intensity (Wharton & Erickson, 1993) and so is viewed as difficult to use constructively for adaptive ends (Elfenbein, 2007).

Disgust is generally viewed as a rejection response intended for expunging something unwanted and closely linked to physiological responses such as nausea or a feeling of revulsion (Davey, 1994). Lerner, Small, and Loewenstein (2004) demonstrated how such complete rejection becomes manifest in the workplace, i.e., moving disgusted buyers to pay
less than sad buyers for the same goods. From a figurative perspective, however, disgust can also entail disgust at others or oneself in some form, i.e., shame, embarrassment, or guilt, resulting from an inability to live up to a personal standard as a result of certain aspects of the self (Powers & Dalgleish, 2008). In a similar light, a powerful social function of disgust is to communicate cultural values regarding what is and what is not morally acceptable (Rozin & Fallon, 1987; Rozin, Haidt, McCauley, 1999). The social function of shame is to communicate apology to others. However, when maladaptive, disgust can move an individual to become overwhelmed with self-consciousness and/or the ability to reject life-sustaining elements (Powers & Dalgleish, 2008), e.g., as in schizophrenia or anorexia patients, respectively.

Fear constitutes awareness of a physical or social threat to a critical goal, e.g., for survival, and is intended for deterring unwanted outcomes. From a social perspective, fear also has the important function of signaling to others that danger is near. Scherer (1988) even argues that the outward expression of fear is tantamount to an appeal for action from others, an urgent request for help out of a situation that is frightening. Fear is particularly associated with appraisals that one lacks the resources to be able to cope with the threat (Powers & Dalgleish, 2008). The presence of fear is associated with selective attentional and mnemonic biases that affect later appraisal processes regarding potential threats (Dalgleish & Watts, 1990; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Gross, 2007).

Finally, sadness signals the loss or failure (real, imagined, or potential) of a valued role or goal, which can vary in importance or type (Powers & Dalgleish, 2008). The function of this emotion is to give an individual the opportunity to reassess and reassign his or her priorities and key objectives. In its maladaptive state, sadness results in withdrawal, helplessness, and social alienation and over time can, as with fear, result in a long-term appraisal bias to generally see the glass as half-empty. The adaptive function of sadness, however, is the act of changing one’s circumstances for constructive change.

As proposed above, positive emotions are just as important as negative emotions for intrapersonal trust. Positive emotions expand the variety of people’s responses to the environment and encourage people to embrace new things (Fredrickson, 2001). Positive emotions thusly inspire individuals to become more innovative, creative, and exploratory as they focus on the long term. Positive emotions also counter the burdensome and painful effects of negative emotions and so allow individuals hiatus from short-term survival responses (ibid). Positive affect is also associated in organizations with positive spontaneous behaviors such as spreading goodwill, constructive suggestions, (George & Brief, 1992), reduced absenteeism (Forgas & George, 2001), as well as greater generosity (Isen, 1987, 2001; Isen & Baron, 1991).

Happiness indicates that one is moving successfully towards or completing a valued role or goal. At work, happiness is associated with increased productivity (Hersey, 1932) and effectiveness (e.g., Staw, Bell, & Clausen, 1986; Staw, et al, 1994). Happiness gives
individuals the confidence to take risks, embrace change, and plan for their long-term futures. I assume here that happiness occurs in response to a particular goal or as the sum of positive experience within the frame of a particular relationship. I also take Power & Dalgleish’s (2008) argument that happiness depends on the fulfillment of personal goals without negative consequences for others. In its maladaptive function, happiness reduces critical thinking (George & Zhou, 2002), heightens reliance on stereotypes in decision-making (Keltner, et al, 2003), and increases the avoidance of experiences that might induce negative emotion (Brooks, 2003).

Love is a momentary or temporary state of affection for someone or something (Lazarus, 1991a). Ranging from romantic love to liking, love in all intensities and types involves intimacy, passion, and decision-commitment (Steinberg, 1986, 1987) resulting from the desire to engage in mutual appreciation by giving or receiving affection (Lazarus, 1991a). In its adaptive function, love allows people to connect in meaningful ways with one another and gives them a sense of belonging. In its maladaptive function, love drives individuals to extremes and isolates people from reality.

Whether surprise is indeed one of the basic emotions (Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1972) is a matter for more empirical exploration (Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1989; Power & Dalgleish, 2008). I do believe surprise plays an important role in relation to trust when a goal takes an unexpected turn, bad or good. Since shifts in goals are always the defining factor for the emergence of an emotion, I wonder if instead surprise, not unlike hope (e.g., Snyder, Harris, Anderson, Holleran, Irving, Sigmon, Yoshinobu, Gibb, Langelle, & Harney, 1991), constitutes more of a general reaction associated with any of the other basic emotions, rather than an actual basic emotion in and of itself. Nonetheless, surprise deserves at least initial consideration for a theory of intrapersonal trust, I think, because the most radical changes in emotion will happen when acts of trust-giving are linked to surprise, irrespective of whether surprise is an outcome or an antecedent.

Overarching emotional themes

I believe that in the simplest form of emotion-driven trust, each basic emotion has one or two overarching relational themes with respect to trust. Doubtless there is a tendency for certain emotions to converge and so create a somewhat more complex emotional response in intrapersonal trust, e.g., anger and fear (Dalgleish & Power, 2008). However, in line with the idea that one emotion predominates the emergence of intrapersonal trust linked with a particular trust event, I discuss each basic emotion in isolation.

Anger in the truster, for example, relates to a goal or role frustrated either by the trustee or by a third party. In the first case, trust toward the trustee will be low, barring some unexpected turn of events that alter the truster’s mind; in the second case, the truster is likely to feel trust in proportion to the skepticism she feels toward the third party.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Emotion</th>
<th>Conceptual description</th>
<th>Function of Emotion</th>
<th>Descriptive words relating to trust</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>Frustration of a role or goal through a perceived agent</td>
<td>Overcome an obstacle blocking a desired goal.</td>
<td>Envy, Exasperation, Indignation, Irritation, Rage, Torment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disgust</td>
<td>Rejection of a person, object, or idea repulsive to the self, and to valued roles and goals, including one’s own values, goals, or ideals.</td>
<td>Rid oneself of something unwanted, figuratively including values and aspects of self that prevent living up to one’s own ideal model of humanity/oneself.</td>
<td>Distaste, Horror, Nausea, Repugnance, Revulsion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear</td>
<td>Physical or social threat to self or valued role or goal.</td>
<td>Rapidly react to ensure a threatened critical goal, e.g., key for survival.</td>
<td>Alarm, Anxiety, Desperation, Discomfit, Intimidation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joy/Happiness</td>
<td>Successful move towards or completion of a valued role or goal.</td>
<td>Ensure the attainment of one’s goals.</td>
<td>Cheerfulness, Contentment, Enthrallment, Optimism, Pride, Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Love</td>
<td>Desiring or giving affection (not necessarily always reciprocated).</td>
<td>Feel a sense of human connection; experiencing belonging.</td>
<td>Adulation, Affection, Amity, Attachment, Devotion, Longing, Lust, Passion, Regard, Tenderness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sadness</td>
<td>Loss or failure (actual or possible) of valued role or goal.</td>
<td>Reassess key objectives and plans and assign new priorities.</td>
<td>Disappointment, Dismay, Neglect, Sorrow, Suffering, Sympathy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Surprise)</td>
<td>(Sudden) awareness of an unexpected turn of events related to a valued goal or role.</td>
<td>Reevaluate previous preconceptions, particularly with regard to trustee.</td>
<td>Amazement, Disillusion, Incredulity, Shock</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Basic emotions relating to trust

Disgust with respect to trust is equivalent to the truster’s – usually ethical – rejection of something associated with the trustee and preempts entirely the emergence and/or continuance of trust. Continued collaboration in such a situation constitutes a proactive act.
of distrust or suspicion. An individual can also be disgusted with her own inability to live up to her own moral standard.

Regarding how fear relates to trust, the truster is cognizant of her sense of dependence upon the trustee for the resources necessary to end the trust event adaptively and gives trust in search of the trustee’s assistance but also his assurance that he will not harm the truster.

Sadness can immobilize the truster, who experiences loss or failure with respect to a particular objective, moving him to relinquish a valued goal to the care of another in the hope of salvaging it. However, when a truster sympathizes with a trustee’s sorrow, the truster is likely to interpret an event as a trust event and give trust because she would want to be trusted were she in the truster’s situation.

Happiness – whether directly related to the truster or whether linked with an unrelated event chronologically close to the trust event – moves the truster to transfer beliefs of ideal behavior to the trustee. Specifically, the truster is more prone to have a “good feeling” about the trustee’s propensity to understand and interpret similarly the truster’s priorities and desires regarding the trustee’s ideal response to the truster’s trust decision, creating the expectation that the trustee is “on the truster’s side.”

Trust is also given out of love in various forms, as is reflected in research on behavior resulting from liking someone (Derlega, Metts, Petronio, & Margulis, 1993; Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995; Liden & Maslyn, 1998; Nicholson, Compeau, & Sethi, 2001). A truster who feels genuine affection for a trustee during a trust event is likely to admire, feel inspired by, or identify with the trustee and thereby believe in the trustee. This idea speaks to the idea of charisma discussed earlier in Chapter 2; and as indicated there, one could even argue that decisions motivated by love are in fact not truly born of trust but for idealization of the trustee. Additionally, in line with past research on positive emotions and information processing (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995; Beal, Weiss, Barros, & MacDermid, 2005; Berdahl & Martorana, 2006; George & Zhou, 2002; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996; Tiedens & Linton, 2001), I would expect positive emotions to be the basis for reduced appraisal and with a sense of the rightness of the decision to give trust or not.

Finally, surprise, a sudden awareness of an unexpected turn of events regarding the truster, can move a truster to completely change his assessment of the trustee. Because surprise is also often linked to changes in the environment as well, ranging from the acquisition of old information previously unknown to the truster to actual altered circumstances, I would expect surprise to fundamentally alter any trust appraisal, even before a trust event is over.

To return to the initial intrapersonal trust concept, the presence of each of these emotions during an appraisal culminating in trust and later in acts of giving trust, reflects a particular set of expectations that color the trustee’s experience about the trustee, the situation, and whether or not trust should be given. These expectations accordingly also influence his behavior.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emotion</th>
<th>Conceptual description</th>
<th>Emotion-driven behavior/appraisal relating to trust(-giving)</th>
<th>Descriptive words relating to trust</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>Frustration of a role or goal through a perceived agent.</td>
<td>If toward trustee: Low unless expectations change. If toward third-party: Proportional to skepticism toward third-party. More in-depth appraisal, chiefly used to justify trusting the trustee, known or unknown.</td>
<td>Envy Exasperation Indignation Irritation Rage Torment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Preempts the emergence or continuance of trust whatsoever; if collaboration ensues, distrust is basis. OR Distrust in oneself ensues from inability to live up to own moral standard.</td>
<td>Distaste Horror Nausea Repugnance Revulsion The self-conscious emotions: • Guilt • Shame • Embarrassment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disgust</td>
<td>Rejection of a person, object, or idea repulsive to the self, and to valued roles and goals, including one’s own values, goals, or ideals.</td>
<td>Sense of dependence on others moves truster to seek trustee’s assistance and assurance (please don’t hurt me).</td>
<td>Alarm Anxiety Desperation Discomfit Intimidation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear</td>
<td>Physical or social threat to self or valued role or goal.</td>
<td>Transference of beliefs of competence to trustee; less intensive appraisal processes.</td>
<td>Cheerfulness Contentment Enthrallment Optimism Pride Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joy/</td>
<td>Successful move towards or completion of a valued role or goal.</td>
<td>Self-identification toward or admiration of or inspiration via trustee moves truster to feel affection and believe utterly in the trustee (cf. charisma).</td>
<td>Adulation Affection Amity Attachment Devotion Longing Lust Passion Regard Tenderness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Happines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s</td>
<td>Desiring or giving affection (not necessarily always reciprocated).</td>
<td>Moves truster to relinquish a valued, once-valued goal to the care of another, i.e., in the hope of goal being saved by an external source OR in the empathetic position that the trustee would want to be trusted if s/he was in the trustee’s position.</td>
<td>Disappointment Dismay Neglect Sorrow Suffering Compassion Empathy Sympathy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sadness</td>
<td>Loss or failure (actual or possible) of valued role or goal.</td>
<td>Changes/flips truster’s expectations regarding trustee.</td>
<td>Amazement Disillusion Incredulity Shock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Surprise</td>
<td>(Sudden) awareness of an unexpected turn of events related to a valued goal or role.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Basic emotions and appraisals in intrapersonal trust
The emotional experience around intrapersonal trust

Some researchers have argued that by nature people have difficulty experiencing negative and positive affect simultaneously (Diener & Emmons, 1984; Diener & Iran-Nejad, 1986). Nevertheless, the promise of any appraisal theory, irrespective of whether basic emotions are based on universal behavioral signals, physiology, or evolution, is that emotions can be experienced together and then analytically separated from one another like colors of light blending against a theatrical stage. Although the appraisal process directs the truster’s attention to the most pressing goal (Scherer, 1984), past research confirms that people do experience ambivalent states based on positive and negative emotion (Pratt & Doucet, 2000; Fong, 2007). Indeed, the widely used definition of trust as a psychological state in which the truster experiences vulnerability toward as well as hope regarding the good intentions of the trustee (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998) even suggests that trust could not exist without the presence of conflicting and ambivalent basic emotions in trust events.

How goals conflict and combine influences the appraisal process, particularly where well-being and coping do not necessarily harmonize with regard to a trust event. These considerations also have bearing on the ways in which a truster feels he can cope with his situation. A truster may not be able to clearly prioritize objectives if affective information is telling him to give equal consideration to more than one goal (e.g., Fong & Tiedens, 2006). In line with research on mood and the carryover effects of affect (e.g., Forgas, 1995; Lerner & Loewenstein, 2004), emotions can be brought into trust events even as new emotional reactions occur around the trust event itself, producing in essence a collocation of different basic emotions that influence the truster’s experience of a trust event. Although emotional reactions can become routinized (Millar & Millar, 1996; Weiss, 2002), the potential for behavioral irregularity amid so many different affective outcomes nonetheless exists and therefore challenges – or at least offers new thoughts on – the hypothesis that trust constitutes a self-reinforcing, interpersonal cycle.

The basic emotions may even be combined to result in a more complex emotion having its own impact on an individual’s state of mind (Power & Dalgleish, 2008). In the former case, one individual may also have multiple, equally important goals that each are associated predominantly with emotion. Such goals may well stand in relation to one another, thereby heightening any sense of internal conflict or conviction in the truster when multiple goals relating to the truster’s well-being are neither easily separable nor clearly irrelevant to a trust episode.

The intrapersonal trust framework in practical contexts

As noted before, since appraisal is tantamount to the interaction between an individual and her environment, it should follow that intrapersonal trust will become visible by observing personal and contextual variables that are especially relevant to a truster and conducive to the
The emergence of intrapersonal trust. Furthermore, I would expect a truster’s experience of intrapersonal trust to be observable through the truster’s evaluation of these variables.

The truster’s environment: Resources

Accordingly, as postulated before, I would expect the experience of intrapersonal trust to be defined in part by the truster’s evaluation of the extent, quality, and nature of the resources at his disposal for ensuring a particular goal stimulated by a trust event. I define resources broadly, to satisfy the need to move closer to, and ultimately to attain, one’s internal representation of desired outcomes, events, or processes, i.e., one’s goals (Austin & Vancouver, 1996). The right resources – material, visceral, social – are the means to any goal. Whether a truster is acting out of happiness or despair, resources define the truster’s expectations of whether or not – and to what extent – she can achieve the goal alone. These expectations also determine the way in which the truster will feel she can, and should, appeal to the trustee to help her culminate her goal; and as mentioned before, these expectations also provide the framework for how a truster feels the trustee can and should respond to this appeal. In line with the proposal that intrapersonal trust is inherently motivated by emotion, the concept of resources can refer to the material goods a truster lacks (cf. Thompson, 1967), but also refers to the intangible, affective, and motivational resources that a truster may feel she needs, and can potentially get, from the trustee, to ensure her objective. Furthermore, the truster need only feel she has those resources for intrapersonal trust to observe; her feelings do not have to coincide with others’ interpretations of the situation. Intrapersonal trust is a subjective phenomenon, and its perils come when the truster is unable to reconcile personal agenda with the characteristics of the environment in which the trust decision will take place (cf. Lazarus & Lazarus, 1994, 144).

Of course, other contextual variables – e.g., culture, the trustee’s personality, the truster’s formal authority over the trustee, time limitations, a third-party’s influence on either truster or trustee, just to name a few of the variables that have been taken into consideration in research on trust – will doubtless play a role in a particular trust setting. However, I believe that these all have an influence on the fundamental contextual variable for intrapersonal trust, namely resources. With the right resources, a truster may feel essentially uninfluenced by another’s formal authority over him. Another combination of personal resources may make the truster feel on the one hand completely unable to handle the emotional aspects of the trust goal but on the other well equipped to deal with the material aspects of said goal.

Still, how a truster views her resources always plays a role in the trust decision because the experience of intrapersonal trust is dependent upon how the truster feels another person will help him to facilitate and ensure her goal. Thus, the intrapersonal experience revolves around the forward-looking exploration of possible future selves (Cantor N., Markus, H. R., Niedenthal, P, & Nurius, 1986; Markus & Nurius, 1986; Markus & Ruvolo, 1989) in relation to the many different options – as a function of resources – at one’s disposal.
The emotions the truster experiences have a great deal to do with how she expects the trustee to respond to the trust decision, i.e., how she expects the trustee to supplement resources to her own situation to ensure her goal. They inform her of whether or not ensuring the goal is really her responsibility – or someone else’s, such as the truster or a third person. For example, if a truster sees her resources toward a particular goal as being blocked by either the conscious intent or the negligence of another person, her emotional response will be to become angry. The energizing nature of anger moves her to take action to reinstate the resources she needs so that she can ensure the goal. If on the other hand the truster lacks the resources to ensure her goal because of her own inability to preserve them, she will experience disgust for want of living up to her own standards, not trust herself to be able to meet her own expectations, and appeal to a potential trustee who can. As a third example, a trust event might alert a truster to the as-yet unhoped-for possibility of unexpectedly attaining a particular goal. Her resulting happiness, bolstered by surprise, would move her to view the event – and the goal-enabling features in it – as broadening resources upon which to capitalize. In essence, the truster’s evaluation of her resources toward ensuring the goal spawned by the trust event because it tells her how and to what extent she can cope with the trust event on her own and whether or not she is responsible for the situation.

*The truster's priorities: Personal variables*

The truster’s evaluation of his environment is invariably guided by a deeper psychological and interpretive foundation special to his past experience, including constructs such as emotional intelligence (Salovey & Mayer, 1993), personality traits (Bargh, 1990), and capability beliefs (Bandura, 1986). Such personal variables account for how a truster assigns meaning to and feels involved in his environment (Lazarus & Smith, 1988) and therefore influence his expectations with regard to the goal at hand. Given the wide range of the factors delineating any given goal, e.g., ease, attainability (Winell, 1987; Bandura, 1986; Naylor & Ilgen, 1984), or time constraints, just exactly which factors lend salience to a goal are particular to the truster and situation (Austin & Vancouver, 1996) and thus more difficult to predict for every trust event. I therefore propose that the personal variables influencing and motivating a truster most with respect to a particular trust event therefore relate directly to its overarching goal. The personal variables that have great influence on the trust decision or experience of intrapersonal trust in one instance may exert practically none in another situation.

Personal variables allow the researcher to delve more deeply into how the truster views the world. In line with the idea that emotion influences intrapersonal trust, however, these variables do not entail mechanisms with which the truster evaluates his own ability to ensure a goal (cf. Bandura, 1982). Rather, personal variables here refer to variables that alter how the truster makes assessments about his environment. Accordingly, unlike theories of goal achievement, which posit that an individual’s beliefs in himself have a great deal of impact
on whether or not he will accept, and then achieve, a goal (e.g., Bandura, 1986), I am suggesting that, since a trust goal can only be fully attained with external support in some degree, the truster’s cognitive processes focus on the environment in the effort to obtain the resources necessary to ensure the goal. I would expect such a focus because intrapersonal trust is experienced based on the extent to which the consequences of and substance in seeking the support of another feel right to the truster. Thus it seems reasonable to suppose that the truster will be less focused on his own abilities and more on what will happen in the environment. Toward that end, personal variables embed the truster’s considerations according to a particular perspective.

Because so many different personal variables can be chosen, research would have to focus on the variables that highlight the internal processes of the truster in a particular role. Toward this end, I offer some initial considerations – and develop proposals for – intrapersonal trust as experienced by leaders as trusters in Chapter 4.

*Applying the intrapersonal trust framework*

The intrapersonal trust framework specified thus includes contextual and personal variables that frame the truster’s interaction with her environment in relation to a particular goal catalyzed by the trust event. The purpose of the intrapersonal trust framework is to shed light primarily on a) the internal processes that generate emotions preceding a trust decision and b) the way in which trusters experience their environments emotionally prior to making a trust decision.

Ideally, the intrapersonal trust framework would also offer some insight into the circumstances under which affectively motivated trust decisions are adaptive or not, as described in the practical examples above. However, the initial intention is to explore how emotions play a role within the intrapersonal trust framework rather than to test causal links between emotions, intrapersonal trust, and outcomes. I have chosen two basic types of environmental variable that I believe in concert will be reflective of the appraisal process and be associated with an emotional reaction evoked by a trust event in a practical empirical setting.

This internal approach to trust further explores the relationship between emotion and trust by suggesting that it begins through introspection. Toward this end, the intrapersonal trust framework also offers a path for studying the discrete effects of basic emotions on trust at the intrapersonal level and has potential for examining the circumstances under which emotions effectively inform the trust decision. Furthermore, the intrapersonal trust framework uses the process of appraisal to study the impact of emotion on a truster’s subjective experience, i.e., intrapersonal trust and then behaviors associated with trust decisions, thereby extending the majority of appraisal research that tests emotions as outcomes.

Particularly since both types of variable providing the springboard for researching the truster’s internal processes through to the trust decision and since reappraisal can potentially
vary, I advocate a qualitative, exploratory approach in the continued development the intrapersonal trust framework. The exploration of appraisal on trust is still essentially brand-new, beginning with Dunn & Schweitzer’s (2005) research on the carry-over effects of incidental moods. I believe that, although one could define the two contextual variables mentioned here into dimensions that might be more easily compatible with past research on appraisal, the intrapersonal trust framework would be considerably limited in its potential by such an act. To begin with, the framework itself requires further exploration prior to being tested as a model. Furthermore, self-report questionnaires that make use of such dimensions tend to rely too much on the emotional cognizance of the participants (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). As I have noted above, appraisal can− and I would expect usually does − occur so rapidly and below the awareness of the truster that the reasons for a reaction or an emotion become clear only with time and upon reflection, for example during reappraisal.

I anticipate several challenges associated with studying the proposed intrapersonal trust framework above. First, people tend to regulate their emotion, precisely so that others will not notice it (Gross, 2007; see also Scherer, 1984b). Second, experiments have limited value in terms of their transferability to practical settings; I believe the experimental setting in particular would compromise the complex and spontaneous nature of the processes proposed above. Third, research based on data from interviews or anecdotes may not reflect what actually happened since people’s memory tends to be selective, especially in connection with strong emotions (Power & Dalgleish, 2008). Fourth, emotions are fleeting (Frijda, 1993); mood is clearly recognizable over longer periods of time. Fifth, qualitative data – particularly with respect to emotion here, which is defined as both outcome and cause – has the potential for common-method bias, in which data on all variables, i.e., on the truster, work environment, trust event, and outcomes, is gleaned from a single source. Sixth, a high level of trust would have to exist in a project to explore the intrapersonal trust framework further because research participants would be making their deepest affective experiences known to others.

To respond all of these considerations, this intrapersonal trust framework could be explored further by using data collection methods that rely on real-time collection, such as experience sampling methods (ESM). Since emotions can be so short-lived, the best means of documenting the way people experience them is to collect data on them as close to the event eliciting the emotion (Beal & Weiss, 2003; Beal, D. J., Weiss, H. M., Barros, E., & MacDermid, S. M., 2005). I would also expect a within-person, episodic approach to provide useful insight into how person and contextual variables interrelate with the stimulus event to generate differences in rightness, emotions, and trust decisions. Between-person analyses of trust relationships would be of limited use here because emotion, and ergo intrapersonal trust, probably varies too idiosyncratically within an individual over time (cf. Beal, et al, 2005). I believe a within-person approach would also shed light on the different phases of appraisal and emotional display around intrapersonal trust. Finally, I would also expect the use of
multiple data sources, e.g., through interviews or storytelling, to corroborate findings in the real-time, anonymous data.

**Summary**

I have proposed in this Chapter that intrapersonal trust emerges through appraisal and generates emotions and expectations that culminate in a sense of rightness about the affective implications and ramifications of a particular trust event for the truster. Trusters strategically regulate their experience of trust; so intrapersonal trust may be thought of as the result of a proactive effort to ensure the truster’s well-being. Intrapersonal trust emerges as a result of filtering different contextual variables in the environment through the experience of the truster via personal variables in a manner that facilitates a trust decision that feels right to the truster. Either these factors harmonize to generate a sense of rightness resulting in trust; or these factors remain dissonant and generate diffidence about giving trust, or even outright distrust. Each basic emotion – anger, fear, disgust, sadness, love, happiness, and surprise – has a unique impact on the emergence of intrapersonal trust and ergo on the trust decision. If the trustee’s response meets the truster’s expectations after trust has been given, the truster will experience positive emotion; if not, negative emotion.

In Chapter 4, I explore all of these ideas by further specifying the intrapersonal trust framework to the leadership situation. There, I postulate that the trust issue is less a question of whether and more a question of how a leader trusts her subordinates. Toward that end, I consider the person-environment exchange that frames leaders’ trust appraisals and then the relationship between a leader’s environment, rightness, and emotional responses in trust appraisals.
Chapter 4: How leaders experience intrapersonal trust

“I looked the man in the eye. I found him to be very straightforward and trustworthy. … I was able to get a sense of his soul,” said newly elected U.S. President George Bush of Russian President Vladimir Putin in June 2001. These words would return in 2008 to haunt Bush, whose policy of forging international relations through strong personal relationships with global leaders of state crumbled when Putin ordered military forces to occupy Georgia, a country just finding its democratic feet (Barnes, 2008).

Bush had been intent throughout his term on spreading democracy worldwide, and the personal friendship Bush actively nurtured with Putin was intended to be a means toward that end. Not only did Bush discover through this most rude awakening that his friend and ally did not back his international policy, but also that, short of declaring war against Russia, the United States could do little more to counter Putin’s move than send in humanitarian aid to care for civilians seeking refuge.

Bush’s policy of depending upon personal rapport with other leaders to promote U.S. foreign affairs reflects the real impact of intrapersonal trust upon leadership decisions. By personalizing his foreign policy strategy thusly, Bush stood to engender a personal sense of obligation in the leaders to whom he appealed and to render a breach of the policy tantamount to a promise broken by a dear friend. The friendships between leaders in this policy were also intended to humanize the rougher edges of international leadership and generate a sense of a shared vision, namely a more peaceful, humane, and above all just international collaboration.

However, Bush miscalculated how this approach would work as his term went on, for the policy depended upon the superiority of American international power and ergo upon Bush’s ability to set the interpretative framework for negotiating international policy. At the beginning of his term, the United States had a great deal more international influence than practically any other country, and was referred to in the press as the “last superpower.” Accordingly, Putin had a clear motivation for nourishing good relations with the United States by ostentatiously accepting and participating in this personalized approach to international affairs. This asymmetry of power would not last through Bush’s last year in office, 2008, which saw the culmination of Chinese economic power as embodied in the Beijing Olympics, the failure of the World Trade Agreement because of objections by India and other developing nations, the fall of several major U.S. financial firms on Wall Street, and the changed topography of global influence as demonstrated by Russia’s occupation of Georgia and the United States’ failure in the Middle East.

Viewed through the framework introduced in Chapter 3, Bush used his trust appraisals as a backbone for making international policy. He melded his personal need to feel good about his decisions with the leadership goal of ensuring U.S. security and influence worldwide. In
doing so, however, he relied heavily on the way his personal interactions with Putin made him feel rather than on the Russian policies and national interests that might motivate Putin, who stated clearly his views on personal friendships as a means for international collaboration:

President Bush told a lot of warm words about myself in public, and I’m grateful to him for that, and I feel his attitude outside formal events and I hope that he has the same feeling when he talks to me. By the way, it does not prevent us from protecting our viewpoints and from having our viewpoints, defending the national interests of our countries. (Press conference with Presidents Bush and Vladimir Putin in October 2001, Shanghai, China)

Given the personal level at which Bush operated foreign policy, Bush’s miscalculation can also be analyzed in more personal terms, i.e., that he appraised Putin as being trustworthy because human beings tend to gravitate toward experiences that will ensure positive emotions. This line of argumentation would also stipulate that Bush felt intrapersonal trust here because choosing to see Putin as untrustworthy would require grappling with the possibility that Putin might work against Bush’s vision for international policy and therefore with a great many negative emotions in the present and unpleasant emotional outcomes in the future. However, this practice cost Bush the ability to see the international policy environment clearly and a certain amount of credibility as a leader later: “I have never believed that one should make national security policy on the basis of trust. I think you make national security policy based on interests and policies.” (U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates in August 2008). As Russian tanks rolled toward the Georgian capital, at least one expert and close advisor to the Bush administration felt that trust should not have been given, irrespective of how right the decision had felt to Bush.

Making matters concrete: Specifying the intrapersonal trust framework for leaders

Since trust is so sensitive to context – and constitutes a process of situated appraisal – the best way to show the ramifications of emotion’s effect on trust is to situate trust in a particular context. I have chosen the context of leader as truster for several reasons. First, most of the literature on trust and leadership discusses “trust in leadership” (e.g., Dirks & Ferrin, 2002), i.e., leaders as trustees motivating followers as trustees to trust them. Only more recent literature delves into how leaders give trust (e.g., Quinn, Spreitzer, & Brown, 2000) and the least of it examines the affective influences of trust on leadership. Second, the temporal thinking interwoven into the fabric of the decision to trust or not is also believed a key element in a leader’s skill set. These two components, anticipation and motivation, are at the heart of a leader’s intrapersonal experience per se, and I believe much can be learned about their impact on leaders’ decision-making by examining trust at this intersection. Third, research has focused more on the normative study of what constitutes effective leader behavior, i.e., what a leader should do to motivate followers. However, the emotions a leader
experiences when giving trust are also indelibly part of the leadership process, particularly in light of emotion-based theories of leadership, such as transformational leadership and servant leadership. Rather than focusing on leadership traits and behaviors that make a leader seem trustworthy to a follower, the intrapersonal emotions of a leader are concerned with a leader’s self-management amid the stress and demands of motivating and engaging others to achieve collective goals, among other things by delegating responsibility downward. The intrapersonal focus puts the relationship between leadership and personal responsibility in a different theoretical light, and one I believe that reflects what individuals want and try to do as leaders.

In this Chapter, I will therefore use the ideas about intrapersonal trust formulated in Chapter 3 to consider the impact of emotions on a leader’s personal experience of trust, i.e., including how it emerges and how she gives followers trust. I begin by highlighting the need to consider the impact of the appraisal process on contextual variables that shape the emergence and quality of intrapersonal trust in a leader. To underscore the depth of this process, I then consider how leadership feels from the inside.

Using that basis, I specify the intrapersonal trust framework to the leadership situation by selecting a personal variable that I believe applies to many leaders, irrespective of hierarchy, function, culture, point in time, level of influence, or location. Specifically, I expect a leader’s experience of intrapersonal trust to be affected by the interplay between the resources he believes he has to ensure the leadership goal at hand and his personal identification with that goal as both of these elements move through the appraisal process. I argue that this interaction situates the development of intrapersonal trust in the experience of leading others to accomplish shared goals.

I then apply the re-specified framework to demonstrate how each basic emotion influences leaders’ experience of intrapersonal trust and makes that experience unique. Thereafter, the practical aspects of applying the framework to research are discussed. I conclude by considering the potential behavioral lesson each basic emotion holds with respect to how trust decisions occur, are motivated, and can accordingly influence one individual’s leadership.

Situating appraisal in leader trust decisions: Process as key

The above example reflects the proposal in Chapter 3 that emotions situate information around a trust decision, in this case in direct relation to a leader’s well-being, and give him a backdrop against which to frame his own expectations for the trustee, the environment, and the outcome of trust. Also visible from the example above, intrapersonal trust revolves around, even requires, the personal stake a leader has in a trust event. How a leader experiences the appraisal-based process of intrapersonal trust from start to finish is therefore a deeply personal, internal phenomenon that generates emotions preceding the leader’s
decision about whether or not to give trust and that gives each trust relationship the leader participates in a unique character tailored to a particular environment and time.

All of these considerations indicate that, for leaders, the trust issue is less a question of whether and more a question of how, and under what circumstances, a leader trusts a particular subordinate. This idea is also reflected in findings from leader-member exchange theories of leadership (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995), which say that a leader interacts differently with each subordinate based on her assessment of each subordinate’s abilities and support of her goals. Gabarro’s (1978) exploratory research with management dyads in several different industries also suggests that leaders are discriminatory about giving trust, i.e., a leader is guided by how he feels about a subordinate’s ability or behavior within a particular situation.

Another consideration is the emotional backdrop assumed in much trust research: Fear. For example, Butler’s (1991) identified ten “conditions” which facilitate trust in dyads, e.g., consistency, honoring promises, fairness, honesty, etc.; these trustee traits also reflect the mechanics of trust formation. An intuitive interpretation of these traits is that they are indicative of a trustworthy trustee. From an emotional stance, however they comprise a mirror of the trustor’s internal experience, i.e., of an individual trying to cope with the fear of being harmed. Given findings in emotion research that an individual’s emotional experience causes selective attention to particular aspects of the environment (Power & Dalgleish, 2007), it seems likely that leaders motivated by a different emotion would focus on other aspects of a trust event. For example, a truster moved primarily by happiness might be more likely to focus on aspects of the trustee that appear to promote the key goal of happiness, which is the facilitation of desired outcomes. Such traits might include creativity, enthusiasm, youth (unrealized potential), or perseverance. Some of the trustee characteristics believed focal for studying trust decisions made out of fear could well overlap with those considered key for happiness, such as the trustee’s presence or competence at the time of the trust decision. Others, however, such as the omnipresent “reliability” variable in so many studies of trust (e.g., McAllister, 1995; Lewicki & Bunker, 1995, 1996; Kramer, 2006), might be a function of the trustor’s optimism and therefore not seen as quite so essential a quality in a trustee.

I therefore challenge Hardin’s (2002) clever argument that the wisdom behind the trust decision depends upon the trustworthiness of a prospective trustee with whom the truster interacts (cf. Kramer, 2006, 69). Rather, the wisdom behind a trust decision depends upon the truster’s ability to fully utilize the emotional and cognitive information associated with the trust event, and a leader’s assessment of a trustee is reflective of that ability. Kramer (2006) argues that trusters use heuristics – “implicit or explicit prescriptions for dealing with commonly encountered … problems” relating to trust (70) to distinguish between who is trustworthy and who is not and therefore to give trust with according judiciousness and to avoid harm if not also to maximize benefit. I do not dispute the idea that judgment and
decision rules can be, and are, put to good use in human decision-making (Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, & Kunda, 1983). However, heuristic processing is probably only one smaller aspect of the appraisal process itself and utilized discriminately, as a function of one’s emotional experience (Forgas, 1995).

Thus studying the mere presence of certain antecedents in one aspect of the trust environment – the trustee – offers limited insight into the trust decision. Rather, these antecedents need to be studied as they affect, and are affected by, the process of appraisal, to better understand how intrapersonal trust can be different in one dyad to the next, even when the leader is the same. Accordingly, I specify the appraisal-based framework of intrapersonal trust proposed in Chapter 3 to the leadership context, but with the specific intention of observing how the variables relevant to leadership move through that process. This idea conforms to my argument in Chapter 3 that a leader’s decision-making needs to be observed as a process rather than an outcome.

**Leadership on the inside: A leader’s emotional experience**

Emotion theory postulates that, for all the useful functions of emotion and affect in helping people to adapt, people nonetheless must deal with the intensity of emotional experience. Every human being experiences the need to find some way to cope with stressful situations and negative affect at work.

Where leaders’ self-management is concerned, researchers have focused on the relative effects of power for providing a leader with certain types of emotional leverage, both for influencing others (Gibson & Schroeder, 2002) and for managing the leader’s own concerns (Keltner, et al, 2003; Kemper, 1978). Leaders, unlike followers and other low-level organizational members (Côté & Morgan, 2002; Hecht & LaFrance, 1998), have the luxury of being able to engage in negative emotional displays with less fear of retribution (Keltner, et al, 2003; Lerner & Keltner, 2001). In particular, leader expressions of anger enhance followers’ perception of leader authority and power (Tiedens, 2000, 2001; Tiedens & Fragale, 2002). Indeed, anger – which is associated with the belief that one can ensure one’s goal (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006) – is more frequently seen in more powerful or influential organizational members (Tiedens, Ellsworth, & Mesquita, 2000), e.g., leaders expressly attempting to gain a strategic upper hand through impression and/or emotion management (Jones & Pittman, 1982; Clark, Pataki, & Carver, 1996). Finally, some research indicates that power may converge follower emotions into alignment with leader emotions (e.g., Hsee, Hatfield, Carlson, & Chemtob, 1990; Tiedens & Fragale, 2002). Accordingly, leaders are by and large believed to have greater freedom of emotional expression and more choices with regard to actively managing emotions.

However, the asymmetry of power in most leader-follower relationships hinders leaders from satisfying the basic need of dealing with work-related negative affect. On the contrary, the expectation is that a leader will use her influence to help followers to handle their
emotional experiences constructively and adaptively, so that followers are better able to contribute toward shared goals. A leader is thus expected to have a bad day on her own and not to burden her peers and followers with her negative emotions by allowing them to see her emotional process it precisely because her behavior would have an impact on her followers’ affective states (Dasborough, 2006). Indeed, the standard expected of an exceptional leader is to look past her affective discomfort in order to be able help her subordinates to deal with theirs, if necessary (Mayer & Salovey, 1990). Extenuating circumstances excepting the leader to this rule are few and far in between because the leader’s power would force followers to tolerate the leader’s unpleasant emotional display having, presumably, to do only with the leader.

Satisfying the desire to connect with others emotionally and socially – such as by an act of trusting a follower – is a hazardous business. The leader’s power moves followers to determine whether or not the leader’s true desires and ulterior motives are in harmony with what the leader says she expects and wants. In the words of head of Responsive Organizations, Inc., Lee Ozley, who worked closely with Harley-Davidson to bring about its cultural sea-change, “People will be looking for signals. They will be looking for congruence between what you say you want and what your behavior says you want” (Teerlink & Ozley, 2000, 30). Followers are quick to defer to their superior, more so if a leader signals in some way that only certain types of input – such as agreement – will be tolerated.

A leader influences the establishment of group affective norms by enforcing, encouraging, or enacting them as she believes entails the appropriate standard (Pescosolido, 2002; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987; Wilk & Moynihan, 2005). These norms in turn influence how people in a group interact with each other, particularly with regard to handling conflict constructively (Yang & Mossholder, 2004). In this way, leaders indirectly influence how followers feel they are allowed to express emotions visibly and even acknowledge them to themselves privately (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995). In essence, leaders set the interpretative framework for any dyad with a follower (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003) through emotional expression, rendering it a particularly powerful form of social influence (Keltner & Haidt, 1999).

Accordingly, followers spend more cognitive energy than leaders on attempting to understand leaders’ actions (Sy, Côté, & Saavedra, 2005), particularly when a follower experiences negative emotion because of a leader’s behavior. Followers’ moods naturally converge around those with greater influence, i.e., leaders (Anderson, Keltner, & John, 2003; Anderson & Thompson, 2004). What the leader experiences as an in-the-moment gut reaction is more likely to be appraised by followers as an action indicative of a greater behavioral pattern. Thus followers are much more likely to experience intense emotions as a result and draw more far-reaching inferences about the personal consequences of that
reaction. Inconsistency in leader behavior is thus more likely to preoccupy followers, many of whom will be primarily focused on their job security.

The reality of organizational life, however, is that people’s emotional frailties do not always allow them to live up to the stalwart ideal of supportive servant leader (Greenleaf, 1977, 1996). Leaders do participate in emotional exchanges with followers, precisely because participating in trust relationships alleviates the isolating, emotionally distressing effects of having power and authority over others. This behavior is particularly true for a leader accustomed to seeking external affirmation regarding the quality of her abilities and leadership by observing the reaction of her followers and colleagues for indications (Leonard, Beauvais, & Scholl, 1995). Indeed, leaders often seek out exchanges with subordinates who will facilitate the leaders’ goals at every level, including collective company and personal goals relating to leaders’ emotional state. Most leaders thus develop their opinion about a follower in a matter of days and use that opinion as the foundation for developing and utilizing the dyadic relationship over the long term (Liden, Wayne, & Stilwell, 1993). Furthermore, leaders focus their efforts on supporting individuals who appear to facilitate leadership goals most readily (Graen, Orris, & Johnson, 1973).

The idealistic norms of leader behavior described above are complicated not only by the need to feel connected with others but also the frequent use of emotion in leadership efforts to motivate followers. Thus the emotional experience of leaders is guided by satisfying two different types of goals – leadership and personal – essentially simultaneously.

Seen accordingly, deciding whether or not to give trust becomes a much more personal matter for the leader as truster because the leader’s personal well-being is often closely connected with the achievement of company goals. A leader has a motivation to internalize company goals more than her followers precisely because of the hedonic implications for her personally. Even though the leader’s first instinct may be to do the thing that gratifies her personal emotional equilibrium, e.g., that appears to dissociate her from negative emotion and goal frustration, the outcome of appraisal is positive only if the leader is able to negotiate a balance between her personal emotional needs and what the environment can truly provide and support toward the accomplishment of the leadership goal at hand (Lazarus & Lazarus, 1994). On the other hand, without a clear sense of her own personal agenda, a leader is likely to attend excessively to the environment and ignore her own sense of self and thus lack the internal cohesion and integrity to be able to lead others and make effective decisions that feel right.

From a leadership perspective, appraisal is vital because it provides a means by which the leader can make initial assessments of her situation solely on the merit of her own convictions and feelings. In this way, appraisal is a means of divesting oneself of, or of perhaps coping with, the need to alleviate feelings of isolation and vulnerability as a leader. In their most constructive form, appraisals inform rational considerations, but as seen in the example of President Bush, can also be erroneously used to disregard them, as well.
Building the platform for leaders’ appraisals: Goal achievement and resources

Intrapersonal phenomena, including trust, require the interplay of the truster’s experience with the environment from one step to the next in the appraisal process in order to be driven by affect. This interplay is embodied here in the interaction between one environmental and one personal variable that culminate in a feeling of rightness from which intrapersonal trust and ultimately the trust decision emerges.

As noted in Chapter 3, the appraisal process needs a platform from which to spring that is specific to intrapersonal trust. Environmental variables influence the truster’s expectations of whether or not the trust goal will be achieved. I therefore proposed that the primary environmental focus of trusters of all kinds revolves around the resources necessary for achieving a goal. However, since each truster is also an individual with many different concerns that may not apply to the trust event, I also posited that the personal variable in the appraisal platform should be defined to reflect the truster’s priorities in his primary role relating to the trust event.

Personal variables in the person-environment influence the leader’s evaluation and experience of his environment, especially in relation to a trust goal. Personal variables can focus on a leader’s assessment of one specific factor in the environment, such as his implicit theories regarding a trustee (e.g., Dweck, 1986); or they can have a more general influence over the leader’s entire way of thinking, such as the leader’s self-concept (e.g., Leonard, Beauvais, & Scholl, 1995). A personal variable takes on significance in the emergence of intrapersonal trust when that variable has a direct link to the trust event. Whether or not implicit theories or self-concept plays a larger role in a particular trust event depends greatly on whether or not these aspects of the leader have a direct impact on her well-being as it relates to a goal or set of goals associated with a particular trust event.

A personal variable relevant to the many different person-environment exchanges in which leaders make trust decisions therefore needs to be an aspect of the leader with a direct relationship to the trust event that also enables research into the subjective experience of trust from the leader’s point of view. The focus is the experience of trust as an internal phenomenon in the heart and mind of one leader deciding to give a subordinate trust or not. Given the importance and personal nature of goal achievement to a leader’s well-being, I would expect leaders as trusters to tend to associate personal well-being – i.e., the validation of personal abilities, values, etc. – with the achievement of a shared goal. The more strongly a leader is inclined to make this association, the more intensely he will experience emotions around the trust decision and the more important it will feel (Lazarus, 1991a). I believe this variable, when combined with the resources variable introduced in Chapter 3, will make visible the leader’s considerations and experience at each step in the appraisal process that
motivate one type of emotional reaction over another, frame his experience of intrapersonal trust, and influence his trust decision.

This platform for intrapersonal trust appraisals by leaders is an extension of the idea from leader-member exchange theory that leaders project certain attributions onto a follower and use those attributions to make their decision (e.g., Liden, et al, 1993). The framework also draws from appraisal theory to suggest that leaders focus at the necessary speed on information that appears most relevant in ensuring a particular goal. A leader may therefore trust one subordinate almost infinitely in one respect, or for one particular task, but in a very limited fashion with respect to another goal. Additionally, the rapidity of the emotional process may or may not – in fact I would posit most often does not – enable a leader to be aware of how and why certain information seems particularly relevant to a trust decision. The platform proposed above is thus reflective of the idea from leader-member exchange theory that a leader changes her conduct toward subordinates according to whether she trusts them or not (cf. Graen, 1973; e.g., Dansereau, Cashman, & Graen, 1973; Dansereau, Graen, & Haga, 1975; Graen & Schiemann, 1978; Liden & Graen, 1980), but underscores more explicitly that leaders are often not conscious of this discriminatory treatment and that their assessment of a subordinate is deeply embedded in personal aspects framing the leader’s cognitive processes.

I make some basic assumptions with regard to the goal achievement variable. First, leaders identify strongly with the achievement of organizational goals and therefore personalize that identification by making the experience of well-being dependent upon goal achievement. Second, appraisals revolve around whether or not the leader feels the organizational goal will be satisfied if trust is given. Third, goal achievement is based on the idea that goals are an intrinsic part of an individual’s personality and that the content of the goals, how they are approached, and whether they are achieved (or not) have an influence on an individual’s well-being (Cantor & Sanderson, 1998a). The goal achievement variable also seems to suggest that the more a goal embodies the leader’s personal values, the more intensely the leader will internalize the goal and experience emotional reactions in connection with it.

The leader trust-giving framework: Trust from the inside

I use the platform proposed above to consider how emotion and cognition conjoin in one – often swift (cf. Meyerson, Weick, & Kramer, 1996) – trust-giving moment and how intrapersonal trust looks from the subjective experience of the leader as truster, as depicted in the re-specified framework of intrapersonal trust in Figure 3. This framework stands in contrast to behaviorally oriented theories of leadership that attempt to find styles of leader behavior that correlate with the effectiveness and performance across a wide range of situations.
Instead, I delve into the emotional and adaptive aspects of the appraisal process that might help to describe, and eventually explain why, a leader gives trust, quite irrespective of whether or not that act of trust-giving was effective or adaptive. A leader’s internal emotional dialogue is an important aspect of leadership because it feeds directly into his ability to manage himself and develop as a person, solve problems, direct others, and participate in the emotion process as it relates to interpersonal influence, interaction, and intrapersonal development. I thus expect this framework to shed light on the emotions that motivate leaders to motivate followers by giving trust.

Figure 2: The intrapersonal trust framework specified for leaders as trusters

**Moving through the process: Basic emotions as experienced by leaders as trusters**

To consider more fully how the framework operates, I will discuss various leader trust decisions associated predominantly with one of the basic emotions introduced in Chapter 3. Since surprise probably shapes subsequent appraisals, it is discussed first among the basic emotions and since surprise can also be closely connected with radical reappraisal, a discussion of the flexibility of rightness follows. I discuss fear next because this emotion has often been a major implicit assumption behind trust research in the past. Thoughts about how anger plays a role in leader trust decisions follows. To contrast the affective profiles of fear and anger and to offer support for the idea that trust is given as a result of optimism and anticipated strength rather than just pessimism and frailty, I discuss the role of happiness in intrapersonal trust. The influence of love on trust follows. Sorrow and disgust are discussed collectively because they both revolve around being absolved of the responsibility of achieving the trust goal.

**Flipping expectations unexpectedly: Surprise**

Given the future-oriented nature of intrapersonal trust, surprise – whether classified as an emotion or not – has an important role in determining a leader’s emotional experience as truster. Trust is not truly being given unless some ambiguity exists about whether the trustee will respond to the trust decision as the truster expects (Shapiro, 1987). Whether the result of
a deliberate act on the part of the trustee, e.g., opportunism, or the result of other factors, e.g.,
trustee incompetence, unexpected responses to the trust decision result from undetected
factors influencing the trust decision (Hendry, 2002).

From an intrapersonal perspective, the truster uses emotions to stabilize her vision of what
will happen – i.e., whether or not a particular goal can be facilitated – in light of a particular
trust decision. This sense of rightness does not, as Möllering (2006) points out, actually
change or reduce uncertainty around the trust decision. Unforeseen responses to the trust
decision, such as infringing on basic rules of conduct, tax and challenge trustees’ conviction
and result in surprise and confusion followed by negative affect resulting in self-serving
actions in the trust relationship (Garfinkel, 1963, 1967). The reaction to Garfinkel’s
experiments was negative because rightness was challenged by actions that intentionally
contradicted trustees’ goals. However, trusters can be pleasantly surprised when despite
expectation trustees do what is desired. As Finkenauer, et al (1998) point out, although
novelty triggers surprise, the personal significance of an event determines the emotional
reaction in surprise.

Another point is that the truster’s awareness and experience of environmental factors have
the ultimate, defining impact on the development of intrapersonal trust. The infringement of
the social rules in Garfinkel’s experiments came to the trusters’ notice precisely because the
rules of the exchange around the trust decision were set forth prior to the experiments. The
infringements were deliberate breaches of contract to foil the goal behind the trust decision
and ergo were experienced emotionally as such.

However, real trust relationships begin their development from a truster’s internal
experience, which is defined by factors made salient through the trust event. If the truster has
focused too greatly on either her personal agenda or that of her environment, she may find
herself suddenly confronted with an unexpected outcome. Her natural response at first is to
feel surprise and then to reappraise her situation. Unexpected changes in the environment
can also result in surprise even after the truster has already begun intrapersonal trust appraisal
process.

Surprise has an influence on intrapersonal trust when an unexpected change or outcome
alters the truster’s expectations of the future given a particular trust decision. Accordingly,
for any of the basic emotions described here, I would expect surprise to polarize the
emotional backdrop for intrapersonal trust. One cannot speak of pure opposites with respect
to emotions, but I would expect the decision elements to in many cases take on their opposite
form as a result of surprise. For example, the elements that give sorrow its immobile,
withdrawn quality can take on the energizing, determined nature of anger in the face of an
unexpected outcome that prevents the truster from fulfilling the goal of sorrow, i.e., to
withdraw and reprioritize. Being hindered in this experience of sorrow feels like a breach of
trust because a trust decision made in sorrow is made to absolve oneself of responsibility in
order to rethink one’s situation.
The flexibility of rightness

Rightness, as a function of the emotion driving it, can also change in quality or certitude. Rightness can change to re-inform trust-giving behavior from a focus on giving trust to a focus on not giving trust. Alternatively, a truster may feel less right about a trust decision.

Editing associate director Jay Hernandez told his colleague, Renita Bennett, that he was thinking of hiring Cora Pedersen, a student completing her master’s degree in journalism, to research for and write articles for a bilingual, monthly magazine, *Hacienda*, about lifestyle in Southern California. Hernandez was surprised at Bennett’s reservations about Pedersen, who had been one of Bennett’s own freelancers for two years. Bennett would not reveal her doubts at first, but Hernandez insisted: “Producing *Hacienda* is a stressful business, and if you’ve got reason to believe Cora can’t handle the job, you’ve got to tell me what it is. You can’t express doubt and then leave me hanging.”

Bennett explained that Pedersen had some kind of psychological problem that became manifest during their first interview: “I don’t exactly know when, but at some point I felt as though I was talking to another person. The upbeat, carefree young woman I had been about to hire was suddenly dark and pessimistic in her outlook and a little paranoid to boot, for absolutely no reason. We took her on, but there are certain kinds of stress she’s not particularly well equipped for handling. But you can’t tell anyone! What I just told you is completely confidential!”

Hernandez had absolutely no intention of talking about the incident with anyone. He felt his publisher, Maxim-Dare, would reject Pedersen’s application on the spot if they heard about the situation. Word got around fast among professionals in the Spanish-English community, and reputations were hard to reinstate. Hernandez did not want to hurt this young woman’s career just as it was getting started.

The fact of the matter was also that Pedersen had submitted a convincing application, the very best from the entire pool of candidates. Although somewhat unappetizingly vociferous in describing herself during the interview as always striving toward, and succeeding in, being the best, Pedersen nevertheless had several years’ experience as a journalist. She had submitted four samples of her writing with just the conversational tone Hernandez was looking for. One and a half years of living in Mexico City along with several university classes in Spanish had made Pedersen quite fluent. He would never let her write into Spanish, which was not her native tongue, but she could certainly research information in Spanish and represent *Hacienda* with the right amiability and politeness when talking to local community members in Spanish. Furthermore, she would be able to appreciate the magazine he was trying to produce.

He considered all of these strengths against Bennett’s reservations. He was grateful that she had entrusted him with this information, irrespective of whether or not it would truly prove to be relevant. However, everyone deserved a chance; Pedersen seemed to really want
this one and to be properly prepared for it. He felt right that choosing her was the ethical course and he was glad that he would have a team member who could really take some of the work off his shoulders. Hernandez decided to hire her.

Within the first two weeks, unexpected mistakes occurred, the most irritating aspect around them being that Hernandez simply could not seem to figure out just exactly what the problem was. Pedersen had the strange knack of doing almost exactly the opposite of what Hernandez told her to do. At first, Hernandez, whose native tongue was Spanish, believed that his instructions were unclear.

He therefore asked Noel Cassidy, his boss at Maxim-Dare and a native English speaker, to take a meeting with himself and Pedersen. Cassidy had noticed the mistakes, too, and told Hernandez in no uncertain terms what he thought of them. Hernandez wanted Cassidy to witness the strangely oblique way Pedersen appeared to hear his instructions, but he also wanted the reassurance that his language skills were not the major problem. Pedersen might simply be ignoring Hernandez’s directions because she believed she knew better, but Hernandez thought the problem was more one of communication rather than ego.

Hernandez let Cassidy do most of the talking. At one point in the interview, Cassidy began to explain at length that gender-neutral language was an absolute must for all Maxim-Dare publications. The use of the masculine pronoun in general statements was antiquated and generally thought inappropriate and sexist in English: “So when you write a generalizing statement about something, don’t write ‘if a reader would like more information, he has only to visit Hacienda’s website,’” explained Cassidy. “Write ‘people looking for more information can visit Hacienda’s website’.”

Cassidy gave several such examples. Hernandez knew exactly what Cassidy was trying to underscore, but Pedersen’s quiescent acceptance gave Hernandez an ominous feeling that Cassidy’s words were not being interpreted as Cassidy intended. Her response was almost identical to the times when she had misunderstood Hernandez. Hernandez surveyed Pedersen’s upright pen in one of her fist ed hands as she nodded emphatically without looking at either himself or Cassidy. She took no notes, but her body language seemed to signal to Cassidy that the point had been taken and he began to discuss other matters. She asked no clarifying questions as she often did before executing a task properly. These things had never occurred to Hernandez before.

After the meeting, Pedersen began to do exactly the opposite of what Cassidy had instructed her to do, as if part of her mind had blocked out the instructions. From that meeting on, she wrote in the masculine singular in generalized statements. Hernandez did not believe her actions were the product of defiance; the problem seemed to lie deep within her interpretation of what she was told, and although she was trying to do her job properly, he could see that some fundamental communication problem was preventing her. He was now fully convinced that although she was a good writer, the difficulties communicating with her – and being sure that she had really understood him – would always be a problem in tasks
that involved fact-checking and editing according to Maxim-Dare’s in-house style-guide. He wanted to talk about the matter openly, to devise some better solution, but doing so was impossible without breaking a confidence and potentially making Pedersen feel self-conscious. He therefore assigned her administrative tasks and put her in charge of correspondence, which she had always done well.

Hernandez felt right about trusting her initially by giving her the job and just as right about reducing the scope of his trust toward her by restricting her task profile. Rightness is flexible because the emotional backdrop that motivates it is flexible.

**The emotion of control: Fear**

Fear is the motivating factor for trust decisions when something in a leader’s environment appears to threaten an organizational or collective goal with which the leader closely associates personal well-being. The threat can – as is most often studied in research on trust – constitute the actions of a subordinate or the potential actions of a subordinate based on the leader’s assessment of his personality. However, the stimulus for a trust event catalyzing fear can also entail an unexpected, external development outside the organization, such as an earthquake; or an internal event that is not in the subordinate’s control whatsoever, such as reduced spending.

Consider consultant Ray Johnson, who took over an ailing project that had become highly internally politicized in a large family firm, in part because the goal of the project challenged established company fair trade policies and in part because the project – particularly the project’s finances – had been sloppily managed in the past. Johnson, who saw the need for comprehensive reform in his client’s social responsibility policies, was determined to lead the project to success, but correcting mistakes of the former project leader generated an excessive workload that preempted careful control of everyone in the team.

In this hectic environment, one of Johnson’s subordinates, Martin Jay, a junior consultant who by chance had many friends in top management at the client’s headquarters, began using these connections to obtain personal interviews with strategic heads and top management to discuss the project. If Jay thought he might reap the approbation and encouragement of Johnson for this effort, he was badly mistaken. Instead, Johnson felt threatened in his fundamental need as project leader to ameliorate the highly political nature of the project by keeping the dialogue low-key and observing religiously protocol in order to ensure that none of the project’s backers felt neglected, ignored, or sidestepped:

Martin was seeing things from his point of view, and his thoughts were disconnected from the importance of the thing. In a highly political project that has become corrupted, the political dialogue is at the core of reinventing it. Martin took action just because he felt he should have more responsibility.

In situations motivated by fear, the rightness of a trust decision depends upon feeling as though one can anticipate what is going to happen and when and then as though one can act
in accord with the changing environment to remove a threat. Taking action thusly is generally more comforting than not taking action, i.e. than internalizing one’s fear (Lazarus, 1991a). Looking into the future, Johnson considered that he could not afford to allow a self-promoting subordinate without a sense of the overarching goal for stabilizing the project to have responsibilities that put Jay in close contact with company decision-makers. There was no telling when or how Jay’s actions might draw the attention of important people too soon or inappropriately. Johnson promptly took Jay off the project and put him in the back office. The trust decision here was therefore not to trust, which also had an impact on Johnson’s leadership and her interaction with Jay.

Jay’s actions were bound to have a negative impact on Johnson’s well-being at several levels. First, Johnson was experiencing fear relating directly to the continued existence of the project even prior to Jay’s initiative. Twenty-seven months of poor management had resulted in hundreds of thousands of dollars being left unaccounted for in the project’s budgeting, and Johnson was extremely sensitive to the disgruntlement of the project’s backers over such errors. Johnson did not want the project to be highly visible in association with anything but praise, and the project simply was in too much chaos to draw anything but fire at the point that Jay began creating visibility around it. Johnson saw his resources for ensuring the survival of the project as being threatened by the indiscretion of an overambitious subordinate. The fear of failure was all the more intense for Johnson because he believed very deeply in the need to reform the company’s policies on social responsibility, particularly regarding fair trade. The causal inference having been made, Johnson acted on the emotional information generated by the trust event and took the action that fear directs an individual to take, i.e., to remove the threat to the survival of the project.

When fear motivates trust decisions, sometimes the truster feels a fear so fundamental that he cannot bear to admit to feeling it; the desire to contain one’s situation is too strong to experience consciously. At this point, a leader regains a sense of control through pure dissociation from the source of distress, i.e., a subordinate’s apparent lack of trustworthiness combined with the leader’s distress at his own lack of trust. Johnson’s closing remarks reflect this point:

I don’t think you understand. This wasn’t a trust issue to me. The project was a political hot button in the company, and I just couldn’t have a junior consultant from my company using his personal connections to get extremely important people from the client involved in the project just so that he could try to have a career.

Given that Jay’s actions were also a first indiscretion and that Jay had been hired specifically for the project, Johnson might have kept Jay on the project but given him a strong cautionary note explaining why Johnson felt Jay’s actions were endangering. However, Johnson chose not to give Jay an explanation. Johnson took action, because taking action was in fact a means of keeping his own dread of failure at bay. A high achiever, Johnson had never dealt well with unexpected change because the thought of it threatened to
destabilize his conceptions of who he was, as a leader and an individual. He equated failure, which he had experienced very little, with unexpected change. In Johnson’s conscious experience, Jay’s networking efforts felt like a rude awakening because they were so unforeseen. However, Jay’s actions felt like a jolt because they touched a nerve embedded below the surface of Johnson’s awareness. Johnson simply could not live – however uncomfortably – with the idea that he might fail to solve the project’s problems. His own peace of mind depended on feeling as though he could control the project; the idea that it might fail with or without him was something to which he could not admit consciously. Johnson’s perspective was thus that he had taken the obligation on and fulfilling it was fundamentally important. Just under the surface, however, was the thought of personal devastation and profound loss as a result of his inability to manage the project that he simply could not allow herself to feel, so he took actions to protect himself against it instead. In essence, He reduced Jay’s influence to keep such profound fear separate and disavowed from Johnson’s waking thoughts.

When fear motivates trust decisions, leaders’ evaluations are framed by the fundamental desire – a desire strong enough to feel like a necessity – to remove an impending threat to the survival of something with which they identify. The leader as truster thus uses the trust decision to obtain and direct resources to ensure survival; the leader’s awareness of and focus on the threat is proportional to the intensity of her emotional experience, generated by the extent to which she takes the threat personally, i.e., feels threatened in her well-being.

The challenge for leaders is not to become so focused on surviving that future considerations are forgotten. The potential of losing sight of the impact of current decisions on future events is particularly likely with fear. Fear is associated with selective attention, and once the threat is gone, a leader’s first instinct is to seek relief and emotional hiatus by returning to business as usual. However, leader decisions made against the urgent backdrop of fear are more likely to generate negative affect in eye-witness subordinates, who may feel personally affronted by the redirecting of resources toward the survival goal or who may simply feel discomfited by the leader’s sudden alarm. For example, Johnson did not ascertain Jay’s appraisal of suddenly being stuck in the back office without explanation. Every trust decision has ramifications for the future of a particular trust relationship and for a leader’s effectiveness with a certain subordinate later.

**Justice and revenge: Anger**

With the overwhelming presence and influence of negative emotion in occupational life (Laucken, 2001; Basch & Fisher, 2000; Boudens, 2005), anger has a uniquely energizing effect, based on positive expectations that an inappropriately hindered goal can – and should – nevertheless be achieved (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989). The effect of this emotion on the emergence of intrapersonal trust is to alert the truster to the hindrance of particular resources by either the situation or another individual’s actions and to counter that
impediment by requiring action from the trustee (Barrett, Mesquita, Ochsner, & Gross, 2007). The trustee’s perception that the individual impeding the resources necessary for the achievement of a certain goal could in fact choose not to gives anger a moral quality of right and wrong and the personal implications for the trustee. Here, rightness in a trust decision is motivated by the feeling that one can, and for ethical reasons also should, counter the influence of an unwanted impediment to a goal by taking direct action. From the perspective of leader as trustee, anger motivates trust decisions when something or someone appears to block the achievement of a goal with which the leader associates well-being.

Although anger has not traditionally been viewed as an antecedent to trust decisions (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005), the expectation that others have not properly fulfilled their obligations can result in several different behavioral responses as a result of the trust decision. A leader might intentionally trust someone new to avoid agentic hindrances to a goal in the future, and precisely because she feels compelled to inhibit, rather than express, her feelings (Lazarus, 1991a). A leader might decide that a subordinate’s lack of trust in the leader makes the subordinate untrustworthy in turn and so take precautionary measures to limit that subordinate’s influence. Resentment at the apparently intentional nature of someone’s hindrance of a particular goal can move leaders to give someone else trust, as a form of revenge and irrespective of whether the new trustee is able to live up to expectation.

Though doubtless similar, each of these instances differs. In the first, the leader deals with his anger by covering all bases so that the cause cannot happen again. In the second, he interprets his subordinate’s lack of faith as a personal affront and counters that anger with a tit-for-tat policy in the dyad toward that subordinate. Thus here, the leader is taking just one aspect of a subordinate’s behavior as a personal offense and potentially generalizing about the subordinate’s behavior in other areas. In the third case, the leader interprets the subordinate herself as the problem and therefore relieves her of all responsibility whatsoever as it relates to the trust goal; this action rectifies the problem in the leader’s mind and satisfies his emotional need to seek compensation for the offense itself. In essence, a leader can use several different means to remove the object of a frustrated goal relating to a trust event.

Consider unit leader Ian Deavon, who reappraised a long-standing working relationship with a subordinate, Kay McNeil, when his own leadership objectives changed in response to the organization in which both worked. McNeil and Deavon were hired during a golden era of a large conglomerate that had been prospering long enough to be considered in terms of its financial stability and influence more like a bank than an international technology company. For years, the company’s policy was to try to ensure the essentially lifelong employment security of its employees, from whom loyalty was expected in turn. However, when a long-term recession hit, the company went from thriving to surviving in a matter of just months and could no longer support individuals who did not contribute to its competitive edge.
As a member of Language Support, Deavon knew that his unit’s days were numbered unless it was somehow restructured to meet the company’s new needs. Language services were considered nice to have but not crucial for business. Personally, he was also distressed by the lack of options for upward mobility for someone in his trade, as well – the options for a language expert to work anywhere but in translation or in managing translation projects were far and few in between.

He therefore created a subunit within Language Support to cater to the needs of top executives who spoke little English but nonetheless had to be able to speak eloquently in international spheres to sell their ideas, the goal being to find a service niche relating to the company’s desire to be more competitive abroad. He also hand-picked a team of experts who specialized in English, some of who, like McNeil, had been with the company for decades and some of who had been hired externally. The new hires were the first in twenty-five years. The new subunit was called Executive Language and its service portfolio revolved around offering executives more personalized and specialized language services, such as speechwriting and particularly difficult translations like annual reports and legal documents.

Deavon’s effort to change his work situation constructively quickly proved challenging. The number of new jobs contracted within Language Support as a whole sank by fully 43%, which in turn had a negative effect on business in Executive Language. Old employees also regarded Deavon’s new processes for running the unit with skepticism and made use of old procedures instead. Furthermore, Deavon found that he was alone in his conviction that Language Support’s existence was in danger; his colleagues had been in their jobs for too long to truly believe the company might let them go, and they did not empathize with his sense of urgency. Furthermore, employees in Deavon’s new team who had been at Language Support for years greeted the new hires with great skepticism.

McNeil was particularly slow to accept the idea that her new colleagues were truly just as qualified as she was and therefore hoarded work from others in Executive Language, quite unbeknownst to Deavon. The outcome was that McNeil had been working extremely long hours and outsourced a great many jobs to freelancers, which drove costs up and profit down. When one of the new hires pointed out McNeil’s behavior, Deavon felt betrayed in his goals of moving on while securing everyone’s job. As far as Deavon was concerned, McNeil’s actions created an unnecessary bottleneck in Executive Language’s service line, overextended her ability to do her job well, frayed her emotional reserves, and protected her own personal, short-term interests at the expense of the new unit’s reputation and long-term goals. Deavon was disgruntled. However, he had been working with McNeil for over twenty-five years; whether she was really against these basic objectives was not immediately clear.

He thought for a few weeks about whether or not he could rely on her to support and contribute to the new unit’s future development. Deavon had proofread the new hires’ work
himself and found McNeil’s skepticism as frustrating as it was puzzling; but he began to document his feedback of each new hire’s work, just to be sure. During that time, the extent of how much McNeil had hoarded became even clearer as Deavon began making a record of all new jobs received – she was taking on almost a quarter of the orders received since Executive Languages was started.

Her tendency to take pride in her organizational skills as a project manager began to seem as grotesquely self-aggrandizing as it was undeserved. Deavon began observing closely what types of jobs McNeil redirected to her internal colleagues and what she managed herself. Even though McNeil’s excessive workload prevented her from adequately proofreading her work, she nevertheless managed more politically sensitive and challenging jobs herself and gave less difficult work such as letters, correspondence, and presentations to the new hires, who had not come cheap and who did not have enough to do. Her self-imposed overload of work kept her in a bad temper, which was slowly but surely becoming apparent to customers at a time when the new unit needed desperately to expand its client base. As Deavon gained an overall impression of what McNeil’s behavior really meant, he began to feel more and more convinced that her work in the new unit would never facilitate either of his goals.

These convictions stayed just under the surface of his awareness until a new hire asked him what was preoccupying him so and if anything was wrong. Surprised to have been sending out visible signals of distress, Deavon answered:

It’s just so inappropriate. Kay doesn’t trust you, me, or anyone. She doesn’t trust my hiring choices, and her actions are keeping us from working together as a unit. She doesn’t get along with you because she’s so certain that you can’t become equally qualified within two years to become a project manager, which she was given ten years to prepare for. She keeps saying, “I’m such a good administrator, I’m so organized!” Well, right now I’ve started to become very displeased with her lately. She’s not doing a good job. I think it’s time to change the routine.

By voicing his feelings thusly, Deavon determined that McNeil’s actions were intentional, unnecessary, and avoidable. He could not have explained why he felt that McNeil’s performance was substandard, but he knew he did not want to continue to let her have as much influence in Executive Language’s development as she currently had. The time had come to put matters into the hands of true supporters. He therefore reduced her workload by 40% and put one of the new hires in charge of particularly challenging projects requiring a lot of collaboration with customers. As his anger grew, he began to believe McNeil was intentionally – almost sociopathically – preventing the new hires from getting better at their job just so that she could feel authoritative. He restricted her activities further, which culminated in regular shouting matches between the two.

Deavon was angry because McNeil seemed not only unwilling to support his goals, of which one was extremely personal, but in fact even dedicated to preventing their achievement when he had been trusting her to do just the opposite. His response was to feel that trusting her no longer felt right and then to seek individuals who would support his objectives. Once his anger generated a sense of rightness about McNeil’s untrustworthiness,
her opinions became far less credible and her statements carried less weight because Deavon simply refused to act on them. He stopped investigating the quality of new hires’ work once he became convinced that McNeil was working solely in her own interests. He also began monitoring the quality of her work for the first time in literally decades and limited what type of work she was permitted to do. In essence, he interpreted McNeil’s distrust of the new hires as a personal affront to himself, just as if McNeil had said she did not trust him; his response was to view her as a foe who could no longer be trusted.

As long as Deavon’s anger was forward-looking and focused on furthering Executive Language’s continued and healthy development, his trust decisions had a constructive, adaptive basis because they allowed him to use his emotions to prevent a negative outcome (cf. Lerner & Tiedens, 2006). However, with time, Deavon’s anger shifted away from ensuring the primary leadership goal and began to revolve around his personal gratification at seeing his own sufferings reflected in the suffering of another. Once McNeil’s recalcitrance was no longer the key stumbling block, Deavon’s lack of trust toward McNeil deserved reappraisal. Lazarus (1991a) points out that emotions involve an individual’s ego-identity in various ways. Accordingly, anger feels particularly personal because the truster feels attacked in her self-esteem; the challenge for leaders as trusters is to not confuse anger relating to the frustration of a leadership goal with anger relating to a personal emotional goal.

Given Deavon’s response to McNeil once he became convinced she could not be trusted, control-oriented behavior in leaders making trust decisions may go deeper than the realist argument from agency and transactional cost theory that trustees are by nature exploitative and opportunistic. Rather, the emotional flipside to prevention may in fact be some form of anger driving the leader’s decision of who she will trust. As Williamson (1993) notes, true trust cannot exist without emotion, and such behavioral responses by leaders cannot exist in a vacuum. Indeed, much research – such as the social loafing phenomenon (for a review, see Karau & Williams, 1993) or transaction cost and agency theory – on leadership and management suggests that leaders do not, and should not, trust subordinates.

Such a message proves particularly challenging for leaders at the intersection between anger and intrapersonal trust. In its most adaptive form, a judicious display of anger by a leader motivates subordinates to recall the shared goal of which the leader is ultimately in charge and to refocus distracted efforts back onto it. When anger becomes a mechanism solely for regaining personal control rather than for ensuring leadership goals, however, the trust decision can have a dysfunctional end that is reinforced into a behavioral pattern if it persists over time. For example, anger can find inverted expression in forward-looking measures by leaders who are resentful of subordinates’ past performance and desiring to contain their ability to contribute to future goals. Nor does such indirect expression of negative affect come without a cost: Repressed anger lingers, focuses awareness on the
source of one’s anger, and makes regulating external displays of emotion all the more challenging (Beal, Trougakos, Weiss, & Green, 2006).

Anger is a demanding emotion because using it constructively requires acknowledging the personal offense associated with an emotion-eliciting event while simultaneously grasping how the event relates to, and blocks, a shared goal for which a leader is responsible. Although anger does have an important function for ensuring goals, largely linked to righting wrongs (Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Dilorio & Nusbaumer, 1993; Morris & Keltner, 2000), its intensity (Dilorio & Nusbaumer, 1993; Wharton & Erickson, 1993), but also its close connection to a leader’s sense of self-worth, makes anger difficult to channel constructively into leadership goals, which as a result can become confused with personal goals. Understanding these challenges may help to explain the prevalence of research showing collective managerial distrust of subordinates.

**Giving trust to feel inspired: Happiness**

Despite findings indicating that people actively seek out positive emotional experiences, the influence of happiness on trust has not been explored in great detail, perhaps because vulnerability, which has been a great focus in much trust research, does not intuitively lend itself to happiness. However, happiness or joy as a short-lived, episodic emotion can influence the development of intrapersonal trust. When happiness is a motivating factor in intrapersonal trust, the truster sees the trust decision – generally speaking the decision to give trust – as a means of attaining a much-desired outcome that appears to broaden the truster’s horizons for future opportunity and benefit. Trust is given because it feels good to do so, but also because it comes with the prospect of positive growth and expansion. Here, the truster’s predominant emotional stance is oriented to a sense of gain that overshadows considerations of risk. While a truster may well be cognizant of the risks associated with a particular trust decision – such as a potential trustee’s lack of experience or qualification or time constraints if trust is given – the affective backdrop for the trust decision is nevertheless one of optimism, enthusiasm, positive anticipation, and even anticipatory savoring in the conviction that the trust decision will catalyze even more happiness and pleasure, however derived. Thus when happiness motivates a trust decision, the rightness of that decision depends upon feeling as though the trust decision will render the environment more conducive to opportunity and/or benefit for the truster.

Student Jenna Keller was asked to help organize the Heartland Conference for Film and Theater, where many theater companies recruited non-guilded actors and technicians for summer-stock productions. In return, the organizers waived the participation fee for Keller, who decided to try out for several acting positions. Producer Mike Thurman of the Changing Woman Field Company interviewed her and recommended that she call John Crow, Changing Woman’s executive producer who made all the hiring decisions.
The call did not go particularly well. Crow had not expected Thurman to find anyone suitable at Heartland, to say nothing of receiving a phone call from an applicant. Keller stumbled through a hasty description of her interview with Thurman and then began talking about her qualifications as an actor/technician.

“But you’re a math major,” interjected Crow, “what are you doing looking for work in theater?”

Avoiding a direct answer to the question, Keller began to talk about her interest and involvement in community theater prior to college. As Crow listened patiently, he got the distinct impression that Keller did not know what it was she really wanted. Crow was perfectly willing to hire a motley candidate, but the more Keller explained, the more unfocused her personal development seemed. After several minutes of describing her abilities, qualifications, and potential, Keller went silent, perhaps waiting for Crow to speak; however, he took a good three minutes to think about her answer in silence while she waited.

“Ah, well, alright,” he said finally, “send me a copy of your résumé with a headshot, and I’ll let you know. You’re from Missouri, right? That’s a long way to travel from just to work in New Mexico for the summer.”

Keller replied that she had given the matter some thought; then she promised to send her application to Crow and thanked him for his time. Not five minutes went by before Keller called him back.

“Look,” she said, “I don’t really feel I gave you a sense of why I’m interested in this job. I know I’m underqualified, but I want to develop my abilities, and besides, this is what I like doing. I know theater isn’t what you’d expect of a math major. I know I’m not a professional and I can’t promise to always be smiling and enthusiastic, but I’m the sort of person who really focuses when I work, and –” (Observed dialogue, May 1990)

Crow heard the determination in her voice and the frank admission of where she was in her personal development in her words. He was impressed she had called back before his first impression really had a chance to sink in; most students were too preoccupied with making a perfect impression in the moment. In addition, far from expecting the recognition and attention many actors wanted from colleagues for their artistic prowess, Keller seemed to prefer doing without it and just doing the work for its own sake.

Assuaging insulted egos in actors and technicians was a perennial problem every year and a process that distracted most company members away from collaborating together: If one actor felt that the color of his shirt was too much like that of another actor’s, then the other actor was annoyed that the cut of his shirt was not as original and interesting as the first actor’s. Technicians fought amongst each other for the “good” jobs, those that communicated superiority and authority to others in the company, and then promptly left Changing Woman forever once the summer season ended. Even those who were not involved were affected because they held themselves back more, to avoid offending anyone or being told they had done something wrong.
Crow knew the company would never be truly professional until it rid itself of this kind of infighting, and he was determined to assemble a company that would help Changing Woman’s growth. He had put Changing Woman together. He wanted to see it flourish in the long term, not just survive. He had not thought through just how he was going to do it, but he could see that Keller’s kind of person pointed to the way. Her kind of attitude and her obvious ability to influence others with her strong personality would transfer to others because they would see it was authentic.

These thoughts went through his mind in a matter of seconds, too quickly to all come to the surface of Crow’s awareness, but he was felt convinced that choosing Keller was not only the right thing to do, but also the interview with her made him feel good because it gave him a sense of how to make more interesting changes happen within Changing Woman for the longer term.

Crow said, “Real professionals do just that, Ms. Keller. We don’t make a big deal of who we are or what we do. We don’t draw attention to ourselves by demanding that others acknowledge our feelings. We just come in everyday and do the work and get it done. I’m going to send you a contract for an actor/technician position. I have decided. What is your address?” (Observed dialogue, May 1990)

When a trust event stimulates happiness, leaders see themselves harmonizing leadership goals with personal goals through the trust decision, and Crow’s choice to hire Keller appeared to bring him closer to his objectives in different respects. First, from a practical stance, he obtained someone who could work as an actor and a technician. Second, and more significantly, the trust decision around Keller provided Crow with at least part of the answer regarding how to evolve Changing Woman into a truly professional theater production. These considerations gave Crow a sense of rightness about giving trust because collectively they indicated that giving trust thusly would bring him closer to achieving his most fundamental goals, and well. In essence, Crow felt right about giving trust because he expected the result to harmonize with where he wanted to be – as an individual and an executive producer – in the future.

Happiness that motivates trust decisions serves as an affirmation of one’s decision-making and leadership skills and tells leaders to make decisions differently and try new directions to develop their environments to realize their goals. Happiness thus also allows leaders to redefine how they interact with followers and to utilize their followers’ abilities more fully by focusing on how followers’ behavior will culminate their goals and by discovering unknown abilities and skills in their followers. Thus happiness also enables a leader to feel connected with followers, first by giving followers opportunities by entrusting them with responsibility and then by feeling supported in her goal achievement by subordinates collaborating with her, thereby countering feelings of isolation between leader and follower.

Happiness is also associated with reduced critical thinking, however. Good outcomes are often viewed as the confirming evidence for the rightness of rightness. However, when
feelings of faith in someone are motivated by the desire to deal with stress by being optimistic rather than make shared goals happen, leaders run the risk of overemphasizing their emotional needs over considering sagely the events in the environment. The challenge for leaders motivated by happiness is to be able to honor the need to feel good with the need to critically question why one feels that need when giving trust.

**Love in leaders: Friendship, romance, and patronage**

Positive affect of all kinds makes people feel good, so I move on to love next to distinguish it from happiness and talk about how it can affect a leader’s experience of intrapersonal trust. I will make the argument here that love in any form – i.e., the desire for human connection and intimacy – moves a leader to idealize and so to view the trustee as the key to culminating the trust goal at hand.

Love relationships come in different shapes and sizes, and each is associated with different subjective experiences and ergo responses (Hatfield & Rapson, 1993; Lee, 1976; Sternberg, 1976, 1988). In the working context and in organizations, three types of love relationship are probably most prevalent. The first of these is companionate love (Hatfield & Rapson, 1993) – i.e., liking. Second, selfless love – what Lee (1976) refers to as altruistic love or “agape” – also plays a frequent role in organizations. The difference proposed here between compassion and altruistic love is that compassion is driven by an empathetic desire to alleviate someone’s pain; altruistic love is the desire for intimacy and connection that will improve the life of another and lift that individual up. Third, although less common, the influence of passionate love (ibid), i.e., romance, between leader and subordinate doubtless plays a role in some leaders’ experience of intrapersonal trust. Practically speaking, passionate love between a leader and a third party, e.g., a partner, can also affect a leader’s experience of intrapersonal trust.

The relationships described above revolve around a long-term emotional state associated with a long-term dyadic interaction in which the love object is always a person. Love in this sense is more akin to a mood not associated with a particular trust event. Liking shows up alongside trust, respect, and commitment in research on leader-member exchange (LMX) as one of the key components of a functional leader-follower dyad (Liden & Graen, 1980; Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995; Liden & Maslyn, 1998). Leader-subordinate dyads governed by positive affect are associated with more pleasant experience (Isen & Baron, 1991) that can influence the leader’s experience and assessment of a subordinate (Robbins & DiNisi, 1994). Love and liking also have broader adaptive social functions in organizations, such as heightening communication, human bonding, and social integrity (Spoor & Kelly, 2004). Since trust also is associated with similar effects (e.g., Giddens, 1990; Luhmann, 1978; Blau, 1964; Simmel, 1950), researchers have begun to explore the high, positive correlation between liking and trust for causality. Möllering (2006), for example, finds that from a leader’s point of view, the ideal basis for giving trust entails liking a subordinate combined
with the observation of “recognized competence and business acumen” (166) in that subordinate. The implication is often that trust exists (e.g., Lewicki & Bunker, 1996) and performance is enhanced (Isen & Baron, 1991) because truster and trustee like each other. The logical conclusion of these ideas is that a truster has positive expectations for a trustee because the truster is fond of the trustee (Möllering, 2006).

Indeed, since the underlying desires around each type of love relationship differ somewhat, so do the acts of trust given and the intrapersonal trust experienced itself when catalyzed by love as emotion. As a transitory emotion, love and liking entail the goal-consistent, and therefore pleasant, feeling of connectedness and intimacy toward another person that results in the urge to affiliate with that person (Grandey, 2008). Broadly speaking, love influences intrapersonal trust when the trust decision – usually the act of giving trust – is expected to augment the truster’s feeling of human connection. However, intrapersonal trust differs slightly between companionate, altruistic, and romantic love because the truster’s expectations differ slightly in each.

The intuitive proposition about love with regard to intrapersonal trust is to say that trust is experienced and given to satisfy the human need to feel connected. People need at least some relationships that appear invulnerable to the disappointments and risks in the world (Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 1996). Positive assessments of a significant other generate feelings of safety and stability and faith in one’s partner (Murray & Holmes, 1997). Accordingly, a leader will experience trust primarily because he loves and therefore projects ideals and virtue onto the trustee (Murray & Holmes, 1997), irrespective of whether or not she truly possesses the necessary qualities for ensuring the goal behind the trust decision. Actress Frances McDermont gave a similar explanation, if perhaps somewhat in jest, as to why she got the lead role in the 1996 American thriller movie, Fargo: “The fact that I’m sleeping with the director may have had something to do with it.”

In some cases, as Fowers, Veingrad, and Dominicis (2002) note, a leader in love with a trustee may even reinterpret faults and inadequacies in a positive light. Accordingly, the CEO of a car company might present sketches for a new luxury model to his wife, who has no experience in designing cars. Foremost in his mind is neither her lack of experience nor the great effort his company’s team of designers may have put into this design. Rather, he loves his wife, so he trusts her implicitly to reject a bad product idea while still giving him a sense of closeness, connection, and intimacy. Indeed, this assurance of acceptance is the stabilizing essence of why a leader trusts a romantic partner and can be transferred into the organizational context to affect leadership decisions. From a functional stance, this type of love allows people to persevere and remain optimistic despite great difficulty (Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 1996). From a practical stance with respect to leadership decisions, this type of love moves a leader to see in a subordinate the potential for achieving an ideal outcome that will heighten the leader’s sense of connection while communicating to the trustee genuine feelings of affection.
However, companionate and altruistic love can fuel rightness that does not necessarily reflect the nature of the long-term relationship between leader and subordinate because the leader does not necessarily idealize the subordinate. Nor do romantic feelings explain all or even the most prevalent instances of love in organizations. Indeed, given the predominance of challenges related to the work environment, I would expect trusters to feel a sense of well-being by helping or offering others friendship and cordiality much more frequently than by engaging in a romantic love relationship.

When trust decisions occur primarily on the basis of liking, the leader as truster must feel as though indulging in those feelings, i.e., desiring intimacy and connection with the trustee, will satisfy the goal related to the trust event. For example, a leader whose greater goal is to ensure her connections with up-and-coming talent may be motivated to feel intrapersonal trust precisely because her affection for a particular subordinate appears to facilitate the objective of networking with younger members of her professional community.

Nonetheless, the intensity with which a leader associates his well-being with the achievement of shared goals complicates companionate love, i.e., liking, in organizations. Organizational research has shown that even if a truster continues to like a trustee after a violation of trust, these feelings are not enough to supplant a truster’s assessment of whether or not a trustee should be given trust in future (Schweitzer, Hershey, & Bradlow, 2006). The pleasure experienced from liking, and feeling liked by, a subordinate often does not outweigh the personal importance a leader associates with the achievement of shared goals, but also cannot be denied its important role toward sustaining the leader’s well-being, particularly against the stress of work. From an intrapersonal perspective, a leader is at this point forced to find some way to satisfy both the personal and the leadership goal, even when either of these is an all-or-nothing type of goal (Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988). When personal and leadership goals appear to be in conflict, a leader searches her feelings to prioritize her goals; if they appear equally important in differing ways, she is most likely to seek a compromise that allows some portion of each to be harmoniously achieved. Thus, a leader might be fond of a subordinate, who she nevertheless trusts only under certain circumstances, e.g., with certain tasks (Gabarro, 1978).

Like happiness, love is associated with goal congruency, i.e., that goals are being achieved, one critical difference being that an individual’s well-being is partially contingent upon the well-being of another (Power & Dalgleish, 2008). Thus love moves leaders to see in the act of giving trust the possibility of satisfying the emotional goal to feel connected by helping another. In essence, the leader is facilitating his goals by facilitating the goals of another. In this appraisal pattern, the leader’s primary goal is to contribute to the trustee’s well-being; resources are viewed as something the leader ought to expend for the sake of the trustee’s well-being. I would therefore expect love to be particularly influential on intrapersonal trust when leaders have made personal investments in their role as guides, such as in mentor-mentee relationships. This type of love can also move a leader to see himself as
a parent figure who a) takes care of his trustee subordinates and b) therefore defines what constitutes appropriate responses to the trust decision. In such a case, the trustee’s idealized response would be interpreted as an expression of the desire to please and obey the leader. An inappropriate response, i.e., when the trustee does not live up to expectation, could be interpreted as a willful act of disobedience to be punished. Altruistic love can influence leaders’ experience of intrapersonal trust in several different ways, but essentially the trustee is motivated by the desire to feel closer to another, the trustee, by contributing to the trustee’s well-being.

Generally speaking, if a leader’s trust expectations are not met, the love object, i.e., the subordinate, may be demonized in proportion to the leader’s disappointment; on the other hand, a leader may experience no disappointment whatsoever, precisely because of her idealized view of the trustee and the conviction that giving trust is an absolutely sure thing. Love is associated with feelings of liberation and power that result in uninhibited behavior, automatic information processing (Keltner, et al., 2003), and increased stereotyping in leaders (Tiedens & Linton, 2001). In its most extreme form, a leader’s desire for affection can blot out other considerations relevant to intrapersonal trust and a trust decision. Accordingly, when love is the backdrop for intrapersonal trust, I would expect a leader to question less a trustee’s/subordinate’s ability to live up to the leader’s expectations around the trust event. I would expect this lack of critical thought as a result of wanting affection to be correlated with a leader’s tendency to idealize a particular subordinate.

Trust given out of love hangs in a deceptively delicate balance because expectations are built against the leader’s idealized projections on the trustee. A telling instance in which ideals take the place of critical thinking might be when the CEO of a family-owned, international conglomerate entrusts a young daughter with no professional education with the leadership of one of the company’s subsidiaries. Without the right mentors and support from the CEO’s subordinates, she will in all likelihood fail; but his love for her has given her an opportunity that could on the other hand have unforeseen, positive effects for the company as a result of having a leader with completely different, fresh input.

If she does fail, her father may reappraise the situation in a number of ways, depending on his original ulterior motive. If he gave trust to begin her training as his successor, he may decide that the mistake was his in presenting her with a task too great for her skills and in demanding that she – as a daughter trying to please a father – try to live up to impossible expectations. In such an event, he will trust her again, but think with more deliberation about how to prepare her with constructive levels of challenge rather than overwhelming her.

On the other hand, if he gave trust because of an idealized expectation that she would be exactly as enterprising as he was at that age, he may feel she has failed to live up to the standards that he has very justifiably set for her and that she, as the heiress to a multicultural, global organization, must one day be able to live up to. In this case, he may feel angry at himself for not having noticed her lack of ability, frustrated with her at the shame he feels
from the public exposure of his daughter’s apparent inadequacies, and driven to regain a sense of control over the company losses and destabilization that occurred during her leadership. In such a case, I would expect to see the father display his resentment toward her in personal exchanges and symbolically in the public arena of the organization by taking away her leadership of it.

Both of these examples are fully feasible outcomes when love is the backdrop for a father experiencing intrapersonal trust. Indeed, in most cases I would even expect the idealization of the trustee to far outweigh any trepidation the leader might have with regard to trusting a loved one. As Elster (1984) argues, feelings of trust are not easily separated from positive affect resulting from behavior that benefits others.

**Please save me: Sorrow and disgust**

Although very different in their basic experience for the truster, sorrow and disgust nevertheless share the basic expectation that the truster hopes to be absolved of the task of achieving the trust goal. This desire to delegate responsibility away from oneself stems from a general feeling of powerlessness present in both emotions.

In the case of sorrow, feelings of powerlessness come from the loss of a vital goal. For a truster, then, sorrow plays a role in intrapersonal trust when an event initiates an irrevocable loss that can somehow be compensated or counteracted by the act of giving trust. The act of giving trust does not return to the truster a sense of control or personal power of self-determination. Rather, the trust decision enables the truster to either retreat from (i.e., if trust is not given) or to seek the support of another (i.e., if trust is given) to withdraw and reprioritize his goals. Socially, sorrow is also an appeal for compassion, and trusters can also be moved to give trust solely out of compassion, as the result of knowing how difficult sorrow is to experience alone.

Both of these phenomena are reflected in the interesting case of journalist Suki Rea, whose divorce turned her into a single mother of three before she had time to even get used to the idea that her husband had fallen out of love with her. Rea felt loneliest during that first year when the Christmas holidays came and she was forced to attend to the emotional needs of her children, who were too young to understand their own emotional distress from the absence of their father. In her alienation and sorrow, she began a pen-pal exchange with an inmate at a local state penitentiary who identified himself as Travis Elder.

The first time she wrote back to the prison inmate is highly indicative of a trust decision motivated predominantly by sorrow. She knew nothing of the man to whom she was writing; indeed, she was aware that he might well be dishonest about his character, past, and identity. However, the letters she received filled an emotional vacuum created by her husband’s absence by allowing her to feel desirable to the opposite sex again and giving her an outlet to attend to her own emotional needs, two motivations strongly associated with personal well-being.
She therefore continued the correspondence, which became increasingly romantic as time went by. More and more Elder alluded to the fast-approaching date of his release from prison and his desire to meet her personally. However, time also gave Rea a chance to reflect upon why she was writing this man. Even as Rea and Elder were beginning to talk in their letters about meeting, she began to have doubts about who he was and how intimate she should allow her relationship with him to become.

Her response – in line with the actions described for fear above – was to take action to regain a sense of control over the situation. She used the return addresses to research who he really was and after several weeks, found herself on the phone with Elder’s caseworker, who was responsible for tracking his psychological fitness. She told the caseworker about the letters and the ever-more romantic exchange between herself and Elder and then asked the caseworker what he had been convicted of and if she should have any reservations about meeting him in person once he was released from prison. After a few moments’ silence, the caseworker responded:

I could lose my job for telling you this, but I understand your situation, and you should know that the man you’ve been writing isn’t going to be released, ever. His real name is Louis Holloway, and he was convicted for the murder of his wife and parents and a convenience store employee. I have experienced him as an extremely dangerous and volatile person and would never recommend that someone in your position actually meet him in person.

The caseworker’s risky divulgence of Elder’s true identity was a signal of compassion for Rea. Compassion involves noticing another’s pain, feeling concern toward that person, and taking action to relieve (Dutton, Worline, Frost, & Lilius, 2006) or prevent it. As a manager, the caseworker was bound to the strictest confidentiality regarding the inmate’s past deeds and current state of mind. However, the caseworker saw that Rea had made herself increasingly vulnerable to a man who she should not continue to trust, irrespective of what her feelings were telling her to do. The caseworker therefore took action, even at the risk of her job, to prevent Rea from experiencing more pain. She trusted Rea to keep the information to confidential enough to prevent the caseworker from being exposed.

Disgust, on the other hand, engenders feelings of powerlessness associated with the inability to live up to a particular standard. Good examples of disgust sparking intrapersonal trust revolve around situations in which trusters feel as though either they themselves or someone who is very important with respect to the trust event fail to live up to a minimal or essential standard, such as substance abuse in trustees. Organizational phenomena such as “whistle-blowing” are indicative of disgust motivating a lack of trust toward one’s superiors and generating trust in other authorities able to put a stop to unethical management practices. When disgust plays a role in leaders’ experience of intrapersonal trust, a subordinate or follower has failed to live up to a minimal work ethic or standard.

As with sorrow, when disgust is the basis for intrapersonal trust, the truster seeks the help of a trustee to absolve him of the situation. Unlike sorrow, however, intrapersonal trust is
driven by the desire to distance oneself as much as possible from something or someone the 
truster experiences as repugnant, potentially even physically so. This desire makes the 
experience of trust feel compelling and urgent, proportionally as strong as the desire to rid 
one self of the situation inducing the disgust. Though disgust can frame intrapersonal trust as 
a result of things that are physically disgusting to the truster, I would expect a breach of 
ethics to be the most frequent cause of disgust as a motivating platform for intrapersonal 
trust.

The truster does not believe the object of her disgust is actually capable of responding 
appropriately to the trust decision, especially if trust is given. Thus when disgust is the 
backdrop for intrapersonal trust, the truster is likely to assiduously avoid giving trust to the 
object of his disgust. If he is disgusted with himself, he will seek the help of the trustee to 
prevent further damage or harm through his actions. If he is disgusted with the trustee, he 
will stop trusting her to prevent her from further influencing the situation. If he is disgusted 
with someone else, he will view the trustee as a means of ridding himself of a relationship 
with someone who he finds personally repugnant.

Here, disgust sends a signal to the truster to redirect resources being squandered by the 
inability to maintain the basic behavioral standards necessary for ensuring a given objective, 
particularly over the long term. Conversely, disgust can also be a signal to seek the resources 
necessary for ensuring those basic standards.

In sum, disgust and sorrow have in common the feelings of powerlessness that the truster 
initially experiences with respect to the trust event. The disgusted truster acts to regain a 
sense of control of his situation, which he sees as being impossible without external help. 
The sorrowful truster acts to withdraw, at least for a while, to rethink his priorities as they 
relate to the goal highlighted through the trust event.

**Applying the framework to empirical research**

In this and the previous Chapter, I have presented trust from an intrapersonal angle to 
consider in more depth the spontaneous nature of the trust decision as well as potential 
catalysts for the “leap of faith” associated with trust (e.g., Möllering, 2006; Murray & 
Holmes, 1997). Trust researchers from all academic disciplines have sought to understand 
how these two elements interact harmoniously with rational considerations behind the social 
exchange between truster and trustee (e.g., Blau, 1964; McAllister, 1995). My response has 
been to suggest a theory in which emotions inform cognition and which explores trust from 
within the mind of the truster from an emotional stance prior to the interaction between 
truster and trustee. A defining element of this intrapersonal experience of trust is that the 
truster’s emotion within a trust interaction is always subject to change because the truster 
constantly reacts to new stimuli around a particular trust dyad, stimuli that can change her 
emotions and therefore alter the backdrop for the rightness that motivates her experience of
trust. To more fully depict how emotion might influence intrapersonal trust, I have applied these ideas to the organizational setting by describing how intrapersonal trust affected leaders’ experience of intrapersonal trust and subsequent trust decision.

My argument throughout has been to suggest that in trust decisions, context is a major deciding factor because it determines the nature of the trust process itself. Moving away from trust as an outcome or antecedent – a what – and toward trust as a process – a how – should shed some insight into how these many situationally different types of trust are linked within the greater phenomenon of trust (cf. Osigweh, 1989). In a sense, then, the theory offered here is a call to be wary of micro logic as a way of not seeing by seeing (Van de Ven, 1989, 487). In order to deal constructively with such theoretical tensions (Pool & van de Ven, 1989), I have emphasized the need to observe the appraisal process in order to understand how emotions occur in direct response to trust events and how they influence the internal experience of trust. An effective theory of trust would thus need to describe and explain each step in the process as a leader appraises a trust event and his potential response.

However, separating the different – and usually rapid – phases of appraisal in practical settings requires a methodological approach that would enable each phase to be if not directly then at least indirectly observable. Although appraisal has been the focus of considerable empirical research, little is as yet known about when one appraisal phase begins and the next ends. Once again, how trust should be tested, this time as an intrapersonal phenomenon, requires further development. Thus exploratory research would be a constructive next step toward further developing the theoretical framework set forth here, particularly for more clearly defining rightness and linking it to the appraisal patterns and subsequent basic emotions at the heart of intrapersonal trust (cf. Hughes, et al, 1986).

Trust research has to date also focused on input-output models that give a structural account of the impacts of or to trust. The complexity of context in natural settings is either eliminated under experimental conditions, simplified into one type of situation in which affective reactions are limited, such as threat (e.g., Williams, 2007), or situated into the trust construct itself, e.g., as swift, cognitive, or affective (e.g., Meyerson, Weick, & Kramer, 1996; McAllister 1997). More recent research on trust has struck a balance between structure and process and resulted in complex, hybrid models that structure within-group trust behavior in a particular context (e.g., Ballinger & Schoorman, 2007).

These approaches have shed much light on the motivations behind trust, within these contexts. However, the creation of so many different types of trust has actually made them less easily relatable to each other because whether they transfer from one context to another requires clarification. In addition, the development of antecedent constructs such as benevolence or integrity obscures the role that context is likely to play (Dyer & Wilkins, 1991) in trust, in part because a structural model does not necessarily reflect process (Smith & Kirby, 1990) or enable researchers to observe trust while it is actually happening.
Most research on trust has accordingly involved quantitative study, usually self-report questionnaires (e.g., George & Johnson-Swap, 1982; Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005; Chua, et al., 2008) and experimental research designs for measuring the visible trust decision. Such research has enabled insight into more normative phenomena as reflected in between-person comparison of cases in a sample population (McMillan & Schumacher, 1993). This approach has given way to the development of models and further refinement of theories of trust based on reciprocity that enable predictions about when people give trust. Predictions about the trust decision based on how the truster expects to feel given a trustee’s response have been a particular emphasis in such research. Variables for empirical research have thus focused on the trustee’s intent and abilities, e.g., benevolence and competence.

Studying trust as an intrapersonal experience as set forth here requires the study of individual experience rather than representative behavior for an entire population. The developmental framework suggested here makes constructivist assumptions that every perspective differs, contributes to the experienced reality in groups, and is therefore worth exploring (Jacques, 1992). Multiple perspectives play a particularly personal role in intrapersonal trust because rightness revolves around them. How trusters’ goal achievement and perceived resources shapes their emotional appraisal and ergo the experience of intrapersonal trust should be explored qualitatively first, to reflect the holistic picture behind each instance of rightness in a trust relationship and to reflect the complexity of the natural organizational settings (Creswell, 1998) in which intrapersonal trust develops. A qualitative approach would enable the collection of data with detailed descriptions that revolve around trusters’ experiences before, during, and after trust events and decisions.

Such research would need to highlight the causes for emotions around a trust event without turning a blind eye to the contingencies between those causes or the emotions themselves (Tsoukas, 1989). Qualitative research is useful precisely when little about such factors within a theory is known (Cherry, 2000), particularly when a real-life or quasi-experimental setting is required for testing the basic precepts of the theory (McMillan & Schumacher, 1993).

Accordingly, an exploratory study of intrapersonal trust would also have to address the passage of time. For one thing, trust and appraisal are both future-oriented phenomena. For another, individuals tend to quickly forget their emotional experiences or to manage emotions by focusing on a few salient details. Reappraisal even has the function of altering the truster’s impression of what happened and why in hindsight.

Thus to show how the truster moves from one phase of appraisal to the next, research would have to highlight the temporal and causal constraints in the mental schemas in trusters’ appraisal of trust events (cf. Stein & Levine, 1999, 389). Retrospective research tools for documenting the truster’s experience could be used, such as an interview schedule similar to the one developed by Stein & Levine (1999) that reflects the different appraisal phases (see Table 3).
**Table 3: Retrospective interview schedule for an isolated trust event (adapted from Stein & Levine, 1999, 389)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview question</th>
<th>Appraisal component researched</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What happened?</td>
<td>Trust event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How did the event affect my goals?</td>
<td>Appraisal, implication to well-being</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How did I feel about it?</td>
<td>Appraisal, implication to well-being</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What did I want to do about it?</td>
<td>Appraisal, coping potential; rightness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What did I do?</td>
<td>Rightness; emotional response; trust decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What were the results of my actions?</td>
<td>(Trustee response); reappraisal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, an effective exploratory study of intrapersonal trust would also require some way of capturing the truster’s experience in the present. Rightness is not a sensemaking variable oriented toward understanding the past but rather a future-oriented variable oriented toward making decisions in the present. Thus, the ephemeral, but also critical, impact of emotion on rightness and of rightness on the trust decision, respectively, would have to be observed. Such affective variables must be measured as close to the trust event as possible (cf. Beal, et al, 2005; Beal & Weiss, 2003). Accordingly, research methods that document emotion-eliciting events as they occur would need to be used, such as experience-sampling methodology (ESM; Csikszentmihalyi & LeFevre, 1989) from the perspective of the truster, or participant observation from the perspective of the researcher. Ideally, these methods would be combined to consider intrapersonal trust in the present from multiple perspectives, among other things to gain a better understanding of the many different factors salient in the truster’s mind at the moment of rightness.

**Summary**

This Chapter has been devoted to thinking in more detail about how intrapersonal trust becomes manifest when applied to a practical organizational context, specifically trust decisions by leaders. When faced with a trust event that has implications for their personal well-being, leaders as trusters go through a rich, internal process that is motivated differently by each basic emotion that in turn changes the experience of the trust relationship and the trust decision itself. Although the initial trust decision has been emphasized in the cases discussed in this Chapter, intrapersonal trust is subject to constant revision because the truster constantly appraises the trust environment and can therefore begin to feel differently about which trust decision feels right. This focus on the internal experience of trust presents particular challenges with regard to researching intrapersonal trust empirically, particularly with respect to the issue of time and the influence of the many different perspectives in the environment on the truster’s subjective experience.
Chapter 5: Concluding Thoughts

Now that the basic emotions have been applied to the intrapersonal trust framework, I would like to conclude by discussing the bigger picture of implications and limitations relating to intrapersonal trust and trust-giving by leaders as presented here. I begin by summarizing the theory and framework discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. The theoretical implications are discussed thereafter, followed by potential practical implications of these ideas for organizational contexts. I conclude with an outlook on how further research could be pursued to refine the theory.

The theory in summary

The purpose of this dissertation has been first and foremost to suggest how trust might be studied from an angle that is somewhat different than previously proposed. Trust has, very reasonably and correctly, been viewed to date as a social phenomenon in which dyadic interaction between truster and trustee is used as the basis for thinking about how people choose to depend on one another. Toward this end, the majority of research exploring these behavioral interactions has focused on the logical conclusions people draw about whether they should, and are likely, to give trust based on the probability of the trustee’s response. However, my argument throughout – and indeed one I believe is gaining increasing attention around trust research (e.g., Chua, Ingram, & Morris, 2008; Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005; Holste & Fields, 2005; Tomlinson & Mayer, 2008) – has been to say that emotion frames trust. As such, trust is a deeply personal experience motivated by the personal implications that a trust decision has for the truster. Therefore, I have suggested that intrapersonal trust is motivated first and foremost by appraisal, and thus emotion, rather than by causal attribution and prediction.

Given that trust decisions are often made rapidly and experienced as a matter of gut intuition, emotions probably do precede the trust decision. However, precisely because trust has been viewed as a fundamentally interpersonal social phenomenon, how emotions influence a truster’s subjective experience of trust and the trust decision has not yet been explored in great depth (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005). Rather, researchers have focused either on deep-level personality analysis (e.g., De Vries, 2005; Erikson, 1968) or on the truster’s rational considerations of particular environmental characteristics, especially regarding the trustee’s responses to the trust decision (e.g., Mayer, et al, 1995; McAllister, 1995). Most such studies also posit that truster emotion is an outcome of the trustee’s response to the trust decision and is the driving force of a self-reinforcing behavioral loop, i.e., the more positive the emotion experienced by truster and trustee, the more trust will exist in the dyad (e.g., Johnson & George-Swap, 1982; Zand, 1972). These studies revolve largely around the idea that vulnerability must be overcome in order for trust to exist. The means most commonly
proposed as effective toward this end are either an urgent, common goal (e.g., Meyerson, Weick, & Kramer, 1996; Williams, 2007) or a gradual, carefully deliberated interaction in which trust is reinforced by both partners over time (e.g., Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Zand, 1972).

These ideas and previous findings have inspired me to consider the emergence of trust and the role of vulnerability within that process from a different angle. Toward this end, I have offered a number of propositions. First, prior to the interpersonal interactions that shape a trust relationship, a trust event moves a truster to appraise, and to have an emotional reaction that gives the truster a feeling of rightness about, whether or not trust should be given. Rightness is based on the truster’s expectation that the trust decision will facilitate his goal and that he will have a certain emotional experience once the goal has been achieved as a result of the trust decision. I have dubbed this experience intrapersonal trust. I have also proposed that intrapersonal trust is a process that should be observed stage by stage in its ever-changing nature rather than as an outcome that can be measured in terms of high and low.

Each basic emotion gives the experience of intrapersonal trust a unique feeling, set of potential responses, and interpretational framework all its own. First, each emotion has its own underlying affective goal that involves a unique series of decision elements motivating the appraisal process, which in turn gives an experience its own feel and character. Looking at past research, literature, and practical environments, the basic emotions that seem most closely linked with trust include fear, anger, sorrow, disgust, happiness, and love. Although surprise probably entails a pre-emotional component that is largely cognitive (Lazarus, 1991a), surprise should be taken explicitly into consideration since it signals a sea-change in the truster’s expectations and ergo rightness about the trust decision.

Since the process of intrapersonal trust thus takes slightly different turns for each basic emotion, it seems reasonable to call for the study of trust in terms of variables that account for the truster and her environment rather than either the former or the latter. Accordingly, trust needs to be explicitly studied in terms of how an individual interacts with her environment in order to have a particular trust experience, to know emotionally why it feels right, and ergo to have a sense of how to give trust appropriate to the situation.

Thus I make no assumption that more trust is better (cf. Barber, 1983). Rather, when intrapersonal trust enables trusters to be adaptive in attaining goals, trust is good. When intrapersonal trust leads to maladaptive truster behavior, i.e., that hinders or neglects the achievement of personal and/or shared goal(s), trust has an overall negative impact. So whether intrapersonal trust is constructive or destructive to the trust dyad depends greatly on whether or not the truster is able to fully and adaptively utilize the emotional information generated by a trust event about a particular goal or set of goals. Toward that end, a truster must be able to discern when her emotions are helping her to realize either personal or shared goals in healthy balance from when her emotions are overwhelming her ability to honor
either her own or the environment’s needs. Every truster has the capacity to use emotions adaptively, but will, for whatever reason, occasionally make mistakes regarding emotion information in intrapersonal trust, i.e., respond maladaptively.

In order to emphasize the emotion process that situates intrapersonal trust, I have used a) the episodic stages proposed by cognitive appraisal theory as a basic framework for each basic emotion as an antecedent experience to intrapersonal trust and b) the initial trust decision. I have limited my arguments thusly for three reasons. First, how trust emerges in the heart and mind of the truster through emotion is an important consideration in intrapersonal trust. Second, accordingly, is the question of how a basic emotion might alter, frame, or guide the experience of intrapersonal trust. Third, studying trust in terms of the truster within a particular environment requires a theoretical backdrop that accommodates both. The idea from appraisal theory that individuals determine the personal significance of an emotion-eliciting event, or as proposed here a trust event, considers just this type of interaction between a truster and the environment.

Furthermore, the appraisal process enables the fluid, context-sensitive nature of trust to come to the forefront. Each trust event has a unique meaning for a truster at a particular point in time and in a particular trust relationship. Therefore, each trust event can also catalyze appraisal that changes the truster’s rightness about giving trust. On the one hand, such changes can accumulate over time to reinforce a truster’s sense of rightness about giving trust and ergo her trust decision under particular circumstances. On the other hand, new emotional reactions can change rightness in a contradictory or inconsistent fashion from one trust event to the next. With time, reappraisal and emotion management also lend complexity to this tendency; however, a truster does not necessarily give trust or not because she attributes reliability to a particular trustee. Rather, her assessment of what the goal behind the trust event means to her combined with the possibilities behind giving trust guide her appraisal processes and the rightness she feels with regard to a particular decision. Thus a truster gives trust or not according to what her emotions are telling her to do in a particular instance. This aspect of intrapersonal trust has potential for explaining selectiveness, inconsistency, and the fragility in how an individual gives trust.

To explicitly account for both truster and environment, I have proposed that this initial process framework begins with a person-environment platform for appraisal. The purpose of the platform is to provide a theoretical starting place for observing the truster’s experience of the events that precede, comprise, and follow intrapersonal trust. The platform consists of an environmental variable that applies to trust dyads and a personal variable that can be specified to the truster, both qualitative. Since intrapersonal trust is an experience that moves trusters to look beyond their own capacities to achieve a particular goal, the environmental variable proposed in Chapter 3 entails the truster’s evaluation of the resources for achieving a goal, i.e., his own combined as necessary with those from the environment.
To reflect the naturally contingent nature of trust, however, the platform has the flexibility to reflect the priorities motivating a particular truster’s goal assessment. I therefore left the personal variable open and subject to definition according to the truster’s primary role in the trust environment in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, I demonstrated how a primary role could specify the intrapersonal trust platform further by defining the truster as a leader. Accordingly, I would expect the primary role of leader to move a truster to associate the achievement of a shared goal with personal well-being. The personal variable defined for a leader as truster thus comprises the leader’s anticipated personal well-being as a result of achieving a shared goal. The more inclined a leader is to make this association, the more she will feel a sense of importance regarding the trust decision and the more intense her emotional experience in intrapersonal trust is likely to be. If this dissertation had focused instead on the subordinate as truster, a different personal variable would probably have been selected to reflect the different priorities that subordinates have. Retaining flexibility in the model thusly allows the intrapersonal trust to be observed in the truster’s particular context. The appraisal process structure enables the development of intrapersonal trust to be observed before, during, and after the trust decision.

Finally, to round out the reader’s sense of the possibilities associated with the intrapersonal trust framework, I used it as re-specified for leaders as trusters to consider how each emotion provides a different backdrop for intrapersonal trust. The relationship between fear and intrapersonal trust signals how trusters experience trust and react via the trust decision to environmental changes that appear threatening. Anger draws the truster’s focus onto the frustration of a trust goal and the injustice of that frustration. Happiness moves a truster to feel assured that the trust decision will facilitate his goal relating to the trust event. Disgust motivates the truster to reject as quickly as possible an element violating the minimal ethical standards that the truster feels are necessary for the goal behind the trust event. Sorrow moves a truster to reconsider the importance or quality of the goal behind the trust event. Finally, love moves a truster to feel and give trust out of a desire to experience a sense of belonging and connection with others, usually the trustee. Each emotion serves as a different backdrop for intrapersonal trust and ergo brings different experiences, motivations, insights, and responses to intrapersonal trust. I would expect surprise to radically transform a leader’s previous appraisals around intrapersonal trust.

**Theoretical implications**

The ideas proposed in this thesis research on trust, leadership, and appraisal in a number of ways. The contributions to each area of research are discussed in detail below in no particular order of significance. Broadly, the implications for trust revolve around a truster’s experience; the implications for leadership relate to leader-follower dyadic interaction; and the implications for appraisal concern the appraisal structure itself.
Trust

As mentioned in the introduction, research and theory on trust does not depict much of what goes on in the heart and mind of the truster from the truster’s point of view, i.e., the intrapersonal experience of the truster. Accordingly, I have proposed a more nuanced take on trust that revolves around the truster’s subjective experience, an angle still largely unexplored in trust research (Möllering, 2006). Trust as documented through observable behavioral interchanges between trusters and trustees presents only part of the reality motivating trusters. The commonly held assumption that trust is based on reciprocity has a flipside in the form of intrapersonal experience. Each truster constructs experience differently, so to some extent how she interacts with the trustee and the trust environment will be guided by her own expectations, goals, and feelings rather than the social norms and expectations she shares with others.

Observing the exchange between the truster and the environment focuses on a truster’s subjective experience through his reactions as they happen, from the truster’s first emotion, through rightness and the trust decision, to reappraisal after the trustee’s response. From this perspective, trust can be experienced intensely before it becomes visible as a social phenomenon and should be studied as such precisely because it forms the basis for a) how the trust decision will be communicated and b) how the trustee’s response to the trust decision will be experienced. In sum, the intrapersonal approach proposed here depicts how a truster proactively makes trust decisions as they relate to him personally and represents a first step toward explaining what really motivates a truster to take the leap of faith, i.e., to give trust.

A series of the theoretical implications for trust from this study relate to the role of emotion in trust. Researchers are just beginning to discover how affect motivates trusters’ experience. Past research has emphasized rational conclusions about trustee behavior and largely bypassed the means by which trusters experience the significance of the events leading up to trust decision. Much of the literature on trust assumes that emotion arises in trust relationships as the product of cognition (McAllister, 1997), which is grounded in rational thought. How cognitions are built upon an affective foundation has not received much attention in trust theory.

However, humans are guided by their emotions repeatedly, rapidly, and spontaneously multiple times within the course of a day. A truster’s emotional state fundamentally frames how a truster interprets events and makes decisions. Accordingly, the rapid, at times even subconscious, nature of the appraisal process provides more explicit clues about why trust decisions can be so spontaneous and intuitive, and sometimes feel so good long before “payback” of any kind is assured. The intrapersonal trust framework sheds new light on how emotions can influence the trust decision well before they become apparent through interpersonal exchange or just before the trust decision. Thus intrapersonal trust offers a
fresh take on how trusters anticipate environmental changes and evaluate the meaning of the trust decision.

Trust theory has tended to view cognition and emotion as two separate lines of influence on trust that for some even suggests two different types of social psychological interaction, rational/calculative and personal/affective, respectively (Chua, et al, 2008). However, the idea that trust is given primarily for calculative reasons or primarily for emotional reasons puts rationality and emotion at odds with one another.

Such structural models of trust falsely emphasize the idea that cognition and emotion are essentially separate constructs, when in fact they supplement and influence each other (Lazarus, 1991c). The emphasis on measuring trust, or aspects of trust, with constructs has created an either/or relationship between cognition and emotion that obscures how the affect-rich context around each trust decision informs a truster’s rational considerations (Dyer & Wilkins, 1991) and vice-versa. For example, Chua, et al (2008) find that work environments, which revolve around calculation, naturally undermine affinity and concern between truster and trustee. However, this idea contradicts findings that indicate how leaders excel by making use of positive affect, e.g., through emotional intelligence, servant leadership, and transformational leadership. Moreover, calculation does not necessarily prevail where personal affinity is lacking; indeed, I would expect negative emotion to have a particularly strong influence on intrapersonal trust in an acrimonious trust relationship as well as on how truster and trustee calculated and rationalized their behavior. The answer to such questions lies in understanding how emotion and cognition supplement each other and collectively shape the experience of trust that informs the trust decision.

Toward that end, the intrapersonal trust framework is built on the assumption that all trust environments are personal precisely because trust events always have implications for the truster. Cognition, calculation, and rational thought all doubtless play a role in the trust decision, but trust is by nature more directly influenced by affect because a truster’s primary concerns involve more than who, what, where, when, how, and why, i.e., the facts around a trust event. Rather, trusters find themselves making decisions not based on facts but on the implications of those facts as embodied in the following (Smith, et al, 1993, 917): “Do I care about what is happening? Is it good or bad for me? Can I do anything about it? Can I accept it? Will it get better or worse?” Given people’s tendency to rely more on affect to make decisions in ambiguous situations (Martin, Ward, Achee, & Wyer, 1993), the intrapersonal perspective sheds light on the adaptive functions of trust as well as on the reasons why trust decisions probably should be made on the basis of emotion.

Accordingly, a final potential contribution of the intrapersonal trust framework with respect to affect is that it provides a means for considering the differential impact each basic emotion has on the truster’s personal experiences, dilemmas, challenges, and even dreams. Key issues of intrapersonal trust involve how each emotion informs a truster’s rationale, how
long that influence lasts, and how it translates into behavior, such as leadership decisions that affect others.

Finally, a third set of implications revolves around the contingent nature of trust as an exchange between an individual and the environment. The interpersonal focus of past trust research has emphasized either the truster’s personality and past experience or environmental factors such as trustee behavioral traits. These two approaches have generated a stark contrast in trust research. Trust is either the product of a deep-level psychoanalysis of one truster’s past history reaching back to childhood (e.g., De Vries, 2005) or of a constellation of environmental factors that only reflect what a truster might be thinking and feeling based on the assumption of maximizing benefit while minimizing harm. Both approaches, as different as they are, depict trust as a what.

The difficulty with this approach is that trust is by nature constantly defined and redefined by how a truster interacts with the ever-changing environment. Asking what trust is at a certain point in time also pigeonholes trust into a past environment that may not apply in the future or a different context, especially with respect to what the truster is feeling. For example, Lewicki, et al’s (1998) division of trust into types over time clearly stipulates that the emotional aspects of trust, true intimacy, come only with time and the positive reinforcement of the relationship through correct responses to the trust decision. However, as discussed in Chapter 4, some emotions create a sense of intimacy quickly, such as love. Focusing on personality as an antecedent to trust puts limitations on the scope of human response; as the discussion of rightness indicates, trusters can change their minds quickly and are not limited to an easily observed pattern of responses due to certain personality traits. Accordingly, the intrapersonal trust framework provides a first step toward thinking about trust as a how, i.e., as a process that reflects the relationship the truster builds with his environment, ultimately through short-lived appraisals of one trust event to the next.

Focusing on the person-environment exchange thusly provides a new means for considering the changes that dyadic trust relationships go through. The ideas of intrapersonal trust as applied here to various leadership situations shows that people are not always aware of the ways in which they judge others. Lasting impressions are nevertheless formed through fleeting encounters that are based on how people feel and during which emotions inform reason. The intrapersonal trust process helps trusters to process a vast array of information, including non-verbal communication, environmental cues, mood, etc. that culminates to give trusters a feeling of rightness in a very short period of time. The intrapersonal trust model thus offers insight into how people gain an impression of a trust event by organizing and remembering information and then transform that impression into an emotional reaction and a behavioral response in the form of a trust decision (Srull & Wyer, 1989).

In addition, focusing on the contingencies of trust through process also has implications for the interpersonal exchange. Specifically, the intrapersonal experience has a direct impact on the interpersonal exchange and an indirect impact on how the interpersonal experience is
experienced and reappraised thereafter. As such, for example, the intrapersonal perspective offers insight into how trust can exist in dyads not dominated by positive affect; indeed, sometimes trust is given precisely because of a truster’s negative affect (e.g., anger). The cases discussed in this dissertation even indicate that trusters actually need to appraise their environments in terms of both positive and negative expectation because the emotional contrast makes them aware of, and helps them to understand and fulfill, their own concerns.

In essence, a basic aspect of trust is that it changes. The intrapersonal trust framework accounts for this changing nature by observing process rather than structure, i.e., trust as a how rather than a what, and by considering the elements that subject a truster’s experience to sudden change, i.e., emotion.

**Leadership**

I believe the ideas on intrapersonal trust presented in this thesis also have some interesting implications for the intersection between trust and leadership. A major objective of this dissertation was to understand more fully the impact of emotion on a leader’s experience of intrapersonal trust and ultimately the trust decision. The cases discussed in this dissertation indicate that leaders give trust through a holistic consideration of all the environmental factors as they relate to the leader’s personal situation. Irrespective of the emotional backdrop against which intrapersonal trust was predominantly framed, each case presented in this dissertation demonstrates that leaders evaluate their situation individualistically in terms of how their environment has developed from its past state to be relevant for the present goal as highlighted by the trust event.

This evaluative approach takes myriad different factors into consideration prior to the leader’s experience of rightness regarding the trust decision. As would be expected from past research, leaders consider elements relating to more factual, “coldly cognitive” information (Smith, et al, 1993) as part of that evaluation when considering whether or not to trust a subordinate. However, the other aspect of this evaluation about which less is known entails the personal implications a leader sees in the trust event for his personal goals. The human tendency to evaluate situations in terms of personal well-being has a profound impact on leadership situations that require solutions beyond a leader’s own resources, be they material, emotional, structural, or physical. Well-being thus makes every trust decision a personal matter to the leader; how personal the trust event will feel to the leader depends on its personal significance.

These considerations indicate that leaders do not necessarily give trust based on learned behaviors. Familiar elements around a present trust event may well cause a leader to consider past experience relevant for the trust decision, to be sure. However, the personal nature of each trust event makes each experience of intrapersonal trust feel unique to at least some extent.
The cases discussed in Chapter 4 indicate that leaders use emotion to harmonize personal desires, concerns, and goals with the need to ensure shared goals by giving others trust. Just exactly how leaders attempt to reach this point of equilibrium differs from one basic emotion to the next. Each emotion has adaptive and maladaptive applications with regard to intrapersonal trust. This tendency provides new insight into how leaders balance trust and mistrust to make decisions that protect shared goals and interests by constructively challenging, and being challenged by, his subordinates (Bennis, 1989). These ideas also shed new light on why leaders sometimes trust blindly (Hardin, 1993, 2001), and even why blind trust is sometimes the more effective leadership decision (Möllering, 2005b).

A leader as truster is motivated through the intrapersonal trust process by fear when the need to trust subordinates to ensure the achievement of shared goals is directly affected by a threat to those shared goals. In regular business situations, a frightened leader takes measures to control potential damage incurred by the threat. If the threat to the shared goal is a subordinate, the leader limits how much and when he gives that subordinate trust with respect to the goal highlighted by the trust event. If the threat is an external force, on the other hand, a leader may trust his subordinates even more to gain a sense of control against it by banding his forces together.

Anger is the backdrop when a leader tries to balance the need to trust a subordinate to work toward shared goals with the desire to rectify an injustice. A leader will first trust a subordinate who is not the target of the leader’s anger. The purpose of this behavior is to try to right the perceived wrong regarding a shared goal by breaking out of the behavioral pattern that led to the injustice in the first place. However, a leader may be forced to tolerate the injustice, in which case she would do so by reappraising her situation.

Happiness frames intrapersonal trust when a leader wishes to harmonize her own desires and goals regarding how to be an effective leader, or a good individual, with giving trust to achieve shared goals. The feeling that one is living out one’s personal and/or leadership ideals by giving trust in order to ensure goals feels good because an ideal is being realized by meeting one’s obligations. Here, the leader as truster feels as though two fundamental goals are being facilitated. The optimism around happiness reduces the leader’s stress and negative emotion. However, merely living enabling such feelings by trusting subordinates in a particular way can produce short-term feelings of happiness and confidence that have negative outcomes later, as the case with President Bush demonstrates.

Love balances the need for connection with other human beings with the need to trust subordinates so that shared goals will occur. Feelings of love differ in quality, depending upon whether or not the love object is a friend, lover, or parent, but intrapersonal trust based on love always stems from a leader’s most personal concerns. A father wishes to believe his daughter can achieve his leadership goals for him; a lover wishes to fulfill her beloved’s desires; a friend wishes to ensure companionship. Each act of trust is motivated by the desire to connect with one’s subordinates on a more personal level.
Sorrow moves a leader to focus on his personal concerns and look to subordinates to ensure shared goals. A leader experiencing the sadness of loss is motivated by the impulse to remove himself from the source of that loss, particularly if the trust event caused that loss. Practical instances in which leaders experience such loss and withdrawal are particularly relevant for massive organizational failures, such as the bankruptcy of Swiss flagship company, Swissair, or the historic $700 billion bailout for American financial firms in fall 2008.

Disgust motivates intrapersonal trust when a source of moral or physical repugnance prevents a truster from ensuring shared goals and therefore is generally also the object of her mistrust. Her first response is to entrust a subordinate with the task of ridding her of the object of her disgust. If she is disgusted with herself, an act of trust might be to hand the leadership of the shared goal over to her subordinate; but if her subordinate is the object of disgust, she trusts someone else to remove the subordinate’s influence over the shared goal.

Each basic emotion gives intrapersonal trust a different experiential quality by changing the path a leader’s appraisal process takes. Accordingly, these behavioral differences also indicate that a leader’s affective information also tells how to make trust decisions to ensure shared goals.

This study has demonstrated that, as with trust, the experience of leading others is fundamentally defined by a leader’s internal experiences. These experiences influence the emotions a leader feels and therefore to a least some extent also how she leads others, in this instance when leadership entails trusting subordinates.

The dilemmas, strengths, frailties, convictions, and fickleness each leader experiences present an intriguing contradiction with regard to a leader’s management of emotions. Proponents of leadership as the business of managing emotions have argued that leaders must manage the mood of their organizations. The panacea proposed for the overwhelming predominance of negative emotion at work is thus emotionally intelligent leadership, e.g., in the form of “constant, positive, emotional uplifts” (Dasborough, 2006, 176), that has a positive influence on follower emotions.

However, the ideas in this thesis indicate that perhaps leaders should not necessarily always attempt to live up to this very standard of constantly making employees feel good. Indeed, the desire to lead by such a norm can condition a leader to attend to his environment at the expense of his own internal needs (cf. Lazarus, 1991a). As Grandey (2003) notes, just being able to manipulate the feelings of others may denote profound aptitude in emotion management and leadership, but is often done without an awareness of the impact to oneself that can all too quickly drain the leader’s own emotional reserves. Leaders who ignore their own emotional needs by “surface-acting” to ensure particular behavior in followers tend to underestimate themselves and experience fewer positive emotions (Beal, Trougakos, Weiss, & Green, 2005, 1053).
Leading others revolves at least in part around being able to translate the internal experience of affective processes to the environment. These processes do give leaders influence over subordinates, who react at emotional levels to their personal experience of a leader. However, emotional processes are bound up with the fundamental motivation to ensure and enhance personal well-being, a process that gets confused when leaders make use of their emotions deliberately to manage subordinates (Gross, 2007). Leaders are thus the source of much negative emotion at the workplace (Anderson & Thomson, 2004), sometimes because of the deliberate attempt to mobilize others. Leaders who are unable to distinguish where personal adaptiveness and well-being end and where shared goals begin, are not only likely to find giving followers and subordinates trust challenging, but also to realize in retrospect that they were largely governed by the desire to cope with a particular emotion at any cost rather than achieve a shared goal.

The significance of the ideas here is based on the observation that how a leader copes with an emotion depends greatly on the goal underlying it (Laux & Weber, 1991). So much of leadership requires reconciling personal expectations with environmental limitations on resources that intrapersonal trust lies at the heart of, and fundamentally motivates, a leader’s emotional experience.

True emotional balance has to happen internally and externally, if it is to sustain a healthy working environment and leadership that can process and use the power of emotion. A lot of research on positive affect assumes that more is better, but findings from appraisal theory indicate the opposite, namely that we need our negative emotions to protect our interests and stay away from harm – even if negative emotions are unpleasant, people need them to make sage and effective and adaptive trust decisions. This array of emotions allows leaders to manage themselves, but comes with challenges as well as support when it comes to making decisions. We can hardly expect leaders to manage others’/followers’ emotions effectively if they cannot manage their own (cf. Mayer & Salovey, 1990).

The ideas presented here suggest that an adaptive leader is able to reconcile contradictory personal differences and opposites generated by conflicting internal and personal goals using emotional information. This type of leader honors the power of her emotions but can separate emotions associated with leadership goals with emotions having predominantly to do with her own well-being and takes according responsibility for each. From a practical stance, she is therefore able to utilize her emotional experience to adapt her perspective and her experience of her environment (Grandey, 2000, 2003; Hochschild, 1983). She also does not try to reconcile her rationality and her emotional nature as two separate but equal social processes (cf. Chua, et al, 2008). Rather, she acknowledges – immediately or in retrospect – the ways in which her affective experiences inform her reasoning and her experience of her environment without compromising the value of how she reasons or solves problems. To quote Beal, et al (2005), “supervisors may not always require the heartfelt authenticity of a service employee’s emotional displays” (1062).
Appraisal

Finally, most appraisal research has focused on confirming the appraisal process as evidenced by quantified outcomes, e.g., by showing that people experience the same situation differently, depending upon the personal significance options for coping that they see in that situation at that point in time (e.g., Scherer & Ceschi, 2000). Scherer (1984) has proposed that appraisal occurs in a particular sequence, but the minority of appraisal research focuses on the process (but see Stein & Levine, 1999 for an exception), including how the different appraisal steps relate to, interact, and potentially overlap one another. In light of the many different aspects a trustor has to consider at once, I would expect empirical research using the intrapersonal trust framework to reveal whether the different elements of appraisal are indeed subject to a particular sequence.

Practical implications

The idea that appraisals influence emotions that in turn influence how people experience and give trust has a number of practical implications for the organizational context and for leaders in particular. First, intrapersonal trust has ramifications for a leader’s self-awareness and emotion management. Second, intrapersonal trust offers insight from the leader’s perspective into the impact of leader behavior on trustees and followers. Third, intrapersonal trust sheds light into the affective, instinctive feelings that move people to create organizational structures or institutions solely by trusting another party rather than by submitting to formal authority or power. Fourth, intrapersonal trust is also a reflection of interpersonal perception specifically from the trustor’s point of view.

The emotional motivations around intrapersonal trust relate directly to how leaders cultivate self-awareness and manage emotions. A basic finding in emotion and organizational research is that leaders make strategic use of emotional expression and their influence to motivate others toward achieving shared goals. However, such interpersonal emotion management probably requires that a leader be able to manage her own emotions in order to project a particular emotion externally for others to see (Williams, 2007, 607). Coping with the intensity of emotional experience is challenging because the desire to avoid unpleasant emotions and encourage positive emotions does not always entail the most constructive use of an emotion. For example, managers who delegate unpleasant tasks to subordinates are actually giving trust solely to circumvent the potential of a negative emotion without necessarily giving much thought to whether or not the task should be delegated or what the emotional effects will be to other followers as a result of having delegated it away. The affective goals behind emotion can also distract trusters to engage in an emotion too often and thus to eventually fall into a maladaptive behavioral rut of giving trust too little or too much. Such behavioral pathologies are associated with all of the basic emotions, even happiness and love (Power & Dalgleish, 2008).
The challenges and stress that generally comes to everyone with emotion management are often complicated by the leadership task of dealing with followers’ emotional issues because the means for managing one’s own and another’s emotions do not necessarily harmonize. In addition, chances are greater that a leader will be forced to deal more with negative than positive emotions at work (Laucken, 2001). Third, dealing with one’s emotional life is particularly important for a leader because leaders’ affective states impact followers’ emotions and performance (Ashkanasy & Daus, 2002). The practical aspects of leadership thus invariably converge around the tension between personal and professional desires and goals, and leaders must be able to negotiate that tension without abandoning themselves or projecting their personal longing onto followers. Thus the emotions preceding intrapersonal trust are particularly important for an individual’s ability to lead because they make a leader aware of which desires are motivating her leadership of others. Awareness of how one gives trust given a particular emotional backdrop can be used to fully utilize – or as necessary change – ingrained emotional habits.

The intersection between leadership and trust is particularly revealing of leaders’ internal experiences because so many leader decisions are based on trust in some form or another, e.g., delegation of management, resource distribution, hiring someone new. Acts of trust – and of course the intrapersonal experience of trust motivating them – can also entail social signals for followers to offer some kind of support, whether advice, time, friendship, or something else. Intrapersonal trust feels integral because everyone feels the need to send out such signals to fellow human beings. Leadership ideals dictate that a leader not use his influence to impose personal emotional agendas on followers; however sometimes the right answer is to entrust one’s emotion to a follower, if for no other reason than to get a second opinion about a problem and its potential outcomes.

In its most adaptive, constructive form, intrapersonal trust can also help leaders to cope with negative affect from stress, isolation, and exhaustion by sharing and communicating with others. Adaptive trust decisions may not feel unequivocally positive in the moment, but they feel right even when negative affect drives such decisions, and rightness lends conviction. From a leadership perspective, adaptive trust decisions also facilitate the achievement of shared goals, no matter how challenging they feel to a leader. Intrapersonal trust also helps leaders as trusters to be aware of how violations of trust have occurred and whether they are easily repairable. Reappraisals after a trust decision are also part of the intrapersonal trust process and help leaders to understand more fully when trust decisions were or were not adaptive.

The cases depicted in Chapter 4 also indicate that leaders as trusters set the interpretive standard against which followers’ responses to the trust decision are gauged and judged. First, followers orient their behavior and affect toward their leader’s affect and behavior (Lewis, 2008; Totterdell, 2000; Totterdell, et al, 1998; Anderson, et al, 2003), thereby generating behavioral and to some extent affective and interpretive norms within the groups.
they lead. Second, leaders’ personal concerns generate the expectations by which a leader assesses whether or not a subordinate has responded to the trust decision as expected and/or desired; so leaders’ intrapersonal trust experience plays a large role in defining how a leader judges a particular subordinate’s performance. Third, leaders establish group norms intentionally by managing followers’ emotions, e.g., by reinforcing certain behaviors through punishment and reward (Gross, 2007). Accordingly, leaders as trusters also indirectly set the legitimizing standard for the trust relationship and what an appropriate response from the trustee constitutes. Thus more than simply an indirect request to be understood and to behave as desired, trust when given by a leader also delimits how emotional expression will be expressed and dealt with by subordinates, to say nothing of tolerated by the leader.

Expectations generated through intrapersonal trust may thus move a leader to set standards for responsibility and accountability, sometimes without the leader even being aware of what she is doing. Depending on her self-concept, a leader may for example take credit for a subordinate’s success as a result of her decision to give that subordinate trust. Alternatively, the same leader might well determine that the act of trusting the subordinate is the subordinate’s fault rather than hers.

**What could come next: Current limitations and future development**

Having considered the theoretical and practical implications of the intrapersonal trust framework, I now discuss limitations and potential future development. First, the framework is still in its exploratory stages. Although many of the basic arguments and ideas offered here are extensions of appraisal and trust theory, more needs to be understood about rightness as a variable, particularly about how leaders as trusters experience it with regard to a trust event in a natural setting. In addition, more needs to be known about how a truster’s evaluation of her resources really does influence her experience of her environment. For example, how personal concerns, goals, ambitions, overlap with and contradict objectives, wants, and needs defined by the environment requires more clarification. Another potential area of research concerns the impact of emotion combinations, e.g., fear combined with anger, and secondary emotions rather than just basic emotions.

A potential step toward this end could be exploratory, qualitative research revolving around the person-environment exchanges that relate to leaders’ trust experiences, emotions, and decisions. Such an approach would allow a more contextualized depiction of the truster’s interpretation of his interaction with his environment. This type of approach would also shed light on the truster’s experience during each step of the appraisal process and on the subsequent impact of each basic emotion on the intrapersonal experience of trust. I would

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3 I emphasize natural setting here because experimental conditions do not evoke the same affective reactions as real-life environments. The truster generally knows that most types of experimental settings do not have great personal significance and the potential outcomes are often unknown. However, real-life situations are laden with unknown outcomes and real implications to one’s well-being.
expect such qualitative work to reveal whether a particular basic emotion or perhaps some combination of two of these emotions is most predominant in the emergence of intrapersonal trust.

Another limitation of the intrapersonal trust framework is that it currently revolves around observing short-term emotional reactions and does not account for the longer-lasting effects of mood. The short-term focus on integral emotions relating directly to a trust event (Pham, 2007) was chosen for specific reasons, despite its limitations. First, decisions and evaluations based integral emotional reactions tend to be more focused on immediate affective benefits and harm than on delayed consequences (Loewenstein, 1996). Accordingly, I believe the effects of basic emotions generated through appraisals around a trust event would move trusters to give more vivid accounts of the trust experience and to give more visible acts of trust. I would expect considering both emotions in combination with mood to considerably complicate the direct impact of affect on intrapersonal trust. Therefore, a better understanding of whether or not the short-term effects of each basic emotion do indeed impact a truster’s intrapersonal experience and decisions as proposed in this study is necessary first. However, in the longer term, the impact of mood and its combined impact with emotion would have to be integrated into the intrapersonal trust framework.

In addition, because this dissertation deals primarily with the emergence of intrapersonal trust, issues relating to the link between emotion and time have not been dealt with and offer much potential for future study. First of all, the effects of emotion on intrapersonal trust posited here indicate that interpersonal trust may not always move in a self-reinforcing cycle (e.g., Zand, 1972). Most work relationships – particularly long-lasting ones – experience emotional highs and lows as mistakes are made, lessons learned, and priorities reset. The increasing interest in research on rebuilding trust after trust violations has begun to explore just this type of affective movement and how it influences trust dyads (e.g., Schweitzer, Hershey, & Bradlow, 2006). Given the unique function of each emotion, the specific context around each trust event, and trusters’ natural inclination to try to predict and control their futures, it seems reasonable to think that such highs and lows in a trust relationship are not necessarily governed by a positive correlation between trust and positive affect over longer periods of time (cf. Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). Accordingly, the emotional reactions and affective patterns motivating intrapersonal trust could for example also move in an oscillating, epicyclical, or even arbitrary manner. The emotional impulses that move leaders, or any trusters, to trust can change with every reappraisal and new trust event, and the question is how such changes influence a leader’s decisions to trust subordinates.

A second consideration relating to time is that the past, present, and future each have a unique role in emotion management and can impact intrapersonal trust long before a trust event actually occurs. Past experience not just with a particular trustee, but more poignantly in a particular type of situation can shape expectations. Such expectations can, in turn, bias
the truster’s concerns and priorities and her emotion management. For example, she may anticipate difficult or unpleasant trust decisions and take measures in the hope of preemitting ever having to make a trust decision at all. How trusters intentionally seek out particular emotional experiences, even unpleasant ones, because they ensure the right motivation to achieve a goal is another intriguing consideration. A more precise consideration of how emotion management impacts the intrapersonal trust framework from start to finish is necessary.

As with past research on trust, I would expect past experience that has generated moods, learned behaviors, and past successes and failures to have an impact on how a truster interacts with the trust environment in relation to a trust event. For example, I would also expect emotion to influence a truster’s recollection of a past trust event (Shariot & Yonelinas, 2008). The present revolves around the goals, emotions, and environmental considerations that define how trust is given in the moment and has been a major focus of this dissertation, which assumes that trust is something that one experiences in the now with regard to a particular concern. Thoughts of the future shape expectations, but invariably become intertwined with reappraisals relating to the aftermath of a particular trust decision. An effective research design would thus address the passage of time around the trust event and ergo document the truster’s experience before, during, and after a trust decision.

Researching intrapersonal phenomena also requires some consideration of the potential bias qualitative data can have when collected only from one perspective. The isolated cases discussed here with respect to each basic emotion may well entail just that – individual exceptions to the rule for intrapersonal trust. The external validity of the links posited here between intrapersonal trust and a basic emotion may not generalize to other trust events. Ideally, qualitative data collected using media from the researcher’s perspective, such as video analysis, participant observation, or interviews, would be triangulated with data collected from at least the truster’s perspective, as well as possibly the trustee’s, third parties influencing the trust dyad, or uninvolved individuals observing the trust event from close by, e.g., using ESM as mentioned in Chapter 4. This multiple-perspective approach would also reduce the potential for bias in the data as a result of the interdependence of the truster and the trustee in a dyad.

Although the cases here took place in multiple cultures in several different countries, I have presented the intrapersonal trust framework without broaching the subject of culture. Past research on cross-cultural differences has demonstrated considerable discrepancies from one culture to the next regarding how individuals respond to their environment (Hofstede, 1980). How individuals lead and give trust have also been shown to differ between cultures. Accordingly, research exploring a leader’s experience of intrapersonal trust would have to account for potential differences in perspective, emotional expression, and internal experience as a result of a leader’s cultural background and that of other important individuals involved in the trust decision.
Additionally, I have discussed the basic emotions that appear to intuitively reflect the basic emotional landscape influencing intrapersonal trust. However, many such lists exist in the literature, indicating that how one cuts up the emotional pie is very much subject to interpretation. A different taxonomy emphasizing different basic classifications of emotions would emphasize much different affective experiences around intrapersonal trust. For example, Lazarus’ (1991a) includes hope as an ambivalent emotion with both positive and negative aspects. I have not included hope because it appears more akin to a method of coping with or managing one’s emotions than an actual emotion. However, given the optimistic skepticism (e.g., Deutsch, 1958) on which many exchange-based definitions of trust are based, hope could well reveal a great deal about the intrapersonal experience of trusters. Future studies should therefore explore such basic emotion taxonomies more exhaustively with respect to their impact on intrapersonal trust.

An important extension of this study would also be an investigation of moderators of intrapersonal trust. Personal variables could for example influence the platform from which appraisal starts. Such variables might include a leader’s self-concept, the implicit personality theories a leader projects onto a subordinate/trustee, or leader or subordinate emotional intelligence. Environmental variables could also exert an essentially constant influence on the truster’s outlook on trust events, such as the influence of a third-party, or a completely unexpected influence on the truster’s expectations, such as a crisis. An important moderating consideration with respect to leadership is the fact that most leaders are also subordinates. Such moderators could be as immediate to the truster as a third-party effect on the truster (Ferrin, Dirks, & Shah, 2006) or as removed as contagion effects within the trust environment. Many variables already studied at length in organizational research might come into question.

One would have to be cautious about interpreting findings about each moderator and heedful of whether or not they interrelate. It is possible, for example, that adaptive emotions in intrapersonal trust when studied empirically might bear a close relationship or likeness to emotional intelligence (EI). The self-awareness and self-management that come from accurately appraising and expressing one’s emotions are doubtless part of the EI concept (cf. Salovey & Mayer, 1990, 193). At present, however, this concept largely been researched in terms of hypothetical outcomes and quantifiable “scores” regarding an individual’s EI classifications, e.g., the emotion management section of the MSCEIT self-report survey (Mayer, 2006). The intrapersonal trust framework, on the other hand, focuses on the process leading up to particular outcomes because from a practical stance, self-awareness involves knowing how affective processes feel experientially, in real-life situations. My belief is that identifying how emotions generate expectations will provide a more precise understanding of the process that a truster goes through to use emotions adaptively. Indeed, understanding more about rightness, i.e., the moment at which making decisions based on their emotions, could also shed light on the processes behind the emergence of EI.
With time, I would expect the intrapersonal trust framework to indicate outcomes and behavioral responses resulting from the truster’s maladaptive use of his emotions. I would expect relationship dynamics between leader and subordinate, or truster and trustee, to come into focus, particularly with respect to the delayed effects of particular trust decisions. These questions also pertain to how adaptiveness emerges from maladaptiveness in a trust dyad, e.g., how trusters use their emotions effectively to rebuild a trust relationship. Understanding how past appraisals, emotions, trust decisions, and acts of trust relate to the present could extend current findings about the fragility of trust (Kramer, 1999). Specifically, how trusters use emotion to protect themselves from breaches of trust or reassess trust relationships after such a breach could provide many new insights from the perspective of the truster’s experience. Related issues might include how the behavioral responses of the truster engage or disengage the trustee to continue to participate in the trust dyad, the trustee’s intrapersonal experience of trust, and the interaction of intrapersonal and interpersonal trust experiences from the perspective of the truster and trustee.

**Conclusion**

A major ambition of this dissertation was to offer a theoretical framework that would help researchers explore and clarify the many different experiences trusters have prior to, during, and after the trust decision. Accordingly, this study offers propositions about the process mechanisms that generate intrapersonal trust, e.g., whether a truster experiences an event as good or bad and how a truster attributes accountability for the event. Such elements directly influence which emotion will develop and provide the interpretive framework for intrapersonal trust. I have postulated that a truster’s interpretation of agency will be reflected in and influenced by his evaluation of how a trust event influences his resources for ensuring the goal relating to the trust event.

Another objective was to provide a new means for understanding the relationship of leadership and trust, i.e., from the perspective of leader as truster. Therefore, I have posited that a leader will experience intrapersonal trust depending on how he associates personal well-being with the achievement of a shared, i.e., leadership, goal that has been highlighted – or caused – by the trust event. How leaders decide to give trust has immediate implications for leadership theories concerned with dyadic leader-subordinate relationships, e.g., leader-member exchange theory.

Taken together, the intrapersonal trust framework contributes new ideas to the study of trust and leadership by expanding our understanding of the role that emotions play on the emergence and personal experience of trust. Each emotion indirectly affects trust behavior by influencing the truster’s expectations relating to the trust decision. I believe that understanding more about these expectations will offer valuable theoretical and practical
insights into how trusters experience, negotiate, and adapt as a result of how they experience trust.
References


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